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36C3 preroll music
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Herald: Next is Bijan. Bijan. Bijan, I [br]pronounce this. Pretty persian. Yeah. He's
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an attorney, ein Rechtsanwalt it is called in[br]deutsch, and he works for the Gesellschaft
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für Freiheitsrechte in Berlin. If I'm[br]right. Good. Give them a welcome.
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applause, please. It's early in the[br]morning. We're going to kick back here.
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applause
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Bijan: Early in the morning, only at the[br]Congress you can call 12:30 early in the
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morning, but it is. And, um, well, if[br]you've ever sat on a plane and wondered
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what the person three rows behind you is[br]eating, whether they flying alone, whether
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they have checked in their luggage or only[br]hand luggage and what visa they were using
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when they were buying their plane ticket,[br]then you're probably a police officer or
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should join the national police of any EU[br]member state, because that is exactly what
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the national polices in Germany and[br]Austria and other Europeans member states,
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Europe, member states of the European[br]Union, can do. Thanks to the PNR
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directive, which is the topic of today's[br]talk. And we are going to talk and explain
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to you what the PNR directive and the laws[br]transposing it into national law are all
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about, why this is problematic and what we[br]can do and what we are actually doing
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against it in order to stop it. And Walter[br]will start off with a few infos.
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Walter: Yeah. Hello. So firstly, I would[br]like to introduce into Epicenter Works,
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because we have already a history on[br]bringing down data retention laws. So
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probably you know us from our fight[br]against data retention in Europe when we
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still were called "AKA Vorrat Österreich".[br]I am working for Epicenter Works on a
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voluntary basis. And I would like to[br]mention my colleague Angelika Adensamer
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who did the main work on this for[br]Epicenter Works. But she cannot be at
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Congress this year. So, flight data. It is[br]said, I've heard that at any given point
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in time, one million people are on a plane[br]in the skies flying around the globe. As
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you can see here. And today, although in[br]times of resource exhaustion, we should
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talk about that anyway. I am convinced[br]today we are talking about the data
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protection issue about it. A big one. And[br]we are talking about passenger name
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records. So what is a passenger name[br]record, anyway? A passenger name record,
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as you can see here, is a data set[br]compiled of 19 different data fields. So
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you can get about up to 60 different data[br]points on one single passenger on one
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single flight. So, for instance, you have[br]data in there like the first and second
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name, address, but also other things,[br]metadata. More important things, like the
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means of payment you made, the point in[br]time when you booked the flight and things
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like that. And as a specific problem about[br]it is that there is also a free text field
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so airline employees can enter data there[br]and which we cannot control. And
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altogether we have a quite big data set of[br]each passenger on each flight. So this is
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common in the airline industry. But in[br]2016, the PNR directive came about. So
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what is the PNR directive? It is a piece[br]of European legislation , which was
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enacted in April 2016. And when we have[br]European legislation, it's important to
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mention that it doesn't come out of the[br]blue out of Brussels, but it is enacted
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together with from the commission, the[br]European Parliament and the council. And
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the council are the governments of our[br]member states. So we have to keep in mind
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that member states governments, have a[br]big say when things like this are enacted.
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And it is a directive. And that means that[br]every single member state has to transpose
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the content of the directive into its[br]national law. And this had to be done
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until the 25th May of 2018. This was the[br]the tenth transposition deadline. And for
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instance, Austria and Germany made laws to[br]transpose that into their national law. So
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what had they to enact? They had to enact[br]laws prescribing that all airlines have to
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transfer data of all passengers, all[br]passenger name records of every flight,
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and they have to be pushed to a national[br]police database. So unlike the telecom
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data retention I already mentioned, the[br]data is not kept where it where where it
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is created. But it has to be pushed from[br]the private sector, from the airlines, to
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police database, databases. And the data[br]retention directive prescribes that every
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flight leaving or entering the European[br]Union must be covered by that. But in
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addition, every single member state also[br]covered flights within the EU. So you have
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we have the full take now. Flights within[br]the EU as well as flights leaving or
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entering the EU. And every single record[br]of every single passenger of every single
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flight is in a police database and will be[br]compared with existing databases, for
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instance, of known criminals or of stolen[br]passports and the like. And they try to
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find matches there. And what they are also[br]going to do is matching with predetermined
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criteria. So they will come up with flight[br]patterns of known perpetrators, for
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instance, when they booked a flight and so[br]on. They will algorithmically try to find
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patterns there, and then they will compare[br]your flight passenger name records with
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that data. And if you have a similar[br]behavior, than a previous perpetrator,
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previous criminal, for instance, then[br]you're already under suspicion. And this
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data in these databases are stored for[br]five years and can be further used by
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different law enforcement agencies. So[br]that data is not only compared and then
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deleted again. The storage time is five[br]years and they do something called
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depersonalization about six months after[br]the data was created. But this is not in
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any way an anonymisation, but they just[br]remove some data and it can easily be
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identified again. So the person the data[br]belongs to can easily be identified for
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the whole period of five years. So you[br]probably asked yourself already: First, is
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this effective? Well, this runs already[br]since last year, so we have some data.
