0:00:00.000,0:00:01.006


0:00:01.006,0:00:01.031
PROFESSOR: OK.

0:00:01.031,0:00:05.005
So the clicker question that[br]I want to ask you right now

0:00:05.005,0:00:07.058
is--ah, shoot!

0:00:07.058,0:00:08.054
This says polling closed.

0:00:08.054,0:00:09.056
Now polling open.

0:00:09.056,0:00:13.077
"Did you commit to turning[br]off the internet

0:00:13.077,0:00:15.066
completely?", press one.

0:00:15.066,0:00:18.016
"Did you commit to restricting[br]your internet usage in some

0:00:18.016,0:00:20.017
way?" That is, you're keeping[br]the internet on, but you're

0:00:20.017,0:00:23.445
promising not to check Facebook,[br]or play Angry Birds,

0:00:23.445,0:00:28.006
or go shopping at Zappos, or[br]whatever other indulgent thing

0:00:28.006,0:00:29.058
you do on the internet.

0:00:29.058,0:00:31.071
If that's your case,[br]press two.

0:00:31.071,0:00:35.036
"Did you put no restriction on[br]your in-class internet use,

0:00:35.036,0:00:38.042
but you're somebody with a[br]computer?" If so, press three.

0:00:38.042,0:00:41.013
Or is it kind of not applicable[br]to you, because

0:00:41.013,0:00:44.076
you're somebody who uses a[br]pencil and paper in class?

0:00:44.076,0:00:45.021
OK.

0:00:45.021,0:00:47.006
Now it's supposed to be the[br]case that the timer is

0:00:47.006,0:00:50.068
counting itself down, but no,[br]I've got to prattle for

0:00:50.068,0:00:52.001
twenty-eight seconds.

0:00:52.001,0:00:53.005
So here we go.

0:00:53.005,0:00:57.088
So this is a case--I read[br]through the papers for my

0:00:57.088,0:01:00.022
section, and my sense there--and[br]I don't know

0:01:00.022,0:01:02.087
whether it was a random[br]sample--is that about

0:01:02.087,0:01:05.037
two-thirds of the students[br]committed to totally turning

0:01:05.037,0:01:09.092
off the internet, and about a[br]quarter committed to sometimes

0:01:09.092,0:01:13.062
restriction, and a very small[br]percentage committed to no

0:01:13.062,0:01:15.034
restriction on internet use.

0:01:15.034,0:01:15.066
OK.

0:01:15.066,0:01:19.074
It should be the case in one[br]second that our slide--

0:01:19.074,0:01:20.039
yes.

0:01:20.039,0:01:20.071
OK.

0:01:20.071,0:01:26.084
So 43% of you, 43% of the[br]students in this room, made a

0:01:26.084,0:01:30.062
precommitment in the[br]form of a promise.

0:01:30.062,0:01:33.042
It became a precommitment[br]because you wrote it down.

0:01:33.042,0:01:35.062
Just thinking it didn't[br]make a precommitment.

0:01:35.062,0:01:40.016
But you took an action at a time[br]when you felt yourself to

0:01:40.016,0:01:45.106
be cool and calm and reasonable,[br]and made a

0:01:45.106,0:01:49.004
decision at that moment that[br]you took to be binding upon

0:01:49.004,0:01:51.023
yourself in the future.

0:01:51.023,0:01:56.029
And an additional 16% of you[br]didn't draw a bright line at

0:01:56.029,0:01:59.079
the turning off internet[br]completely, but attempted to

0:01:59.079,0:02:04.008
put in place some sort of[br]intermediate restriction.

0:02:04.008,0:02:10.002
Now my next question for you is[br]whether you have strayed.

0:02:10.002,0:02:10.096
Twenty seconds. "One.

0:02:10.096,0:02:12.037
Not even an itty bitty bit.

0:02:12.037,0:02:14.003
Not once." "Two.

0:02:14.003,0:02:16.013
Just once or twice." "Three.

0:02:16.013,0:02:21.637
Um, well, a few times, but I'm[br]trying." Or "four, yep, I've

0:02:21.637,0:02:29.034
been playing Sparkle HD Lite[br]on my iPad all class long."

0:02:29.034,0:02:32.006
And let's see how the[br]numbers came out.

0:02:32.006,0:02:32.094
OK.

0:02:32.094,0:02:36.006
So we should get--that didn't[br]show up automatically.

0:02:36.006,0:02:36.924
Aha.

0:02:36.924,0:02:40.027
So 56% of you--

0:02:40.027,0:02:41.016
excellent.

0:02:41.016,0:02:43.665
56% of you have not[br]strayed at all.

0:02:43.665,0:02:49.092
But notice that half of you have[br]found ourselves unable to

0:02:49.092,0:02:53.083
carry through with a commitment[br]that you made, and

0:02:53.083,0:02:57.076
that you provided some[br]enforcement for in the sense

0:02:57.076,0:03:02.063
that you internalized in your[br]conscience the idea that you

0:03:02.063,0:03:05.624
had made a commitment.

0:03:05.624,0:03:09.008
It turns out that for many[br]people, simply making a

0:03:09.008,0:03:15.086
commitment in their mind is[br]insufficient for them to stay

0:03:15.086,0:03:20.092
in this not even an itty[br]bitty bit category.

0:03:20.092,0:03:27.093
For those people, who end up[br]here or here or even here, it

0:03:27.093,0:03:29.088
turns out that putting some sort[br]of external constraints

0:03:29.088,0:03:32.013
in place are useful.

0:03:32.013,0:03:35.024
So the New York Times had[br]a piece last week about

0:03:35.024,0:03:40.678
something called Phone Condom,[br]whose slogan is "Zip it, lock

0:03:40.678,0:03:45.048
it, keep it in your pocket." And[br]the idea is that you take

0:03:45.048,0:03:49.047
your cell phone, and you put it[br]in this little Ziploc bag,

0:03:49.047,0:03:52.091
and while you're driving,[br]you are unable to

0:03:52.091,0:03:55.056
gain access to it.

0:03:55.056,0:03:58.044
One of the students in this[br]class--and you'll have access

0:03:58.044,0:04:01.093
to this on the slide--e-mailed[br]me a link to a computer

0:04:01.093,0:04:05.064
program which is basically a[br]computer condom, a "zip it,

0:04:05.064,0:04:08.047
lock it, keep it in your pocket"[br]for internet access.

0:04:08.047,0:04:12.385
It turns off access to[br]the internet for a

0:04:12.385,0:04:15.201
given period of time.

0:04:15.201,0:04:18.042
But for those of you who feel[br]like you want some sort of

0:04:18.042,0:04:22.083
external reinforcement, but[br]you're not prepared to make

0:04:22.083,0:04:27.005
use of the internet lockup, I[br]thought I'd provide something

0:04:27.005,0:04:32.069
which would help you stick to[br]your commitment by making use

0:04:32.069,0:04:37.032
of two things that we learned[br]about last week.

0:04:37.032,0:04:42.425
One is that when there are eyes[br]in front of you, you feel

0:04:42.425,0:04:45.076
the gaze of the world[br]upon you.

0:04:45.076,0:04:48.023
And the other is that when[br]there's a kind of social

0:04:48.023,0:04:53.041
reinforcement by peers, it's[br]easier to stick with a plan.

0:04:53.041,0:04:57.073
So not only because they are[br]left over from my older son's

0:04:57.073,0:05:03.004
bar mitzvah, I have for you[br]smiley face stickers, which

0:05:03.004,0:05:04.068
the TFs will hand out.

0:05:04.068,0:05:08.724
And if you would like, you are[br]free to put a red or orange

0:05:08.724,0:05:11.039
sticker on the corner of your[br]computer if you're committed

0:05:11.039,0:05:12.097
to no internet during class.

0:05:12.097,0:05:15.996
It'll be there to remind you[br]and to show your peers.

0:05:15.996,0:05:19.044
And a green or blue sticker on[br]your computer if you are

0:05:19.044,0:05:22.068
committed to restricted[br]internet during class.

