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Hello and good evening on day two of the chaos communication Camp 2023 Translated by {Yang}{Li} (ITKST56 course assignment at JYU.FI)]

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it's late in the evening this is meleeway stage in case you're wondering

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and the next talk is going to be about incident report responses

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so if you're curious about how to even get there to have an incident response how you could 
prepare for an incident response and how you could support a new organization

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uh, the incident response team in doing the job and trying to fix whatever broke

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let's put it that way um we have the right talk for you

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this is stories from the life of an incident from incident responders Harry and Chris

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please a very warm Round of Applause [Applause]

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so, good evening and thank you for joining us today um we will tell you a little bit of our

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life as incident responders and I'm Chris I did my computer science

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studies at the University of alang and Nuremberg I do this security stuff for

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over 10 years now so my CV is a little bit longer at the moment I'm a detection

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engineer before that I was a long time working in dfir so digital forensic incident

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response in different organizations and

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yeah I'm Harryr I studied electrical and computer engineering at RWTH

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University and I played a lot of CTF and did some hacking stuff at chaos computer club RWTH

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during my masters I worked at x41 dsac doing pen testing patch analysis

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so I also have some kind of offensive security background on for around one year now I'm working at G data Advanced

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analytics doing digital forensics and incident handling

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first Christian will give you a short introduction and then he will tell you how a classical ransomware attack looks

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like and in the second part of the talk I will tell you how the incident

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responders work and what you can do in advance to make it go as smooth as possible and support the incident

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response team so as Harryr told you I will probably

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we'll talk about ransomware because the customers we usually have are small and

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medium-sized businesses universities and hospitals and those are regularly

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unfortunately regularly hit by um um

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ransomware gangs the main reason for this and that's if you heard the last

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talk um why they maybe not that responsive

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and are not so interested in they just lack the resources so the manpower to do

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uh proper security measurements to secure their systems especially in in erm

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situations where you are for example in a hospital have medical devices

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um which where you cannot simply install an AV on or even patch the system

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because you lose the certification as a medical device then but also in in

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companies manufacturing companies on the shop floor we're talking about systems


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that have run times of 25 plus years so if you look back now 2023

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we're talking about XP and older systems fun fact I was in a ransomware case and

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Wannacry in 2017 when I got a call from from a person from the shop floor

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asking me if we have a nt4 expert, um

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that can tell us if WannaCry is affecting nt4 of course you don't need

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to be a expert for NT-4 this one requires of course not affecting nt4

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systems so due to the time uh slot we thought

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memes are the best way to to tell you those stories and we have a lot of them

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so in the first uh um section I tell you a little bit of how an attack Works

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um there are a lot of different possibilities how you can describe and how to structure the how an attack works

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there's the miter attack framework for example there was for example a talk Yesterday by Maker Salko

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um here on the stage there's the original cyber kill chain from from Lockheed Martin you have

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stuff from from companies like Mandy and their targeted the tech life cycle but

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that's all in my opinion two two fine-grained it's that's the reason I

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just take three simple steps yeah get a foothold in the door

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look move play around and cash out those three uh I will just go over

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so start with uh get a foot in the door so normally we

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see three ways how attackers can can get into the environment in the ransomware

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cases you have vulnerabilities in uh remote uh internet facing systems you

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have the remote Services itself and you have malware

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starting with the with the the vulnerabilities and um I just looked uh up the last four

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years and maybe somebody remembers netscaler the the so-called Citrix

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vulnerability in December 2019 um it was released mid of uh 2019 uh

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December 2019 the first POC publicly available POC was in beginning of

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January and the patch was available in middle of January so there was a round one week to one and a half weeks between

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a public proof of concept for the vulnerability and uh patch for the vulnerability and what we saw

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during 2020 a lot of companies patched but the patch didn't remove the the

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compromise so they were already compromised and um yeah with it with the patch they

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didn't remove the compromise so what we found what we could provable

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see or proof evidence for uh was nine

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month uh customer was breached after nine months using this this vulnerability

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and we had other customers where we could see that the netscaler was affected after two years but we couldn't

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prove that this this compromise was the reason for the actual ransomware case

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and of course such vulnerabilities happen not that often

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yeah so 2021 gave us uh hafnium exchange