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First, I will present to you the data from[br]Austria. In Austria, we found out that
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already until the 30th of September, 2019,[br]almost 24 passenger name records where
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forwarded to the passenger name unit at[br]the Bundeskriminalamt and
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11 900 000 thousand different people[br]were subject to that. And of these, almost
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24 000 000 passenger name records, the[br]algorithms that checking against databases
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already brought up 190 000[br]matches. So every single match,
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every single output the algorithm has,[br]must be checked by a human employee. So we
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have sitting there people who have to[br]check. Even this is not even the data of a
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year. And they have to check[br]190 000 matches and only 280
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of them are actual hits. So if a person[br]checks what the algorithm outputs there,
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then only in 0.15% of the cases[br]the policewoman or policeman
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come to their conclusion: This is actually[br]relevant for us. And if you do the math,
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this means that only 0.001% percent of all[br]that 24 million passenger name data, your
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data which is checked, actually leads to a[br]hit. And we don't even know how many
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actual false positives remain in these[br]220. This is only what the police will
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inspect afterwards. So we have no numbers[br]or results if they had actual
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investigative results on that. But what we[br]can say is that there are 21 employees,
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qualified employees, working in the[br]passenger name, Passenger Information Unit,
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and this costs almost 2 million euros per[br]year and only for checking that data in
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the small country of Austria. And Bijan[br]now will present to you the data in German.
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Bijan: The number, the data of the big[br]neighbor, because you said small country
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Austria. In Germany the numbers are[br]surprisingly similar. We also had - have
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numbers up until mid of August 2019, and[br]we have had almost 32 million passenger
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name records checked, which generated[br]automatic results of matches of about
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240 000, which then were checked by 40[br]police officers and there remained only
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910 actual hits. So the fail rate was[br]99.6% and 0.003% all PNRs checked led to
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actual hits. And even of that number, just[br]as in Austria, we are not sure how many
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false positives remain. We know that there[br]were considerably a considerable amount of
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false positives. We estimate them to be in[br]the hundreds. But the law enforcement did
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not specify what actually, how many[br]supposed positives remained, even among
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the 910. And one of the results we know is[br]that it led to 57 arrests. We don't know
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for which crimes. We don't know whether[br]these people actually committed a crime,
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whether they were suspected for crime,[br]whether they were just on a watch list.
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But 57 arrests, assuming this is these[br]were legitimate, this means that 0.0002%
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of all PNRs checked led to an arrest. And[br]if you try to to transpose this to other
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situations in life, you could go to a to a[br]market, to to some, uh, to some festival
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or what not, and just ask randomly people,[br]and you would probably have with a similar
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probability, an arrest in the end at the[br]end of the day. So if this holds that this
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whole PNR processing holds is this[br]effectiveness is the standard that we are
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happy with, then you can easily take this[br]to all other sorts of walks of life. And
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this is true, in our opinion, a big[br]problem, because it will lead to a digital
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surveillance state, which is has come[br]quite near with these new tools that the
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PNR directive provide. What we've now just[br]shown are the the automatic is the checks
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against databases. That was the one thing[br]that the PNR directive provides for. The
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other one is the checking against[br]predetermined criteria. And this is where
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the voodoo kind of starts, because the[br]idea that you can merely from the data
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that is in the PNR, in your passenger name[br]record, derive whether you are suspicious,
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or dangerous even is, at least in our[br]opinion, pretty much voodoo, and it has
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serious consequences. And it might lead to[br]automatic profiling affecting hundreds of
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millions of people, possibly, because[br]everybody is checked when they and when
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they use a plane. Everybody PNR record is[br]checked against these automatic , against
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these predetermined criteria, and not just[br]for crimes such as terrorism or organized
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crime, where you could maybe make a case[br]that there exists such a thing as a
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pattern of movements where you can[br]identify a terrorist suspect, but it is
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also used for crimes such as fraud or[br]forgery or cyber crime where I would argue
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you cannot find the typical cyber[br]criminals flight pattern, flight patterns.