0:05:22.068,0:05:25.084
To the TFs, there are 720 of[br]these stickers, so we're not

0:05:25.084,0:05:26.004
going to run out.

0:05:26.004,0:05:28.416
You can just hand out--

0:05:28.416,0:05:31.015
just hand them out, a little[br]piece of them, and people can

0:05:31.015,0:05:33.078
pass them around, and put[br]them there or not.

0:05:33.078,0:05:34.086
We're no worse off.

0:05:34.086,0:05:37.041
They were sitting on my desk[br]since the bar mitzvah, which

0:05:37.041,0:05:40.075
was in October, and I thought,[br]here, we can make four points

0:05:40.075,0:05:42.002
at once in a class.

0:05:42.002,0:05:44.068
In fact, we can make five.

0:05:44.068,0:05:49.004
Because the question of[br]self-regulation is, in fact,

0:05:49.004,0:05:53.049
the fundamental question that[br]we are addressing in the

0:05:53.049,0:05:57.006
context of the material that[br]we read for today.

0:05:57.006,0:06:01.002
So I want to apologize, because[br]today's lecture really

0:06:01.002,0:06:04.087
is, in lots of ways, dead[br]guys on Tuesday.

0:06:04.087,0:06:08.056
I'm going to go through, in some[br]detail, some arguments

0:06:08.056,0:06:11.018
from Plato, and then in[br]some detail, some

0:06:11.018,0:06:12.076
arguments from Aristotle.

0:06:12.076,0:06:16.081
But my hope is that by doing[br]so, I'll provide you with a

0:06:16.081,0:06:19.027
framework that will allow you,[br]when you go back to the

0:06:19.027,0:06:21.057
reading, perhaps in the context[br]of writing your

0:06:21.057,0:06:27.006
papers, to feel like those texts[br]have become accessible.

0:06:27.006,0:06:32.062
So famously, as you recall,[br]Plato had suggested that our

0:06:32.062,0:06:37.056
soul can be understood as[br]having three parts.

0:06:37.056,0:06:41.086
That we have a rational part,[br]which he represents sometimes

0:06:41.086,0:06:45.022
as a human being, sometimes[br]as a charioteer.

0:06:45.022,0:06:48.018
That we have one called the[br]spirited part, which he

0:06:48.018,0:06:51.002
represents sometimes as[br]a cooperative horse,

0:06:51.002,0:06:52.064
sometimes as a lion.

0:06:52.064,0:06:55.093
And that we have, in addition,[br]an appetitive part, which he

0:06:55.093,0:06:59.077
represents sometimes as a wild[br]horse, and sometimes as a

0:06:59.077,0:07:01.077
multiheaded beast.

0:07:01.077,0:07:08.068
Plato's suggestion is that a[br]certain kind of happiness is

0:07:08.068,0:07:13.039
available to us if we get[br]these parts into line.

0:07:13.039,0:07:17.048
He writes, "one is just who[br]does not allow the various

0:07:17.048,0:07:21.017
parts within him to meddle[br]with each other.

0:07:21.017,0:07:25.165
He regulates well what is his[br]own, and rules himself, puts

0:07:25.165,0:07:29.033
himself in order, and harmonizes[br]the three parts of

0:07:29.033,0:07:33.126
himself like three limiting[br]notes on a musical scale.

0:07:33.126,0:07:36.985
And from having been many[br]things"-- from having been as

0:07:36.985,0:07:41.007
you are, pulled in two[br]directions, pulled in the

0:07:41.007,0:07:44.004
direction of keeping the[br]internet off, and pulled in

0:07:44.004,0:07:47.098
the direction of checking[br]your Facebook page.

0:07:47.098,0:07:50.096
Pulled in the direction of going[br]to the library and doing

0:07:50.096,0:07:53.079
your homework, and pulled in the[br]direction of hanging out

0:07:53.079,0:07:56.018
your suite and talking[br]to your suitemate.

0:07:56.018,0:07:59.035
"From having been many[br]things"--pulled in the

0:07:59.035,0:08:02.087
direction of what reason tells[br]you to do, and pulled in the

0:08:02.087,0:08:06.065
direction of what spirit or[br]appetite tells you to do--"you

0:08:06.065,0:08:11.012
become entirely one, moderate[br]and harmonious."

0:08:11.012,0:08:16.074
So the Platonic ideal of the[br]well-structured soul is one

0:08:16.074,0:08:23.038
regulated by reason in which[br]spirit and appetite are

0:08:23.038,0:08:27.079
subjected to reason's[br]mandates.

0:08:27.079,0:08:30.002
Now, what I want to[br]give you now is

0:08:30.002,0:08:32.028
basically a thirty second--

0:08:32.028,0:08:34.041
well, five minute--

0:08:34.041,0:08:39.093
overview of the plot of Plato's[br]Republic in Books,

0:08:39.093,0:08:42.078
(sort of), II, III,[br]IV, and IX.

0:08:42.078,0:08:43.062
OK?

0:08:43.062,0:08:45.765
So the story goes as follows.

0:08:45.765,0:08:50.023
Plato is trying to tell us what[br]the human soul is like.

0:08:50.023,0:08:52.085
And in honor of the weather,[br]we'll represent the human

0:08:52.085,0:08:55.212
being like this.

0:08:55.212,0:08:58.071
And he points out, as I just[br]noted, that the human soul has

0:08:58.071,0:08:59.008
three parts.

0:08:59.008,0:09:04.012
It's got a rational part, it's[br]got a spirited in part, and

0:09:04.012,0:09:08.002
it's got a part that is full[br]of appetite, appetitive.

0:09:08.002,0:09:11.036
And you can see the human[br]being, the lion, and the

0:09:11.036,0:09:15.023
multiheaded beast, in Plato's[br]famous image there.

0:09:15.023,0:09:19.094
But in order to understand what[br]is good for the human

0:09:19.094,0:09:24.073
being, Socrates suggests, at the[br]end of the discussion in

0:09:24.073,0:09:29.345
book two, which we read for last[br]class, that the best way

0:09:29.345,0:09:33.054
to understand what it is that's[br]good for the tripartite

0:09:33.054,0:09:38.091
human being is to think about[br]what would be good for a city

0:09:38.091,0:09:41.007
that is structured[br]in the same way.

0:09:41.007,0:09:46.095
What societal structures can[br]help us understand things

0:09:46.095,0:09:49.666
about the internal structures[br]of human beings?

0:09:49.666,0:09:56.051
So he proposes the famous[br]city-state analogy, whereby

0:09:56.051,0:09:58.085
corresponding to the part of[br]the soul that he calls

0:09:58.085,0:10:07.003
appetite are citizens of the[br]city that he calls workers, or

0:10:07.003,0:10:12.009
people who do the day-to-day[br]work of the city, and who take

0:10:12.009,0:10:17.029
their joy and pleasure from the[br]pleasures of the body and

0:10:17.029,0:10:18.096
of the appetite.

0:10:18.096,0:10:26.003
There are soldiers, those who[br]defend the city and serve as

0:10:26.003,0:10:30.007
its defenders in military[br]context, that who are

0:10:30.007,0:10:32.074
motivated by honor.

0:10:32.074,0:10:39.048
And there are, in addition,[br]philosophers or guardians,

0:10:39.048,0:10:42.099
those who live the[br]life of the mind.

0:10:42.099,0:10:45.000
And you'll notice who[br]gets to end up at

0:10:45.000,0:10:47.844
the top in this story.

0:10:47.844,0:10:53.049
So the idea is that in order[br]to understand the four

0:10:53.049,0:10:59.024
cardinal virtues in the context[br]of the individual, we

0:10:59.024,0:11:04.525
will be helped by thinking about[br]where those virtues can

0:11:04.525,0:11:07.036
be found in the city.

0:11:07.036,0:11:11.051
And we can then map what it[br]is that we've learned from

0:11:11.051,0:11:14.045
looking at the problem[br]writ large in

0:11:14.045,0:11:16.006
the context of society.

