(Korean) Hello, I am Jae Ho Chung.

Hi everyone, I'd like to start
by thanking the organizers

for this excellent venue,
for a very important discussion.

It is my great pleasure
to share with all of you

some of my thoughts
on the future of China.

I wish I could say the same thing
as what Kevin Rudd said,

"I'm here to help."

But somehow, predicting the future
is a very difficult task.

First, social scientists are not
very well equipped to predict the future,

as we've seen
in the collapse of the Soviet Union,

the financial crisis in East Asia,
and so on and so forth.

Another reason is that black swans
actually show up, so it's very difficult.

Particularly, when it comes down
to China, the future of China,

the challenge is much more daunting,

and I have to talk about it
in just 15 minutes.

So I'll try my best to give some answers.

These are the two cartoons that I adopted

from South China Morning Post
early this year.

As you can see,
in the cartoon on the right side,

Chinese officials are trying very hard

to maintain the growth rate
of 7% or higher.

And then, on the left side,
this cartoon says

there are three new think tanks
starting up in China.

And then the guy sitting at the desk says
we don't need any more think tanks,

we need "know" tanks
because they give me some answers.

I hope I can give you answers
by the end of this 15-minute presentation

but even if I cannot,
please bear with me.

Let me first introduce one book.

This book came out in 2006

from a publisher
called Rowman & Littlefield,

and this book grew out
of an international conference

that took place in 2004.

In this book, I put together
eight internationally renowned experts

to chart China's future
from what we had back in 2004.

In that book, we laid out
eight possible scenarios for future China.

If you look at the column on the left,
these are the three scenarios

that I'd like to take off
from the list at this point.

Although we considered
these three possibilities back in 2006,

but I think these three scenarios
are no longer plausible or applicable

to the future of China

from the vantage point
of 2015 which is now.

Yugoslavia doesn't exist anymore,
it's completely disintegrated;

you cannot find it on the map.

Now you can refer to Serbia,
Bosnia, Herzegovina, and so on.

It's gone.

So I don't think
this will be the future for China.

Indonesia, back in 2004, when we were
actually doing research for this book,

Indonesia was economically very backward,

politically it was not
a democratic system,

and it didn't really have

a very strong diplomatic
or strategic presence at all.

So we didn't think China's future
will go down the path of Indonesia,

so it's off the list as well.

Latin America: a lot of people
compare high Gini coefficient,

that means income inequalities,
in China to those of Latin America.

That might be true.

But Latin America's diplomatic
strategic presence is not felt.

Differently, China is now rising
and is making its imprints everywhere

so I think the Latin America model
is also off the list.

If you look at the column in the middle,
there are three models.

Indian model, back in 2004,
India's economy was not that great.

Of course it's doing a great job now.

But even so, India's presence,

particularly from the viewpoint
of Northeast Asia,

is not being felt very strongly.

Of course, there is still a possibility

that China's path might actually resemble
that of India in the future.

So there is a possibility
for these three models in the middle,

but not really high, I would say.

Soviet Union: as you all know
what happened to Soviet Union,

now it's Russia,
it's now still a semi-global power,

although its global reach
has been constricted considerably.

But there is still a possibility

that China might go down actually
the path of the Soviet Union,

but the possibility as I see it
is not that high.

Finally, the French model:
France is a global power,

but France cannot make
international rules and norms by itself.

But France actually makes its imprints

by vetoing what others are willing to do,
particularly the United States.

So it's a global veto power.

Will China resemble the path of France?

It remains to be seen.

So these three possibilities
in the middle column still remain,

but I'd say the likelihood
is not very great.

If you want me to bet, my bet
would be on the column on the right,

either the Chinese model
or the American model.

What does the Chinese model mean?

It means an authoritarian political system

with a highly competitive
market-based economic system.

China has been successful
in sustaining this particular model.

If China really should prove successful
in the future as well, and I think

that will have enormous implications
scholarly, as well as policy-wise.

The American model: that is market-based,
highly competitive, efficient system

as well as a politically
democratic system.

Will China eventually go down this path?

I don't know, but if you want me to bet,
among these eight models,

probably China will go down
either the Chinese model

or in the long run, the American model.

We'll see.

I think, down the road,
probably the easiest task

that China can accomplish
is economic development.

When will China overtake
the US in GDP terms?

Already my colleagues from China
have talked about it,

but I'd like to lay out
a couple of important predictions

made by "think" tanks not know-tanks.

Goldman Sachs provided two estimates.

In 2003, they said
that China would surpass

the United States in GDP terms by 2050.

And then six years later, in 2009,

Goldman Sachs revised
their figures, to 2027.

And then the Economist,
the magazine based in London,

gave out the prediction for 2019.

And Japan's Cabinet Research Office
came out with an estimate of 2025.

And China's own Academy of Sciences
came out with an estimate of 2019.

So what does this tell us?

I think this seems to suggest
that between 2019 and 2025,

China's GDP is very likely
to surpass that of the United States.

So I think accomplishing
the economic takeover

is probably the easiest and I think
it's going to happen very soon.

Maybe, at the latest, within 10 years,
the fastest, probably within 5 years.

Particularly given what my colleagues
from China and New Zealand

have said about One Belt One Road;

if that should prove successful,

I think it will give an enormous impetus
for China's economic development.