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It's just not possible. And so but but the[br]PNR directive itself is only the one
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thing. We are fighting this for reasons[br]that go way beyond the PNR processing so
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the processing of PNR flight data, because[br]it may set a dangerous precedent for other
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mass surveillance. Already now PNR[br]processing is being discussed for buses
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that cross borders, for ships and trains.[br]And there are some countries such as
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Belgium that have already enacted the very[br]much. And why stop there, might a police
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officer argue. Why not include rental cars[br]that cross borders? Why not at some point
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include private cars that cross borders?[br]Why not get away with that requirement of
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crossing borders? Why not have everybody[br]checked all the time, maybe via their
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mobile phones? So when we give way to this[br]sort of data processing with such a low
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threshold of effectiveness, we open the[br]door for all sorts of, um, of activity
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that at least from our point of view, is[br]illegal. And the question you were maybe
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asking yourself or maybe not. Is this[br]legal? We are convinced it is not. And
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luckily, we could rely on a legal opinion[br]that the European Court of Justice ECJ has
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rendered a two and a half years ago. There[br]is one PNR agreement in place between the
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EU and the USA, which has not been[br]challenged yet. And another agreement was
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supposed to be known or was negotiated[br]between the EU Commission and Canada, and
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the EU Parliament then presented the[br]question to the ECJ whether this agreement
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would be violating fundamental rights of[br]the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
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European Union. And the ECJ concluded that[br]it would, in the form that it was proposed
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to it, breach Article 7 and 8 of that[br]charter's. Article 7 as the right to
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privacy in Article 8 is the right to have[br]your data protected, your personal data
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protected. And we are, of course, relying[br]heavily on that, on the arguments that the
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court developed and developing them even[br]further, because; as you can imagine, the
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PNR, the agreement with Canada and the PNR[br]directive are quite similar. So what are
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these arguments that we are bringing up?[br]And we've shown already that the
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effectiveness is highly doubtful. And this[br]leads us to concluding that the PNR
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directive is disproportionate. So it[br]violates human fundamental rights. For
0:16:50.432,0:16:55.943
several reasons. One being a point that[br]we've both raised already that PNR
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processing indiscriminately affects all[br]passengers. And this is a very important
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point, because it makes it shows the[br]difference between PNR processing under
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the PNR directive and what was formerly[br]the the data retention of
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telecommunications data. Because the[br]latter would require a specific case,
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something must have had happened in order[br]for the law enforcement to ask for the
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telecommunications data of the[br]telecommunications provider. But our
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PNR data on flights is checked all the[br]time, always, against databases, and even
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more importantly, the predetermined[br]criteria, which we, of course, do not know
0:17:36.669,0:17:41.600
nothing about. And this brings with it[br]especially the last point, the
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predetermined criteria, are high risk of[br]false accusations. We've already seen that
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99.6% of data base matching, automatic[br]data is matching is wrongful. And imagine
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how much higher the number would be with[br]checking against predetermined criteria.
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And that the reason why we expect many[br]false accusations, false positives, is the
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so-called base rate fallacy, which[br]basically says that when you're looking
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for a very small amount of people in a[br]large dataset and you have a significant
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fail rate, you're very likely to produce[br]more false positives, maybe many more
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false positives than true positives. So[br]actual suspects, or not suspects, but
0:18:23.660,0:18:28.104
actual terrorists. So, for instance, when[br]you if you're checking 100 million flight
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passengers. And you're looking for 100[br]terrorists, and you have even a fail rate
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of 0.1%, not the 99.6 that we're talking[br]about now, but even just 0.1%, this would
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render this would this would render[br]100 000 flight passengers subject to to
0:18:45.269,0:18:50.756
to being suspected terrorists. So you[br]would have 100 000 false positives, 100
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terrorists that let's assume all of them[br]so that they had a positive success rate
0:18:55.280,0:19:00.311
of 100 percent identifying positively as a[br]terrorist suspect. Then you will have
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100 000 false positives, 100 people that[br]are correctly suspected. But everybody, of
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course, will be treated the same. And what[br]I've listed here are just the obvious
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things, stigmatization at the airport by[br]interrogation, searches of luggage of
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people and arrests, missing flights.[br]And depending on the country
0:19:21.460,0:19:27.019
you're in you may be in much more trouble[br]after that. The second point is that the
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data is being stored way too long. As[br]Walter has already mentioned 5 years. Why
0:19:33.075,0:19:38.549