0:11:16.006,0:11:20.082
We can map that onto what[br]would be the case in the

0:11:20.082,0:11:25.008
context of the problem writ[br]small, the individual.

0:11:25.008,0:11:30.028
So Plato's Socrates points out[br]that there are four cardinal

0:11:30.028,0:11:32.094
virtues, and you know these[br]from your reading.

0:11:32.094,0:11:35.085
The first of these is wisdom.

0:11:35.085,0:11:39.072
And the wisdom of the city and[br]of the individual is to be

0:11:39.072,0:11:43.007
found in its rational part.

0:11:43.007,0:11:43.034
OK.

0:11:43.034,0:11:44.059
Those should be--

0:11:44.059,0:11:50.054


0:11:50.054,0:11:53.062
There is courage.

0:11:53.062,0:11:57.005
And the courage of a city or[br]of an individual is to be

0:11:57.005,0:12:01.003
found in its spirited parts.

0:12:01.003,0:12:03.054
They're dancing.

0:12:03.054,0:12:07.004
And there are two virtues--the[br]distinction between which is

0:12:07.004,0:12:11.025
important in some contexts, but[br]not for ours--and those

0:12:11.025,0:12:14.071
are the virtues of moderation[br]and justice.

0:12:14.071,0:12:19.003
And the suggestion here is[br]that just as a city is

0:12:19.003,0:12:23.036
moderate and just when the[br]relations among the people in

0:12:23.036,0:12:28.043
it are proper, so, too, is an[br]individual moderate or just

0:12:28.043,0:12:32.006
when the relations among[br]its part are

0:12:32.006,0:12:34.072
appropriate and proper.

0:12:34.072,0:12:38.062
That is, moderation and justice[br]involve a certain kind

0:12:38.062,0:12:43.001
of harmony among the parts.

0:12:43.001,0:12:46.019
So that's the Platonic[br]picture.

0:12:46.019,0:12:51.093
And it turns out that this[br]is Plato's answer--

0:12:51.093,0:12:54.002
Plato's answer in the[br]voice of Socrates--

0:12:54.002,0:12:58.095
to the challenge that Glaucon[br]posed to us in

0:12:58.095,0:13:01.004
middle of book two.

0:13:01.004,0:13:04.062
You remember that we were given,[br]at the beginning of

0:13:04.062,0:13:08.097
book two, a three-way[br]distinction among goods.

0:13:08.097,0:13:11.072
We were told that there were[br]things that are valuable

0:13:11.072,0:13:15.023
intrinsically, in themselves.

0:13:15.023,0:13:18.062
There are things that are[br]valuable instrumentally, for

0:13:18.062,0:13:21.003
the goods that they provide[br]beyond themselves.

0:13:21.003,0:13:24.009
Those are things like money,[br]which have no intrinsic value,

0:13:24.009,0:13:27.066
but which have instrumental[br]worth.

0:13:27.066,0:13:29.098
And that there are things[br]that are valuable both

0:13:29.098,0:13:33.024
intrinsically and[br]instrumentally.

0:13:33.024,0:13:38.062
And you recall that Glaucon's[br]argument, first with the claim

0:13:38.062,0:13:42.205
that when we talk about justice,[br]we make claims for

0:13:42.205,0:13:46.087
its benefit in terms of the[br]goods that it provides in

0:13:46.087,0:13:48.015
reputation.

0:13:48.015,0:13:52.014
Second in his Ring of Gyges[br]story, where he argued that if

0:13:52.014,0:13:55.057
we can get away with acting[br]unjustly, we should do so.

0:13:55.057,0:13:59.001
And third, in the story of[br]what's called the statues

0:13:59.001,0:14:03.008
scrubbed, or the inverted[br]story, that even if you

0:14:03.008,0:14:08.006
weren't convinced by the Gyges[br]story, surely if justice

0:14:08.006,0:14:11.061
produced a bad reputation, and[br]injustice a good one, that you

0:14:11.061,0:14:14.004
would want to act unjustly.

0:14:14.004,0:14:19.033
So those three arguments are[br]Glaucon's arguments in favor

0:14:19.033,0:14:25.011
of justice being something with[br]only instrumental value.

0:14:25.011,0:14:31.906
On his picture, justice is[br]something that is of utility

0:14:31.906,0:14:35.093
to us in a way that money[br]is of utility to us.

0:14:35.093,0:14:41.086
It can help us buy our way into[br]things that themselves

0:14:41.086,0:14:45.072
have intrinsic value.

0:14:45.072,0:14:49.027
Socrates' argument, by contrast,[br]is that justice is

0:14:49.027,0:14:53.002
something with both of these[br]characteristics.

0:14:53.002,0:14:56.036
No doubt it is of instrumental[br]utility.

0:14:56.036,0:14:59.085
He doesn't deny either Glaucon's[br]arguments or

0:14:59.085,0:15:03.079
Adeimantus's arguments about[br]the ways in which being

0:15:03.079,0:15:08.066
perceived as just can[br]be of use to us.

0:15:08.066,0:15:12.039
But in addition, he argues[br]that there is a certain

0:15:12.039,0:15:17.016
intrinsic worth associated[br]with having one's soul

0:15:17.016,0:15:21.016
structured in the way that[br]the just soul is.

0:15:21.016,0:15:24.072
Now, I want to point out to you,[br]to be fair to Glaucon and

0:15:24.072,0:15:28.032
Adeimantus, that there's[br]a bit of a cheat here.

0:15:28.032,0:15:31.049
Glaucon and Adeimantus[br]are working with an

0:15:31.049,0:15:34.088
under-theorized notion[br]of justice.

0:15:34.088,0:15:38.043
The picture that they have is[br]that justice is roughly acting

0:15:38.043,0:15:41.083
in conformity with the[br]regulations that society

0:15:41.083,0:15:45.022
imposes upon us as[br]considered to be

0:15:45.022,0:15:47.007
meritorious, loosely speaking.

0:15:47.007,0:15:50.097
Being just is roughly[br]doing what the laws

0:15:50.097,0:15:52.532
say you should do.

0:15:52.532,0:15:56.049
Socrates, by contrast, goes on[br]and gives us a much more

0:15:56.049,0:15:59.042
sophisticated account[br]of justice.

0:15:59.042,0:16:03.033
But if those two[br]characterizations are what

0:16:03.033,0:16:07.084
philosophers sometimes like to[br]call extensionally equivalent,

0:16:07.084,0:16:10.087
then Socrates isn't cheating.

0:16:10.087,0:16:13.944
What it is to be extensionally[br]equivalent, is that you pick

0:16:13.944,0:16:17.065
out the same set of actions[br]in the world.

0:16:17.065,0:16:21.039
So Socrates' claim is that[br]it's a law that you're

0:16:21.039,0:16:24.635
supposed to be honest and[br]not murder people.

0:16:24.635,0:16:27.049
But it's also the case that[br]somebody with a soul

0:16:27.049,0:16:31.009
structured in the way that he[br]has called "just" will not

0:16:31.009,0:16:34.039
steal, and not murder people.

0:16:34.039,0:16:39.084
It's a norm of justice that one[br]will have piety towards

0:16:39.084,0:16:40.845
one's parents.

0:16:40.845,0:16:43.952
A norm of justice in the[br]conventional sense.

0:16:43.952,0:16:47.365
So, too, says Socrates, is it a[br]norm of justice in the sense

0:16:47.365,0:16:49.061
that he's characterized[br]that you will have

0:16:49.061,0:16:51.059
piety for one's parents.

0:16:51.059,0:16:53.051
And so on.

0:16:53.051,0:16:58.072
So the picture is that the[br]notion, the more filled-out

0:16:58.072,0:17:02.039
notion of justice that Socrates[br]has provided us with,

0:17:02.039,0:17:05.094
accords well enough with the[br]notion of justice that Glaucon

0:17:05.094,0:17:10.058
and Adeimantus were interested[br]in to make this not cheating.

0:17:10.058,0:17:15.052
And that allows Socrates to make[br]two kinds of arguments in

0:17:15.052,0:17:19.029
favor of the intrinsic[br]values of justice.