Don't forget that America's rise
was based in significant part

on the gold rush toward California

because it expanded
the spatial as well as the time dimension

for development, by 50 to 100 years.

So if that One Belt One Road initiative
should become successful,

then, I think, it would be
an enormous variable for China's future.

So economic dimension:

I think there is very little debate
on what China will become in 2025.

I think more debatable
is China's military power.

Let me introduce two books here.

The one on the left is
the Task Force Report

which came out in 2003

by the Council on Foreign Relations
in the United States.

And this Task Force Report was chaired
by Mr. Harold Brown,

the former Secretary of Defense.

And he put together more than 20 experts,
security and military experts in America

and the findings, the conclusion
of this Task Force Report

is that as of 2003,
the publication date of that report,

as of 2003, China's military power
was lagging behind the US by 20 years.

So if we take that conclusion
at face value, that means, by 2023,

China's military power
will most likely equal that of the US.

Now, let me introduce
the book on the right.

This is the book I edited,
and it will be forthcoming in two months,

in early October this year by Macmillan.

I put together
13 internationally renowned scholars;

among them three were military experts.

They contributed
three chapters to the book.

One on conventional military power,
a second on nuclear weapon power,

and a third one on cyber and space power.

They all agreed to one fact

that is, by 2025, China is not going to be
a match for the US on a global theater.

So globally, China is not going
to be a match for the US.

However, they added a footnote.

That is in the regional setting,
particularly East Asia,

China will be a peer competitor.

Particularly given
the technological leapfrogging

China has been making
in the last 10 years or so,

including
the anti-ship ballistic missiles,

supersonic weapons, and so forth;

I think this is real.

So, on the global setting,
China is no match even by 2025,

but the conclusion might be
quite different in regional settings.

So, economically, China
will be number one by 2025,

but militarily China will still be limited
to a regional competitor.

Globally, the US will still be
the hegemon.

Then I think we have to think

what will be the final game?

The final game will be basically
something about perception:

how the US will view China,
and how China will view the US.

And most importantly,
how the international community

and regional states
will view the United States and China.

In other words,
which of the two will be considered

as a more benign and friendly power.

I think that with perception,
competition will be very important.

Now, given the limited time,

I'll just focus on the perceptions
between the US and China.

These are the summary statistics
based upon PEW Global Research

between 2008 to2014.

And these are American perceptions
and Chinese perceptions of the future,

whether or not China
will surpass the United States.

If you look at the third column
from the left,

about 10% of both Americans
and Chinese think

that China already surpassed the US.

10% of the Americans and Chinese think
China already surpassed the United States.

That's not correct,
that is not the reality,

but people are already thinking
that China already surpassed the US.

If you look at the second column,
the percentage of Americans and Chinese

who think China will eventually surpass
the US is increasing by the year.

So if you look at 2014,
39% of Americans, nearly 40%,

and nearly 50% of Chinese are thinking

the so called power transition
is inevitable.

If you look at the fourth column,

the percentage of Americans
and Chinese who think

China will never surpass the US
is actually decreasing.

So what does this tell us?

Increasing number of Chinese
and Americans are thinking

that power transition is going to happen.

More importantly, the next slide,

these are the summary statistics
based upon Gallup polls in the US

between 2001 and 2014.

Which country constitutes
the biggest enemy in the eyes of America?

If you look at 2001, China was number two.

But since then, until 2011,
China never made top two.

It was always Iran, Iraq,
and North Korea.

But after 2010, the year when we all think

China began to make
some assertive diplomacy,

American perception of China
began to change.

So in 2011, China made it
to number two biggest enemy

in the minds of the Americans,
and in 2012, China remained number two,

but in 2014, China finally became
number one enemy of the US.

Of course, public perceptions change.

Public opinions are very fickle.

However, given the fact
that America is a democratic system,

public opinions do matter.

It may have an enormous influence
on policy making.

So this is not very good news.

However, probably that is why
our colleagues and Kevin Rudd

were talking about constructive realism.

Thus far I've talked only about China.

I haven't talked much about the US.

But I think, in order to talk
about the future of China,

we have to talk about the US.

Why? Because it's a game of relativity.

If China grows richer and stronger,
but the US stagnates here,

then power transition
would definitely take place.

But if China grows stronger and faster,
but the US also grows stronger and faster,

then power transition
is not likely to take place.

So this is a very important dynamics
that we have to bear in mind.

History has taught us a lesson

that the biggest enemy
of an empire or a hegemon

is not another country,
but actually it is self-complacency.

These are the quotations
I got from British politicians

in the late 19th century
and early 20th century.

Mr. Benjamin Disraeli was
Earl of Beaconsfield in the UK.

He made a speech in 1872.

1872 is a very significant year,
because it is the year

when the GDP of the US
has surpassed that of the UK.

And Earl Disraeli says,
"I express here my confident conviction

that there never was a moment
in our history

when the power of England was so great

and her resources
so vast and inexhaustible."

30 years later, Mr. Joseph Chamberlain,
a very renowned politician,

made another speech in 1903,
along the similar lines.

UK has never been more powerful,
never been stronger.

But we all know
what happened 40 years later.

In 1944,
the Bretton Woods System was created,

giving the US the status of a hegemon,

making the UK nearly irrelevant
in international relations.

So, I think what the US will do,
and what the US will be able to do,

in the 10 years and after would probably
shape the future of China as well.

Thanks for listening.

(Applause)