do you need 5 years worth of data to check[br]a database entry or against a
0:19:38.549,0:19:42.795
predetermined criteria? Of course, you[br]don't needed it for that. Because you
0:19:42.795,0:19:47.970
could do that immediately after a person[br]has boarded. You can perform the check and
0:19:47.970,0:19:52.584
then you could get rid of the data, delete[br]it after it's being used. The reason why
0:19:52.584,0:19:56.508
they're storing it so long as that law[br]enforcement and intelligence agencies have
0:19:56.508,0:20:01.489
an interest that goes beyond that checking[br]after boarding, they want to keep the data
0:20:01.489,0:20:06.649
and check it in future, criminal[br]investigations in future, looking into a
0:20:06.649,0:20:10.635
person, what where they've traveled and so[br]on and so forth. But that has nothing to
0:20:10.635,0:20:15.980
do with the original purpose of PNR, the[br]PNR directive. And what at least everybody
0:20:15.980,0:20:21.243
here will know in all data storing, so[br]data storing is in itself a problem. It's
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in itself a violation of fundamental[br]rights when there is no legitimate reason
0:20:25.169,0:20:30.316
to do so. But also all data storage puts[br]the data stored at risk. And as we've
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mentioned already, there's the payment[br]data, especially there's other other
0:20:34.980,0:20:39.320
sensitive data with whom you've traveled,[br]whether you've traveled with light luggage
0:20:39.320,0:20:45.787
or not, where you have gone to, via which[br]place and so on and so forth. Another
0:20:45.787,0:20:49.370
point, which is a bit more complicated is[br]that the director does not sufficiently
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differentiate between crimes where[br]automatic profiling could make sense and
0:20:54.039,0:20:59.901
others. So as I have said, there may be a[br]point in saying that the typical
0:20:59.901,0:21:06.039
terrorists would fly from A to B via C[br]without checking in luggage using this or
0:21:06.039,0:21:11.220
that tourist office and so on and so[br]forth. So maybe just assume that this is
0:21:11.220,0:21:17.200
the case. This, no one can can tell me[br]that there is a typical flight pattern of
0:21:17.200,0:21:23.200
a fraudster where you could ask someone[br]define which way a fraudster typically
0:21:23.200,0:21:27.990
flies and identify such a person. So what[br]the directive would have needed to do if
0:21:27.990,0:21:32.269
they wanted had wanted to check against[br]predetermined criteria would have been to
0:21:32.269,0:21:38.943
identify for which crimes - exactly, and[br]only for these - you can use such a voodoo
0:21:38.943,0:21:44.389
miracle weapon. And finally, these are not[br]the only arguments, but the more most
0:21:44.389,0:21:49.269
important ones. We expect that the false[br]positives especially will lead to
0:21:49.269,0:21:55.249
discrimination against minorities. And one[br]example that the German National Police,
0:21:55.249,0:22:01.249
the Bundeskriminalamt has given us for a[br]predetermined criteria are young men
0:22:01.249,0:22:06.732
flying from airports from the south of[br]Turkey to a major European city. So
0:22:06.732,0:22:10.700
they're thinking about former IS fighters,[br]IS terrorists. And as you can easily
0:22:10.700,0:22:15.690
imagine what kind of people will be[br]sitting in in in a on a plane that's
0:22:15.690,0:22:20.310
coming from the south of Turkey to Germany[br]or to any other European country. Of
0:22:20.310,0:22:25.986
course, this will affect them[br]disproportionately, affect minorities. And
0:22:25.986,0:22:32.030
it is already now highly intransparent[br]what how these these predetermined
0:22:32.030,0:22:38.220
criteria are developed. And imagine a near[br]future where law enforcement will
0:22:38.220,0:22:42.640
naturally try to involve artificial[br]intelligence and finding patterns in the
0:22:42.640,0:22:48.179
raw data of flight movements of PNR data,[br]of the treasure they're now hoarding with
0:22:48.179,0:22:54.559
a five year worth of data. And at the[br]latest, at that point in time, it will be
0:22:54.559,0:23:00.710
impossible for us to understand why a[br]certain criterion was defined and how how
0:23:00.710,0:23:04.372
to challenge it when you're in the[br]position to be arrested at the airport,
0:23:04.372,0:23:10.189
for instance. So what can we do? And[br]that's where we come in. The two
0:23:10.189,0:23:15.919
organizations that we are. We are no[br]typical advocacy organizations, but we do
0:23:15.919,0:23:21.039
strategic litigation. Because[br]unfortunately no advocacy worked on the
0:23:21.039,0:23:26.220
PNR directive. It came into force pretty[br]much as the, um, as national law
0:23:26.220,0:23:34.139
enforcement wanted it to be. And so there[br]is one instance, one authority at the time
0:23:34.139,0:23:39.019
that in Europe, in Germany, in Europe, the[br]European Union, the courts, which can
0:23:39.019,0:23:44.919
which can ideally, um, dismiss of the[br]reasons of the motivations of law
0:23:44.919,0:23:51.340
enforcement to have such a directive[br]enforced and can try to objectively assess
0:23:51.340,0:23:57.181
whether this is actually legal and should[br]remain in force, stay in force or not. And
0:23:57.181,0:24:01.639
we did this through litigation both in[br]Germany and in Austria, and both are
0:24:01.639,0:24:06.490
having the same goal, which is to present[br]to the European Court of Justice the
0:24:06.490,0:24:11.774
question whether the PNR directive and any[br]national law that is transposing the PNR
0:24:11.774,0:24:17.980
directive is in violation of the Charter[br]of Fundamental Rights. Why do we have to
0:24:17.980,0:24:23.470
go? Why is the ECJ important? Because when[br]you have a national law that directly
0:24:23.470,0:24:31.330
transposes a European law, a directive,[br]then then only the ECJ can declare such a
0:24:31.330,0:24:35.419
law void. There is no way for, for[br]instance, in Germany, the federal
0:24:35.419,0:24:39.669
constitutional court, the[br]Bundesverfassungsgericht, to say that this
0:24:39.669,0:24:46.016
law should not be applied any longer. This[br]question must be presented to the ECJ. So
0:24:46.016,0:24:50.940
how could we get to the ECJ? This actually[br]was a process that took us quite a bit of
0:24:50.940,0:24:56.489
time. It's been two years in the making. A[br]year ago, we launched six different
0:24:56.489,0:25:01.270
complaints of six different plaintiffs[br]that are flying all over Europe, that we
0:25:01.270,0:25:05.792
booked flights for them that led them to a[br]European member states, a European Union
0:25:05.792,0:25:10.926
member states and two states outside of[br]the European Union. And we sent the
0:25:10.926,0:25:16.029
complaints to three different courts. The[br]one, two complaints were directed against
0:25:16.029,0:25:20.320
the German national police and went to the[br]administrative court in Wiesbaden, and
0:25:20.320,0:25:24.559
four others were directed against the[br]airplane airlines. So we tried to
0:25:24.559,0:25:30.950
diversify as much as possible in order to[br]find a judge that would agree with us that
0:25:30.950,0:25:36.779
this is problematic and this needs[br]checking. And we are optimistic that
0:25:36.779,0:25:43.500
either the court in Wiesbaden or the court[br]in Cologne will soon present these very
0:25:43.500,0:25:48.289
questions to the court, whether the German[br]transposition law and the PNR directive
0:25:48.289,0:25:53.119
itself are violating fundamental rights[br]after European of the Charter of the
0:25:53.119,0:25:58.981
European Union.[br]Walter: So as Bijan already mentioned, our
0:25:58.981,0:26:05.389
aim is to bring our case as quick as[br]possible to the European Court of Justice.