0:17:19.029,0:17:24.003
The first comes at the end of[br]book four, where he argues

0:17:24.003,0:17:28.023
that justice is a[br]kind of health.

0:17:28.023,0:17:33.055
Roughly, justice is to the soul[br]as health is to the body.

0:17:33.055,0:17:37.007
A healthy body is one whose[br]parts are doing what their

0:17:37.007,0:17:39.032
parts are supposed to do.

0:17:39.032,0:17:42.081
Your body is healthy if your[br]heart is pumping blood at the

0:17:42.081,0:17:46.042
right sort of pace, so that[br]your brain is getting the

0:17:46.042,0:17:48.095
amount of oxygen that it needs,[br]and your fingertips are

0:17:48.095,0:17:53.077
getting the amount of blood[br]that they need, and so on.

0:17:53.077,0:17:59.061
So just as health is of both[br]intrinsic and instrumental

0:17:59.061,0:18:06.175
value to us in the body, so, too[br]is justice, which is the

0:18:06.175,0:18:11.012
health of the soul, of both[br]intrinsic and instrumental

0:18:11.012,0:18:17.075
value to us as spiritual in[br]addition to physical beings.

0:18:17.075,0:18:22.051
We're spiritual here in[br]a very modest sense.

0:18:22.051,0:18:23.079
So that's the first argument.

0:18:23.079,0:18:29.023
The first argument is an idea[br]that presupposes that there's

0:18:29.023,0:18:32.008
a way that it's good[br]for people to work.

0:18:32.008,0:18:34.074
And we'll revisit this[br]in the context of our

0:18:34.074,0:18:36.064
discussion of Aristotle.

0:18:36.064,0:18:39.015
So there's a way that your body[br]is supposed to work: The

0:18:39.015,0:18:41.006
heart is supposed to do this,[br]the lungs are supposed to do

0:18:41.006,0:18:43.000
this, you knees are supposed[br]to do this, your ears are

0:18:43.000,0:18:44.185
supposed to do that,[br]and so on.

0:18:44.185,0:18:47.001
And we have a picture of[br]what health amounts to.

0:18:47.001,0:18:51.024
So, too, says Plato, the[br]excavation project that he's

0:18:51.024,0:18:55.093
engaged in thinking about the[br]city-state analogy brings out

0:18:55.093,0:18:59.545
what it would be for a soul to[br]be healthy, and it turns out

0:18:59.545,0:19:05.007
that health for the soul is to[br]be arranged in the way that

0:19:05.007,0:19:06.095
justice mandates.

0:19:06.095,0:19:09.023
So that's the first argument[br]that he offers.

0:19:09.023,0:19:12.791
It's an argument through[br]something that Glaucon and

0:19:12.791,0:19:16.009
Adeimantus have conceded to[br]have intrinsic as well as

0:19:16.009,0:19:21.004
instrumental utility, and a[br]claim that once you understand

0:19:21.004,0:19:25.063
what justice is, you can see the[br]direct analogy between the

0:19:25.063,0:19:29.021
soul and justice and the[br]body and health.

0:19:29.021,0:19:33.082
The second pair of arguments[br]occurs in book nine, and

0:19:33.082,0:19:37.915
concern the question[br]of happiness.

0:19:37.915,0:19:41.079
The first argument there is an[br]argument that we'll actually

0:19:41.079,0:19:44.084
hear again when we read John[br]Stuart Mill at the beginning

0:19:44.084,0:19:47.778
of our utilitarianism section.

0:19:47.778,0:19:51.013
And that's an argument which[br]runs as follows.

0:19:51.013,0:19:54.032
The person who has developed[br]the capacity for

0:19:54.032,0:19:59.075
self-regulation, the self-ruler,[br]has along the way,

0:19:59.075,0:20:06.055
because of the kinds of beings[br]we are, also experienced all

0:20:06.055,0:20:10.004
of the other kinds[br]of pleasure.

0:20:10.004,0:20:13.018
In some ways, this is like[br]the Freudian story.

0:20:13.018,0:20:16.047
We start off as a bundle of[br]desires, and we take the

0:20:16.047,0:20:19.022
things that we want, without[br]consideration of their

0:20:19.022,0:20:21.058
long-term consequences for us.

0:20:21.058,0:20:27.008
And over time, we come and get[br]that unregulated bundle of

0:20:27.008,0:20:30.235
needs into a certain[br]kind of order.

0:20:30.235,0:20:34.082
We regulate it first by means[br]of praise and blame, roughly

0:20:34.082,0:20:38.023
making use of the honor part[br]of ourselves, and then we

0:20:38.023,0:20:40.052
regulate it by means[br]of reflection and

0:20:40.052,0:20:42.029
self-understanding.

0:20:42.029,0:20:46.043
So the person who has gotten[br]their soul into a harmonious

0:20:46.043,0:20:51.881
state is in a subjectively[br]excellent position, because he

0:20:51.881,0:20:56.009
or she has experienced all of[br]the pleasures that the person

0:20:56.009,0:21:02.028
who doesn't do self-regulation[br]has experienced, and in

0:21:02.028,0:21:05.086
addition, has experienced the[br]kinds of pleasures that are

0:21:05.086,0:21:09.072
available to us only if our[br]soul is well-ordered.

0:21:09.072,0:21:14.032
So all of us have experienced[br]the pleasure of checking

0:21:14.032,0:21:19.001
Facebook and playing Tetris.

0:21:19.001,0:21:23.034
But only some of us have[br]experienced the pleasure of

0:21:23.034,0:21:27.001
turning off our Internet during[br]class, and leaving it

0:21:27.001,0:21:30.009
off and listening to[br]what it is that's

0:21:30.009,0:21:32.093
being said by our professor.

0:21:32.093,0:21:36.004
And those of us who have had[br]the great pleasure of doing

0:21:36.004,0:21:43.082
the second, says Plato, have[br]recognized that that pleasure

0:21:43.082,0:21:47.019
is a greater form of[br]pleasure than the

0:21:47.019,0:21:50.036
pleasure of Angry Birds.

0:21:50.036,0:21:53.004
I'll leave it to those of you[br]who have experienced both to

0:21:53.004,0:21:55.276
assess that argument.

0:21:55.276,0:21:57.065
That's the first argument that[br]he makes in book nine.

0:21:57.065,0:22:00.005
The second argument is actually[br]a very interesting

0:22:00.005,0:22:03.087
argument, and one for which[br]full understanding would

0:22:03.087,0:22:06.088
require my going through the[br]allegory of the cave, which

0:22:06.088,0:22:08.056
I'm not going to do right now.

0:22:08.056,0:22:13.035
But suffice to say that it is[br]part of the Republic, and part

0:22:13.035,0:22:17.019
of Plato's philosophy in[br]general, to say that the kinds

0:22:17.019,0:22:20.092
of earthly pleasures that we[br]experience in interacting with

0:22:20.092,0:22:23.336
objects are, in fact, a certain

0:22:23.336,0:22:25.054
kind of unreal pleasure.

0:22:25.054,0:22:30.027
They aren't interacting with[br]that which is most real.

0:22:30.027,0:22:34.062
What is most real, says Plato,[br]are not the approximations of

0:22:34.062,0:22:38.034
circles that we encounter when[br]we use the PowerPoint Draw

0:22:38.034,0:22:41.017
program to make the snowman[br]in the slide.

0:22:41.017,0:22:46.026
They are the mathematical[br]ideals of circles.

0:22:46.026,0:22:54.001
The true nature of wisdom, for[br]example, is not the wisdom

0:22:54.001,0:22:56.059
that we encounter in the[br]individuals around us, so

0:22:56.059,0:23:01.003
that's wonderful, but rather the[br]form of wisdom, of which

0:23:01.003,0:23:05.037
all of these instances[br]are simply imitation.

0:23:05.037,0:23:09.066
So, too, with every other[br]pleasure that we have. So

0:23:09.066,0:23:14.016
there's the earthly pleasures,[br]and then there's a domain of

0:23:14.016,0:23:17.065
things with which we[br]interact which lies

0:23:17.065,0:23:21.009
beyond the earthly realm.