0:26:05.389,0:26:11.470
So we had different options. And in Austria,[br]we went a third way. We brought a case
0:26:11.470,0:26:18.976
before the Austrian Data Protection Authority[br]against the Fluggastdatenzentralstelle
0:26:18.976,0:26:24.603
im Bundeskriminalamt, a passenger[br]named unit. And we we brought several
0:26:24.603,0:26:31.059
different cases and we also found out that[br]different, smaller things which we are on.
0:26:31.059,0:26:38.014
But the main thing is that this case[br]already went as planned to the
0:26:38.014,0:26:46.579
Bundesverwaltungsgericht, so the federal[br]administrative court in Austria. And from
0:26:46.579,0:26:54.850
there, we hope that is also soon forwarded[br]to the European Court of Justice. And
0:26:54.850,0:27:02.239
theoretically, it would be enough if one[br]case hits the European Court of Justice.
0:27:02.239,0:27:07.590
But practically, it is, of course, very[br]important to have different strategies
0:27:07.590,0:27:15.749
because there are different speeds and so[br]on. So that's why we also should mention
0:27:15.749,0:27:22.929
another case, the the Belgian case. So[br]this Belgian human rights organization,
0:27:22.929,0:27:28.647
they also brought the case before a[br]Belgian court. In this case, it was
0:27:28.647,0:27:34.720
directly the Belgian constitutional court.[br]So they had a direct way to the
0:27:34.720,0:27:40.340
constitutional court, unlike our cases in[br]Austria, where this or in Germany where
0:27:40.340,0:27:47.369
this was not possible. And therefore, the[br]Belgian constitutional court already
0:27:47.369,0:27:55.037
referred this case to the European Court[br]of Justice. And we are hoping that our
0:27:55.037,0:28:01.210
case will be soon or cases, or at least[br]some of them will soon be joined with this
0:28:01.210,0:28:11.220
case at the European Court of Justice, and[br]then decided together. So to sum up, we
0:28:11.220,0:28:20.429
have actually a very infringing piece of[br]legislation the PNR directive, PNR
0:28:20.429,0:28:28.529
processing, as Bijan explained to us in[br]more detail, is extremely intrusive in all
0:28:28.529,0:28:34.549
flight passengers' fundamental rights. It[br]violates fundamental rights, especially
0:28:34.549,0:28:41.460
because it is already... is also[br]ineffective and disproportionate. So we
0:28:41.460,0:28:47.649
heard about these different things. The[br]base rate fallacy that it is ineffective
0:28:47.649,0:28:54.099
and disproportionate because it is not[br]really possible to find specific suspects
0:28:54.099,0:29:02.570
in such amount of data with without having[br]a lot, a real lot of false positives. So
0:29:02.570,0:29:08.190
other arguments are that it is data[br]retention in the first place. So also
0:29:08.190,0:29:14.989
already the retention of the data of[br]people like you and me is a big problem
0:29:14.989,0:29:22.600
and unlawful. And this general suspicion[br]it leads to. So everybody becomes a
0:29:22.600,0:29:30.200
suspect and can become practically a[br]suspect, can get problems practically from
0:29:30.200,0:29:38.899
that legislation without being a criminal.[br]And yeah, we have strong arguments as we
0:29:38.899,0:29:48.599
showed you already, the case of the Canada[br]PNR directive, the PNR agreement with
0:29:48.599,0:29:55.259
Canada is very similar in practice to the[br]PNR directive. So the arguments already
0:29:55.259,0:30:01.480
held before the European Court of Justice.[br]So actually, it's a shame that this was
0:30:01.480,0:30:07.971
not stopped earlier. And civil rights[br]organizations as we are have to do that.
0:30:07.971,0:30:16.590
And that's what we do. And that's also why[br]we depend on donations. So that's also
0:30:16.590,0:30:21.789
important to stress that our work people[br]having people fully employed to do things
0:30:21.789,0:30:28.700
like that cost some money. And that's[br]where you can find us. So we have a
0:30:28.700,0:30:35.799
campaign website, nopnr.eu in German[br]and English. And you can find us, of
0:30:35.799,0:30:40.580
course, on our website and both websites[br]and find ways how to join us, how to
0:30:40.580,0:30:46.730
support us. And also still today, you can[br]meet us at our assembly in the CCL
0:30:46.730,0:30:52.590
building the about freedom assembly, where[br]both the Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte
0:30:52.590,0:31:00.659
and Epicentre Works have their desk and[br]you can ask all the question. But first,
0:31:00.659,0:31:03.378
ask all your questions now. Thank you.
0:31:03.378,0:31:06.870
Applause
0:31:06.870,0:31:14.760
Herald: Thank you, Walter and Bijan, for[br]this very clarifying statements. I suppose
0:31:14.760,0:31:19.379
there are quite some questions here in the[br]audience. Only I'm looking at someone
0:31:19.379,0:31:32.252
who's grabbing a microphone now. I see the[br]signal angel. Yes. The mic is not on. Can
0:31:32.252,0:31:47.591
someone help him? Signal Angel needs a mic.[br]Yes, it's almost there. Brains are
0:31:47.591,0:31:51.409
working.[br]Signal Angel: Thank you. Is there a cheap
0:31:51.409,0:31:55.470
method to spam for some trees, for[br]example, by booking flight under a false
0:31:55.470,0:32:02.999
name and then canceling the flight?[br]Bijan: Well, I think it's it's difficult
0:32:02.999,0:32:06.889
to say. I didn't get the very first words.[br]Sorry.
0:32:06.889,0:32:11.159
Signal Angel: Yes, the very first one was:[br]is there a cheap method to spam, to spam
0:32:11.159,0:32:14.809
for some trees?[br]Bijan: Yeah. Theoretically, I don't think
0:32:14.809,0:32:19.129
that anything could speak against that.[br]Yeah, but the problem is that you would
0:32:19.129,0:32:23.749
need to cancel very late because, um, I[br]think the first time they push the data,
0:32:23.749,0:32:28.139
the airlines are pushing the data to the[br]national police is, 48 hours before the
0:32:28.139,0:32:32.799
before boarding. So that might come to[br]become a bit expensive.
0:32:32.799,0:32:34.439
Laughter
0:32:34.439,0:32:38.918
Walter: I would want to make a general[br]remark also on that. Of course, here,
0:32:38.918,0:32:44.109
especially here, thoughts like that, how[br]to hack the system are very important and
0:32:44.109,0:32:50.759
can help. But our general approach is to[br]take legal action to protect all people at
0:32:50.759,0:32:56.019
the same way, and not only those who who[br]are able to protect themselves or hack the
0:32:56.019,0:33:04.139
system or whatever. So that's the reason[br]why we both go this general way to bring
0:33:04.139,0:33:11.449
that down. Completely.[br]Herald: And other question here. Yes.
0:33:11.449,0:33:20.879
Sorry, sir. Please.[br]Q: What do you expect as a result of your
0:33:20.879,0:33:26.549
litigation if you are successful in court?[br]Will ... do you expect the courts to
0:33:26.549,0:33:34.309
strike down the directive entirely, or do[br]you expect another legislative process to
0:33:34.309,0:33:42.260
do the same thing again or to fix, quote[br]unquote, the directive in very small ways
0:33:42.260,0:33:47.570
just to to drag out this battle and[br]continue the practice. What do you think
0:33:47.570,0:33:52.210
the effects will be?[br]Bijan: Well, we think that the European
0:33:52.210,0:33:56.070
Court of Justice, if it follows our[br]argument, our reasoning, it should it will
0:33:56.070,0:33:59.690
strike down the PNR directive entirely,[br]because the way it is set up is
0:33:59.690,0:34:06.561
fundamentally not in in accordance with[br]what it earlier ruled so far. Unless it
0:34:06.561,0:34:10.550
will change its its entire history of[br]ruling on data retention and so on and so
0:34:10.550,0:34:15.679
forth. But of course, we will expect the[br]member states to push for another
0:34:15.679,0:34:21.349
legislation that may be similar, but not[br]the exact same thing. So I can imagine
0:34:21.349,0:34:25.889
something of a of the sort of data[br]retention of telecommunications, as it
0:34:25.889,0:34:31.060
were, and with airlines retaining the data[br]and keeping it for a shorter period of
0:34:31.060,0:34:36.291
time and only giving it out when there is[br]a specific request with, where there is a
0:34:36.291,0:34:41.029
specific reason for law enforcement to ask[br]for the data. I could imagine such a thing
0:34:41.029,0:34:45.845
coming up again and then we would need to[br]check whether this is illegal or not. And
0:34:45.845,0:34:50.254
maybe go through the whole procedure as[br]well. But it is it would be an immense
0:34:50.254,0:34:56.191
success if the PNR directive as it stands[br]would be void. Declared void.