0:23:21.009,0:23:25.005
I spend a lot of times watching[br]children's movies,

0:23:25.005,0:23:26.098
being the parent[br]of two of them.

0:23:26.098,0:23:30.064
And among the movies that I've[br]seen recently with my younger

0:23:30.064,0:23:33.012
child is Narnia.

0:23:33.012,0:23:35.051
And among the movies that I've[br]seen recently with my older

0:23:35.051,0:23:37.065
child is Infection.

0:23:37.065,0:23:41.057
And we've also watched The[br]Matrix, and we've also watched

0:23:41.057,0:23:43.027
The Truman Show.

0:23:43.027,0:23:49.074
All of these are movies that[br]make Plato's point.

0:23:49.074,0:23:55.003
The gambit in each of these[br]films is that the reality

0:23:55.003,0:24:00.086
which you take to be genuine[br]and most profound--

0:24:00.086,0:24:04.077
this earthly realm, in the case[br]of Narnia, the experience

0:24:04.077,0:24:07.093
that you're having right now, in[br]the case of The Matrix, and

0:24:07.093,0:24:13.083
so on, is, in fact, but a shadow[br]of that which truly

0:24:13.083,0:24:16.794
lies beyond.

0:24:16.794,0:24:22.066
And this theme is, in fact, a[br]central theme of almost every

0:24:22.066,0:24:25.004
religious tradition.

0:24:25.004,0:24:28.053
That the domain of the secular,[br]the domain of the

0:24:28.053,0:24:32.555
mundane, the domain of the[br]worldly, is in some sense

0:24:32.555,0:24:36.014
unreal, and there is, in[br]addition, a domain of the

0:24:36.014,0:24:41.016
beyond, interaction with which[br]provides a kind of good that

0:24:41.016,0:24:46.071
is so immeasurably better than[br]the good of interacting with

0:24:46.071,0:24:50.059
the world, that there's almost[br]no comparison between them.

0:24:50.059,0:24:56.009
And Plato's Socrates, when he[br]says, the person with the

0:24:56.009,0:25:01.069
well-regulated soul spends his[br]or her time contemplating the

0:25:01.069,0:25:06.000
form is making exactly the same[br]kind of claim that, for

0:25:06.000,0:25:11.002
example, a religious Christian[br]would make in saying that in

0:25:11.002,0:25:16.005
giving up the earthly good and[br]focusing instead on what is

0:25:16.005,0:25:22.023
spiritually valuable, one gains[br]a kind of possibility

0:25:22.023,0:25:26.057
for flourishing that is[br]incomparable to that which you

0:25:26.057,0:25:29.012
can get in the earthly domain.

0:25:29.012,0:25:34.094
So the second argument around[br]happiness claims not merely

0:25:34.094,0:25:37.009
that the person with the[br]well-regulated soul has

0:25:37.009,0:25:42.043
experienced all the pleasures[br]and felt subjectively that

0:25:42.043,0:25:46.071
this one is the best,[br]but, in fact, that

0:25:46.071,0:25:49.075
that person is correct.

0:25:49.075,0:25:53.059
That the greatest form of[br]pleasures comes from the

0:25:53.059,0:25:58.091
well-regulated soul that spends[br]its time interacting

0:25:58.091,0:26:04.052
not with the mundane and[br]earthly, but with the ideas of

0:26:04.052,0:26:06.009
the beyond.

0:26:06.009,0:26:08.093
Now, final quote.

0:26:08.093,0:26:11.063


0:26:11.063,0:26:15.055
One of the ways of bringing home[br]the point that Socrates

0:26:15.055,0:26:20.014
has made is by means[br]of vivid imagery.

0:26:20.014,0:26:23.001
We'll find throughout, in[br]every single one of the

0:26:23.001,0:26:26.064
authors that we read, that[br]they are trying to make

0:26:26.064,0:26:30.032
arguments that appeal to the[br]various parts of your soul.

0:26:30.032,0:26:33.018
I just gave you a bunch of[br]arguments that ran through

0:26:33.018,0:26:38.835
reason, and now we're going to[br]get an image that's supposed

0:26:38.835,0:26:44.075
to stick in your mind, the idea[br]for which Plato has just

0:26:44.075,0:26:46.882
provided argumentation.

0:26:46.882,0:26:48.037
Here's how the passage goes.

0:26:48.037,0:26:49.964
You read it for your[br]reading today.

0:26:49.964,0:26:54.048
"Can it profit anyone to acquire[br]gold unjustly if by

0:26:54.048,0:26:59.938
doing so, he enslaves the best[br]part of himself to the most

0:26:59.938,0:27:01.036
vicious?" Right?

0:27:01.036,0:27:04.008
So the top part of the[br]snowman to the

0:27:04.008,0:27:05.213
bottom part of the snowman.

0:27:05.213,0:27:07.027
And here's the analogy.

0:27:07.027,0:27:10.032
"If he got the gold by enslaving[br]his son or daughter

0:27:10.032,0:27:13.006
to savage or evil men, it[br]wouldn't profit him, no matter

0:27:13.006,0:27:15.754
how much gold he got." Right?

0:27:15.754,0:27:18.846
If I tell you, you can have all[br]the money in the world,

0:27:18.846,0:27:22.019
all you have to do is sell your[br]brother or sister into

0:27:22.019,0:27:25.087
slavery, I assume that that[br]trade-off wouldn't be

0:27:25.087,0:27:29.057
appealing to most of you, and[br]those of you to whom it would

0:27:29.057,0:27:33.685
be, there are actually courses[br]on peer relations over in the

0:27:33.685,0:27:35.002
psychology department.

0:27:35.002,0:27:37.948
"It wouldn't profit him, no[br]matter how much gold he got.

0:27:37.948,0:27:42.002
How, then, could he fail to be[br]wretched if he pitilessly

0:27:42.002,0:27:45.046
enslaves the most divine part[br]of himself to the most

0:27:45.046,0:27:47.003
polluted one?"

0:27:47.003,0:27:48.083
So the idea is this.

0:27:48.083,0:27:55.575
When you steal, when you murder,[br]when you act in ways

0:27:55.575,0:27:59.125
that let the lower part of your[br]soul do what the higher

0:27:59.125,0:28:04.028
part of your soul tells you[br]shouldn't, you're exactly like

0:28:04.028,0:28:09.036
the person who has these[br]ill-gotten gains.

0:28:09.036,0:28:14.001
Just as it's not a good way to[br]make money to sell your son or

0:28:14.001,0:28:18.045
daughter into slavery, so, too,[br]Socrates suggests, it's

0:28:18.045,0:28:23.047
not a good way to make money[br]to sell the higher part of

0:28:23.047,0:28:26.018
your soul into slavery.

0:28:26.018,0:28:32.041
To enslave it to your passions[br]and to your appetites.

0:28:32.041,0:28:38.035
Now, this idea that we can take[br]some of the common wisdom

0:28:38.035,0:28:43.071
about the nature of happiness,[br]but recognize that it captures

0:28:43.071,0:28:49.205
only part of the truth, is one[br]of the things, one of the many

0:28:49.205,0:28:54.011
things, that's going on in the[br]passages from Jonathan Haidt

0:28:54.011,0:28:57.003
that I had you read for today.

0:28:57.003,0:29:00.041
So we read two chapters[br]for today.

0:29:00.041,0:29:03.086
One was required, chapter[br]five, which was about

0:29:03.086,0:29:05.606
contemporary theories[br]of happiness.

0:29:05.606,0:29:08.069
The second, which I recommend[br]to you was the

0:29:08.069,0:29:09.082
chapter about virtues.

0:29:09.082,0:29:12.005
I want to talk about the first[br]of those chapters, the

0:29:12.005,0:29:14.024
happiness chapter.