0:34:56.191,0:35:02.290
Herald: Thank you. Someone else has a[br]question. I see the person here.
0:35:02.290,0:35:10.789
Microphone one, please.[br]Q: Hel-lo, yeah. Okay, so you had the
0:35:10.789,0:35:15.480
agreement that, uh, there are a lot of[br]false positives when they checked up PNR
0:35:15.480,0:35:20.640
data. Um, do we have any information how[br]long it takes for them to react on the PNR
0:35:20.640,0:35:25.570
data if they get a positive hit? So maybe[br]they won't react after the person has
0:35:25.570,0:35:31.109
landed and already, uh, is in the country?[br]Bijan: They claim that they can act
0:35:31.109,0:35:36.930
immediately, but we can't know that for[br]sure. So the fact that they had 57 arrests
0:35:36.930,0:35:42.366
at the airports signals that at least that[br]in some respects this is true. But we
0:35:42.366,0:35:47.477
cannot know for sure how much, how quickly[br]they they they kind of react. And keep in
0:35:47.477,0:35:52.470
mind, this is only the start. So, so far[br]in Germany, right up until the point where
0:35:52.470,0:35:57.220
this the data that I presented for Germany[br]came about, there were only 9 airlines, I
0:35:57.220,0:36:01.440
think, that were linked to the system. So[br]expect there to be much more data coming
0:36:01.440,0:36:05.829
in. And once they start with a[br]predetermined criteria thing, this will
0:36:05.829,0:36:13.440
multiply probably. Um, even so, I cannot[br]imagine unless they they ... have this
0:36:13.440,0:36:20.279
new, um, thing with hundreds of people[br]involved that they can act immediately in
0:36:20.279,0:36:26.240
each and every case.[br]Herald: Thank you. There is a question
0:36:26.240,0:36:30.100
again on the Internet. Yes.[br]Signal Angel: Yes. How come, you haven't
0:36:30.100,0:36:35.349
tried voiding the local at one provisions[br]that this PNR there for intra EU flights? (???)
0:36:35.349,0:36:39.180
That seems most likely against Schengen[br]provisions.
0:36:39.180,0:36:44.837
Bijan: We have addressed that as well. We[br]have picked intra-EU flights also. We have
0:36:44.837,0:36:52.290
not just picked flights that go extra EU,[br]but, we've also made the point about the
0:36:52.290,0:36:57.839
the violation of Schengen criteria. But[br]that is not so much that is not the focus
0:36:57.839,0:37:02.893
of our argument because they are, in our[br]opinion, much stronger ones. Because with
0:37:02.893,0:37:06.990
Schengen you would need to argue that it's[br]practically impossible to enter the
0:37:06.990,0:37:13.260
country without being held up and you're[br]not being held up in a physical form, at
0:37:13.260,0:37:18.910
least not in general, generally. And so[br]this argument is a bit more difficult than
0:37:18.910,0:37:25.024
having an actual border checking of[br]people. But we're making this point, of
0:37:25.024,0:37:30.460
course. And but we rely on other points[br]that we think are stronger.
0:37:30.460,0:37:35.540
Herald: Okay. Please. Microphone number[br]one, please.
0:37:35.540,0:37:40.093
Q: Is there also data being collected on[br]flights inside a country. So, for example,
0:37:40.093,0:37:43.530
from Munich to Berlin.[br]Bijan: Not yet. Not under the directive.
0:37:43.530,0:37:48.099
And theoretically, of course, that the[br]German legislator or any other legislator
0:37:48.099,0:37:51.820
could decide to include that as well, but[br]not so far.
0:37:51.820,0:37:56.329
Herald: Number two, please. Microphone.[br]Yeah.
0:37:56.329,0:38:01.920
Q: I was wondering how much, uh, false[br]negatives are in there. You know, that,
0:38:01.920,0:38:07.940
like, uh, these big databases. If I don't[br]act like a normal terrorist or something
0:38:07.940,0:38:10.570
than I am?[br]Bijan: We don't we don't know,
0:38:10.570,0:38:15.130
unfortunately, not yet. Um, I did. I think[br]it would be very interesting, especially
0:38:15.130,0:38:21.750
for the predetermined criteria , to see[br]how many they miss. Um, but yeah. No, not
0:38:21.750,0:38:28.579
nothing at.[br]Herald: Yeah, and there is no undo button,
0:38:28.579,0:38:33.579
I think. No. No. No undo. That's always[br]the thing that I that I'm worried about,
0:38:33.579,0:38:38.140
you know. Then you have an announcement[br]about France's data that go out and then
0:38:38.140,0:38:44.040
you can't have an undo. So what do we do[br]then? It's always new. Yeah, you can keep
0:38:44.040,0:38:48.640
this for five years now. But who says it's[br]there for five years and what kind of
0:38:48.640,0:38:51.967
interpretation to get out of it for five[br]years? After five years?