0:29:14.024,0:29:17.075
So we just heard that Plato[br]points out, or argues, or

0:29:17.075,0:29:22.032
contends, through this long[br]book, that human flourishing

0:29:22.032,0:29:26.049
comes not from material wealth[br]and physical goods, but rather

0:29:26.049,0:29:29.021
from something that it might[br]not occur to you was the

0:29:29.021,0:29:33.002
source of flourishing:[br]reflection and wisdom.

0:29:33.002,0:29:36.022
And the arguments that he makes[br]there make use of the

0:29:36.022,0:29:39.097
resources of the tradition[br]of which he's a part.

0:29:39.097,0:29:42.087
They're set in an ancient Greek[br]context, and they use

0:29:42.087,0:29:46.051
the argumentative tools[br]of philosophy.

0:29:46.051,0:29:52.075
In a similar way, the discussion[br]that Jonathan Haidt

0:29:52.075,0:29:58.009
provides in chapter five tries[br]to do this that is similar to

0:29:58.009,0:30:03.041
Plato, colon: It tries to show[br]that there's some truth in

0:30:03.041,0:30:06.044
common pictures of what[br]happiness amounts to, but that

0:30:06.044,0:30:09.004
they haven't gotten the[br]whole story right.

0:30:09.004,0:30:13.000
And it does so in part by using[br]the strategy which I

0:30:13.000,0:30:14.695
described to you earlier.

0:30:14.695,0:30:17.072
It takes what the common[br]picture looks like, it

0:30:17.072,0:30:21.013
provides a more profound[br]analysis of it, and it shows

0:30:21.013,0:30:24.674
that those pick out roughly[br]the same class of things.

0:30:24.674,0:30:30.049
And Haidt, in particular, in[br]that chapter, presents us with

0:30:30.049,0:30:35.002
two claims. The first[br]is one that he calls

0:30:35.002,0:30:37.078
the progress principle.

0:30:37.078,0:30:42.091
The discovery--for which there[br]seems to be pretty good both

0:30:42.091,0:30:47.000
behavioral and neuroscientific[br]evidence, both within the

0:30:47.000,0:30:50.645
domain of American culture and[br]cross-culturally--that most of

0:30:50.645,0:30:55.011
our pleasure comes not from[br]the achievement of a goal,

0:30:55.011,0:30:58.009
though there is some pleasure[br]that comes from that, but from

0:30:58.009,0:31:04.025
the process of achieving[br]that goal.

0:31:04.025,0:31:07.069
And the second--which hearkens[br]back to the material that we

0:31:07.069,0:31:11.086
read last week from Daniel[br]Kahneman, and the day before

0:31:11.086,0:31:16.073
that from Jonathan Evans--that[br]because we are more sensitive

0:31:16.073,0:31:23.082
to changes in good than to[br]absolute levels of good, more

0:31:23.082,0:31:28.088
of something doesn't always[br]make us happier.

0:31:28.088,0:31:36.006
More of something tends to make[br]us used to that something

0:31:36.006,0:31:41.023
and desirous of the change which[br]comes with having even

0:31:41.023,0:31:42.099
more of that.

0:31:42.099,0:31:46.093
The next slide is going to ask[br]you to have your clickers, so

0:31:46.093,0:31:47.099
if you can take them out,[br]we'll turn to them.

0:31:47.099,0:31:49.492
It's not an interesting[br]slide, I just ask you

0:31:49.492,0:31:51.006
to have your clickers.

0:31:51.006,0:31:53.026
So this gives rise to something[br]which is sometimes

0:31:53.026,0:31:54.097
called the hedonic treadmill.

0:31:54.097,0:32:00.003
The hedonic treadmill is the[br]idea that in order to maintain

0:32:00.003,0:32:04.145
the same amount of happiness,[br]if it's based on material

0:32:04.145,0:32:10.072
goods, requires us to run to[br]stay in the same place.

0:32:10.072,0:32:14.042
And the psychological principles[br]which underlie the

0:32:14.042,0:32:20.012
adaptation principle are exactly[br]the principles that

0:32:20.012,0:32:25.003
governed the cases that Kahneman[br]was describing.

0:32:25.003,0:32:29.009
That we are, as he showed in the[br]visual system, enormously

0:32:29.009,0:32:32.031
sensitive to contrast,[br]and extremely

0:32:32.031,0:32:35.062
bad at absolute judgment.

0:32:35.062,0:32:39.027
And we'll come back to that[br]principle when we read the

0:32:39.027,0:32:43.044
Cass Sunstein paper in the[br]section in ethics.

0:32:43.044,0:32:44.016
OK.

0:32:44.016,0:32:47.036
So my question, polling is open,[br]is "Are you ready to

0:32:47.036,0:32:50.088
move on?" Press one if: "Yes,[br]I can't wait for Aristotle."

0:32:50.088,0:32:53.042
Press two if: "No, you have[br]a question about Plato or

0:32:53.042,0:32:54.093
Haidt."

0:32:54.093,0:32:55.061
OK.

0:32:55.061,0:32:57.033
So this is just to like[br]re-engage you in case you

0:32:57.033,0:32:59.068
zoned out, because I've been[br]jabbering, and the clickers

0:32:59.068,0:33:00.895
are supposed to keep[br]you talking.

0:33:00.895,0:33:01.019
OK.

0:33:01.019,0:33:02.098
We have--

0:33:02.098,0:33:03.095
oh, shoot.

0:33:03.095,0:33:05.939
This clock was supposed to[br]start automatically; we

0:33:05.939,0:33:07.036
already have 118 of you.

0:33:07.036,0:33:07.098
OK.

0:33:07.098,0:33:09.003
So if you are somebody--

0:33:09.003,0:33:12.059
can we jump this, or not?

0:33:12.059,0:33:12.091
Oh!

0:33:12.091,0:33:14.023
That was worse.

0:33:14.023,0:33:14.078
OK.

0:33:14.078,0:33:15.009
I'm not going to touch this.

0:33:15.009,0:33:18.051
So if you are somebody who was[br]in category two, and you have

0:33:18.051,0:33:20.571
a question about Plato or Haidt[br]that you would like to

0:33:20.571,0:33:23.047
ask now, please do it before[br]we discover how

0:33:23.047,0:33:25.081
rare a being you are.

0:33:25.081,0:33:28.092
Or perhaps how common.

0:33:28.092,0:33:30.017
All right.

0:33:30.017,0:33:32.002


0:33:32.002,0:33:33.005
No questions?

0:33:33.005,0:33:34.453
Question.

0:33:34.453,0:33:37.077
STUDENT: [INAUDIBLE]

0:33:37.077,0:33:39.845
PROFESSOR: You don't really[br]understand extensional

0:33:39.845,0:33:40.017
equivalents.

0:33:40.017,0:33:40.076
Yes.

0:33:40.076,0:33:41.614
OK.

0:33:41.614,0:33:43.052
So that is a philosopher's[br]term.

0:33:43.052,0:33:45.036
Let's see how rare you[br]are, and then I'll--

0:33:45.036,0:33:46.562
ah, OK.

0:33:46.562,0:33:49.079
So though you are in the 9%, I[br]will nonetheless answer your

0:33:49.079,0:33:51.025
question for you.

0:33:51.025,0:33:57.832
So two characterizations are[br]extensionally equivalent if

0:33:57.832,0:34:01.009
they pick out the same set[br]of things in the world.

0:34:01.009,0:34:06.073
So if I say: I'm interested in[br]picking out all geometrical

0:34:06.073,0:34:12.037
figures that have four corners[br]that are equally spaced from

0:34:12.037,0:34:16.052
one another, and you say, I'm[br]interested in picking out all

0:34:16.052,0:34:21.006
geometrical figures that have[br]four sides that are of equal

0:34:21.006,0:34:25.465
length and at right angles to[br]one another, you're picking

0:34:25.465,0:34:29.082
out squares and I'm picking out[br]squares, even though we

0:34:29.082,0:34:33.008
gave different descriptions[br]of what we're picking out.

0:34:33.008,0:34:37.022
If I'm picking out all female[br]siblings, and you're picking

0:34:37.022,0:34:42.009
out all sisters, we're picking[br]out the same class of things,

0:34:42.009,0:34:45.057
even though we're using[br]different descriptions.

0:34:45.057,0:34:46.003
OK.

0:34:46.003,0:34:49.396
So it's a democracy.

0:34:49.396,0:34:52.014
Plato doesn't think that's the[br]best form of government, but

0:34:52.014,0:34:52.755
here we are.

0:34:52.755,0:34:54.098
We're going to move on.

0:34:54.098,0:34:55.097
All right.

0:34:55.097,0:34:57.056
Aristotle.

0:34:57.056,0:34:59.034
So at the very least, right,[br]you're taking a philosophy

0:34:59.034,0:35:02.085
class, you deserve to have this[br]picture explained to you.

0:35:02.085,0:35:06.111
Since you see it on every poster[br]on campus. "Come to the

0:35:06.111,0:35:08.026
writing center!" I don't know[br]why they put Plato and

0:35:08.026,0:35:10.845
Aristotle on the "Come to the[br]writing center," but I might

0:35:10.845,0:35:13.384
as well tell you what's going[br]on in this picture.

0:35:13.384,0:35:17.045
So this picture is a famous[br]painting by the great

0:35:17.045,0:35:18.078
Renaissance painter, Raphael.

0:35:18.078,0:35:20.575
It's called The School[br]of Athens.

0:35:20.575,0:35:23.037
Many of the figures within[br]the larger painting

0:35:23.037,0:35:24.093
represent his friends.

0:35:24.093,0:35:28.096
You can go and see this in the[br]Vatican, if you're interested.

0:35:28.096,0:35:32.097
In the center of that painting,[br]famously, are Plato,

0:35:32.097,0:35:35.058
standing right here,[br]and Aristotle,

0:35:35.058,0:35:36.093
standing right here.

0:35:36.093,0:35:40.081
Plato is holding in his hand,[br]you can almost read it, a book

0:35:40.081,0:35:45.007
called the Timaeus, which is a[br]book of cosmology, and he's

0:35:45.007,0:35:49.005
pointing upward, many say[br]because he's pointing to the

0:35:49.005,0:35:53.005
realm of the forms.

0:35:53.005,0:35:56.000
Aristotle, by contrast, is[br]holding in his hand the

0:35:56.000,0:35:57.094
Ethics, the book that we're[br]reading, right?

0:35:57.094,0:36:00.003
The Nicomachean Ethics,[br]there it is.

0:36:00.003,0:36:03.416
You have a book that's on[br]the wall of the Vatican.

0:36:03.416,0:36:04.002
That's so exciting.

0:36:04.002,0:36:07.477
You have a $6 paperback[br]copy, but still.

0:36:07.477,0:36:09.473
You have, in some[br]ways, the book.

0:36:09.473,0:36:13.089
And Aristotle's hand is here[br]for one of two reasons.

0:36:13.089,0:36:16.078
Either because he's pointing to[br]the earthly domain as part

0:36:16.078,0:36:21.202
of his denial of the Platonic[br]picture of forms, or because

0:36:21.202,0:36:24.094
he's talking about the doctrine[br]of the mean, about

0:36:24.094,0:36:27.043
which all of you know a great[br]deal, because it's what we

0:36:27.043,0:36:29.009
read for today.

0:36:29.009,0:36:29.049
OK.

0:36:29.049,0:36:33.087
So next time you see this[br]picture, at least you'll know

0:36:33.087,0:36:37.052
who these two characters are:[br]Plato and Aristotle.

0:36:37.052,0:36:41.034
Aristotle, as you know, was[br]a student of Plato's.

0:36:41.034,0:36:45.046
And the text that we read for[br]today is, to my mind, one of

0:36:45.046,0:36:49.026
the most profound works of[br]psychology written in the last

0:36:49.026,0:36:51.006
2500 years.

0:36:51.006,0:36:54.076
It is, however, miserably[br]difficult to read, in part

0:36:54.076,0:36:58.001
because, though Aristotle wrote[br]dialogues, most of those

0:36:58.001,0:37:01.001
dialogues were lost. And what[br]we have here are basically

0:37:01.001,0:37:02.059
Aristotle's lecture notes.

0:37:02.059,0:37:05.053
You notice that on one of the[br]pages he says, "and now we'll

0:37:05.053,0:37:07.473
go and look at the[br]chart." Right?

0:37:07.473,0:37:09.038
He had--like--some papyrus[br]version of

0:37:09.038,0:37:10.675
these PowerPoint slides.

0:37:10.675,0:37:12.906
I don't know if they were[br]animated with--like--people

0:37:12.906,0:37:14.154
who walked back and forth.

0:37:14.154,0:37:18.064
But what we have here are[br]notes of a kind that are

0:37:18.064,0:37:20.037
rather difficult to read.

0:37:20.037,0:37:24.017
So because this is, in many[br]ways, my favorite book in the

0:37:24.017,0:37:27.083
whole world, much of what's[br]going to go on in the next

0:37:27.083,0:37:30.165
slide is that I'm just going to[br]give you some quotes from

0:37:30.165,0:37:34.041
it, and tell you what's[br]going on in the text.

0:37:34.041,0:37:36.306
So this is Aristotle's Ethics.

0:37:36.306,0:37:38.379
If Plato is thirty seconds,[br]this is going to

0:37:38.379,0:37:39.762
take sixty or so.

0:37:39.762,0:37:43.054
Let me tell you what's[br]going on.

0:37:43.054,0:37:46.025
So the discussion that we read[br]starts at the beginning of

0:37:46.025,0:37:49.057
book one, with an argument[br]that's sometimes called, the

0:37:49.057,0:37:53.096
argument in favor of the summum[br]bonum --you don't have

0:37:53.096,0:37:56.004
to write it down, which is why[br]I didn't put it on the

0:37:56.004,0:37:59.066
slide--sometimes called[br]the highest good.

0:37:59.066,0:38:00.075
That which is pursued[br]for its own sake.

0:38:00.075,0:38:03.048
And the argument here is[br]basically what we might call a

0:38:03.048,0:38:05.076
regress argument.

0:38:05.076,0:38:08.025
It's like the intrinsic/[br]instrumental value argument

0:38:08.025,0:38:09.096
that we heard in Plato.

0:38:09.096,0:38:13.885
The idea is that every good,[br]that is, everything that you

0:38:13.885,0:38:17.073
seek, is pursued either for[br]itself, or for the sake of

0:38:17.073,0:38:18.079
something else.

0:38:18.079,0:38:21.457
And if it's pursued for the[br]sake of something else, it

0:38:21.457,0:38:24.073
must bottom out or talk up.

0:38:24.073,0:38:26.091
Summum bonum, the[br]highest good, it

0:38:26.091,0:38:29.069
must top up in something.

0:38:29.069,0:38:33.051
And so the inquiry that we[br]engage in when we do what

0:38:33.051,0:38:36.009
Aristotle calls political[br]science--which is not

0:38:36.009,0:38:39.026
political science like in the[br]Poli Sci department--it's

0:38:39.026,0:38:43.036
political science in the sense[br]of the study of human beings

0:38:43.036,0:38:46.051
as political, that is,[br]social animals.

0:38:46.051,0:38:51.007
So the study of ourselves as[br]socially embedded creatures is

0:38:51.007,0:38:55.009
the study of what is the highest[br]good for the human.

0:38:55.009,0:38:58.097
And the highest good for the[br]human being, says Aristotle,

0:38:58.097,0:39:04.001
is--both in the minds of the[br]common man, that is, both in

0:39:04.001,0:39:07.091
sort of what you would read in[br]the equivalent of the mass

0:39:07.091,0:39:12.053
media in ancient Greece,[br]and in the mind of the

0:39:12.053,0:39:17.073
educated--what was called[br]eudaemonia or flourishing,

0:39:17.073,0:39:19.095
sometimes translated[br]as happiness.

0:39:19.095,0:39:24.017
That's what everybody[br]is going for.

0:39:24.017,0:39:27.031
So that's the beginning of[br]the passages that we

0:39:27.031,0:39:28.136
read from book one.

0:39:28.136,0:39:29.083
There's the question,[br]what's the thing

0:39:29.083,0:39:30.069
that everybody's after?

0:39:30.069,0:39:33.756
And the answer is, everybody's[br]after the same thing.

0:39:33.756,0:39:37.007
They're after happiness,[br]flourishing, eudaimonia.

0:39:37.007,0:39:38.085
So the next question is this.

0:39:38.085,0:39:40.071
What sort of happiness?

0:39:40.071,0:39:45.564
What is it that we mean when we[br]set out to seek happiness?

0:39:45.564,0:39:48.064
And here Aristotle runs through[br]this inventory of

0:39:48.064,0:39:50.059
answers that have[br]been provided.

0:39:50.059,0:39:54.038
And you'll notice, good student[br]that he is of Plato's,

0:39:54.038,0:39:58.046
that this taxonomy here is going[br]to look pretty familiar.

0:39:58.046,0:40:02.013
If it's the pleasures of[br]gratification, that is, the

0:40:02.013,0:40:03.019
pleasures that Plato[br]would call the

0:40:03.019,0:40:04.038
pleasures of appetite?

0:40:04.038,0:40:07.082
"No," says Aristotle, and he[br]gives some reasons for that.

0:40:07.082,0:40:10.043
Is it the pleasures of honor,[br]what Plato would call the

0:40:10.043,0:40:11.072
pleasures of spirit?

0:40:11.072,0:40:15.042
"No," says Aristotle, and he[br]gives some reasons for it.

0:40:15.042,0:40:18.098
Is it, then, the pleasures of[br]reflection, the things which

0:40:18.098,0:40:20.031
come from reason?

0:40:20.031,0:40:22.045
"Yes!" Says Aristotle.

0:40:22.045,0:40:25.034
And now he goes on to give[br]some reasons for it.

0:40:25.034,0:40:28.087
But the reasons that he gives[br]for it look different from the

0:40:28.087,0:40:33.007
reasons that Plato gave. Because[br]Aristotle rejects

0:40:33.007,0:40:38.021
Plato's idea of the forms.[br]Aristotle is not looking to a

0:40:38.021,0:40:40.082
domain beyond to defend[br]his view.

0:40:40.082,0:40:44.007
He's looking to a domain within[br]to defend his view.

0:40:44.007,0:40:45.088
It's 11:17.

0:40:45.088,0:40:47.095
I'm going to do one more slide,[br]and then we'll finish

0:40:47.095,0:40:50.558
up with Aristotle[br]next lecture.

0:40:50.558,0:40:53.082
So the question is, if you can't[br]turn to the form as your

0:40:53.082,0:40:55.009
justification for reason--

0:40:55.009,0:40:57.013
remember, Plato has this[br]explanation: "Why

0:40:57.013,0:40:58.414
is reason so good?

0:40:58.414,0:41:01.001
It lets you connect to a domain[br]beyond yourselves."

0:41:01.001,0:41:03.012
Aristotle can't give[br]that answer.

0:41:03.012,0:41:05.038
What, then, makes[br]reason so good?

0:41:05.038,0:41:07.535
Well, here's the argument.

0:41:07.535,0:41:10.018
Every object in the world,[br]he says, has a function.

0:41:10.018,0:41:12.009
The function of a knife[br]is to cut well.

0:41:12.009,0:41:15.097
The function of a paperweight[br]is to hold down papers.

0:41:15.097,0:41:19.051
The function of a laser pointer[br]is to direct attention

0:41:19.051,0:41:20.993
towards the slide, and so on.

0:41:20.993,0:41:25.265
And a good one of those things[br]is one which does

0:41:25.265,0:41:29.005
its function well.

0:41:29.005,0:41:32.091
Its function is that which set[br]it apart from other entities.

0:41:32.091,0:41:36.089
So good paperweights are things[br]that are heavy, and bad

0:41:36.089,0:41:40.003
paperweights are things that are[br]light, or round, so that

0:41:40.003,0:41:41.066
they roll off.

0:41:41.066,0:41:44.039
Or invisible, so that[br]you can't find them.

0:41:44.039,0:41:47.205
Or too heavy to move, so that[br]you can't pick them up off

0:41:47.205,0:41:48.042
your paper.

0:41:48.042,0:41:52.049
So when something has a[br]function, a good version of

0:41:52.049,0:41:58.851
that thing has manifest in[br]itself that which allows that

0:41:58.851,0:42:02.063
object to perform its function[br]especially well.

0:42:02.063,0:42:04.091
Well, what's the function[br]of human beings?

0:42:04.091,0:42:07.094
Well, to answer that question,[br]we have to answer the question

0:42:07.094,0:42:10.026
what is special about[br]human beings?

0:42:10.026,0:42:13.022
What distinguishes us from[br]plants, which take in

0:42:13.022,0:42:15.099
nutrition, and from animals,[br]which are capable of

0:42:15.099,0:42:18.049
locomotion and feeling[br]sensation?

0:42:18.049,0:42:22.034
What distinguishes us from[br]those beings is reason.

0:42:22.034,0:42:26.004
So just as knives are great when[br]they cut well, humans are

0:42:26.004,0:42:29.056
great when they do that special[br]human thing especially

0:42:29.056,0:42:31.062
well when they reason well.

0:42:31.062,0:42:36.125
"Reason is," he writes at 1098,[br]"the special function of

0:42:36.125,0:42:39.037
a human being." What, then,[br]is the human good?

0:42:39.037,0:42:43.073
Well, the good for a knife[br]is to be most manifestly

0:42:43.073,0:42:45.007
knife-like, right?

0:42:45.007,0:42:48.034
I mean, all those magic swords[br]that you get in plays and

0:42:48.034,0:42:49.076
movies and books?

0:42:49.076,0:42:51.544
What makes them good swords?

0:42:51.544,0:42:54.033
That they're especially able to[br]slay your enemies, right?

0:42:54.033,0:42:56.068
That's why the swords[br]are good swords.

0:42:56.068,0:43:01.005
So what makes you the Sword of[br]Lancelot of human beings?

0:43:01.005,0:43:05.625
It's that your soul is[br]structured in such a way that

0:43:05.625,0:43:09.011
you do what is best and[br]most completely

0:43:09.011,0:43:11.004
and distinctly human.

0:43:11.004,0:43:14.073
The good human being is the one[br]that does the human stuff

0:43:14.073,0:43:18.073
best of all, and the human[br]stuff turns out to be

0:43:18.073,0:43:23.096
reasoning and acting in[br]accord with virtue.

0:43:23.096,0:43:27.022
So the question that we'll turn[br]to at the beginning of

0:43:27.022,0:43:28.055
next lecture--

0:43:28.055,0:43:31.011
and you're all in a position[br]to read the punchline, in

0:43:31.011,0:43:33.866
fact, you should have read[br]the punchline for today--

0:43:33.866,0:43:39.066
is what does the virtue look[br]like that makes us distinctly

0:43:39.066,0:43:43.067
and most excellently human,[br]and how is it cultivated?

0:43:43.067,0:43:48.002
So for Thursday, we[br]are reading three

0:43:48.002,0:43:51.016
really fantastic things.

0:43:51.016,0:43:54.055
We're reading selections from[br]The Iliad, and I've given you

0:43:54.055,0:43:56.095
two choices of ways[br]to do that.

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Pleas look at the[br]reading guide.

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You can either read all of book[br]one or you can look at

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the context of each of the[br]passages that Jonathan Shay

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gives us, and I've given you[br]instructions how to do that.

0:44:07.005,0:44:09.098
We're reading Jonathan Shay's[br]incredible book, Achilles in

0:44:09.098,0:44:13.012
Vietnam, and we're also reading[br]Stanley Milgram's

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famous 1963 "Behavioral Study[br]of Obedience" paper.

0:44:17.011,0:44:20.044
So we'll start with our[br]Aristotle, and then we'll move

0:44:20.044,0:44:24.001
on to our discussions[br]of those three.

0:44:24.001,9:59:59.000