0:38:51.967,0:38:55.089
Bijan: You can't know in[br]which database you will be transferred in
0:38:55.089,0:38:59.940
the meantime, because law enforcement can[br]access the data of that very data set and
0:38:59.940,0:39:03.700
forth for that data and the PNR data set[br]and put it in another data set because
0:39:03.700,0:39:08.480
they have whatever reason to do so. And[br]then these are again enlarged and
0:39:08.480,0:39:12.670
enlarged. And then you will find another[br]reason why they should remain in there for
0:39:12.670,0:39:17.230
a longer time. So, yeah. That's why we're[br]fighting this now and hoping to change the
0:39:17.230,0:39:19.480
future.[br]Herald: How do you see your chances?
0:39:19.480,0:39:27.070
Actually, uh, a long term or short term[br]chances to get to that point is that?
0:39:27.070,0:39:30.500
Bijan: We are very convinced that we will[br]be successful, because otherwise we
0:39:30.500,0:39:33.529
wouldn't have started this. This is one of[br]our principles. We only do things that we
0:39:33.529,0:39:38.321
are convinced of being able to win and we[br]think that we will win this. And what will
0:39:38.321,0:39:42.240
come out of it? Referring to the I think[br]the second and the second question
0:39:42.240,0:39:47.480
earlier. And what will be happening in the[br]future with other legislation? I can't
0:39:47.480,0:39:51.430
know. But one argument the police is[br]always making or in private, at least to
0:39:51.430,0:39:55.819
me, are is that they're saying, well,[br]people will get used to it and it won't be
0:39:55.819,0:40:00.783
in in five or 10 years. Nobody's gonna be[br]wondering about things like this. And this
0:40:00.783,0:40:05.299
is exactly what we are working against,[br]that this never becomes normal, because if
0:40:05.299,0:40:07.470
this becomes normal, as I've argued[br]before,
0:40:07.470,0:40:11.130
applause[br]Herald: needs an applause Yes.
0:40:11.130,0:40:14.880
Bijan: If it becomes normal, as I've[br]argued before, it is easy to extend it to
0:40:14.880,0:40:20.529
all sorts of life and ways of life and[br]walks of life. And this then would be in a
0:40:20.529,0:40:25.859
surveillance state par excellence.[br]Herald: We were very close there. So we
0:40:25.859,0:40:30.089
need to support them really hard. There is[br]one last question I suggest. No. There is
0:40:30.089,0:40:35.619
two questions. Number two. Yes.[br]Q: Does the PNR directive apply only for
0:40:35.619,0:40:39.492
regular scheduled flights? So does it also[br]apply for private flights? The general
0:40:39.492,0:40:42.819
aviation business flights, etc.?[br]Bijan: Good question. I don't know.
0:40:42.819,0:40:48.510
Actually, I look into that and. Write me![br]Come, come here later and I'll check and
0:40:48.510,0:40:52.310
I'll give you an answer.[br]Herald: Then there is one at number one.
0:40:52.310,0:40:56.710
Q: I just wanted to ask a question in[br]response to the idea that this is becoming
0:40:56.710,0:41:01.810
very normal, because one thing that I[br]think has become very normal that hasn't
0:41:01.810,0:41:07.924
been mentioned explicitly is the idea that[br]people can be essentially put on a watch
0:41:07.924,0:41:12.782
list as being a potential criminal in the[br]absence of a crime. And we have these
0:41:12.782,0:41:19.605
terrorist watch lists all over the world[br]now. That is now the new normal. And I
0:41:19.605,0:41:24.750
think that's very problematic. And can you[br]just maybe talk about: Do we, do you see a
0:41:24.750,0:41:30.829
future where we can actually get back to,[br]you know, only arresting or investigating
0:41:30.829,0:41:33.890
people because of probable cause, for[br]example?
0:41:33.890,0:41:39.421
Bijan: Oh, I hope that this will be our[br]future. But, uh, about that point, that
0:41:39.421,0:41:43.750
very point, I'm not too optimistic, to be[br]honest. I am optimistic about one other
0:41:43.750,0:41:48.859
one. Another thing that is that these[br]instruments that are now being created
0:41:48.859,0:41:52.910
will prove to be highly ineffective, as[br]we've so now see now already with checking
0:41:52.910,0:41:58.290
against databases, that is already a lot[br]of work and very tedious work. But with
0:41:58.290,0:42:04.079
the idea that you can define criteria for[br]people that that are legitimately to be
0:42:04.079,0:42:08.710
suspected of committing a crime in the[br]future, I think it will prove, at least
0:42:08.710,0:42:12.990
for the next few decades, to be quite[br]impossible. And this is I don't know if
0:42:12.990,0:42:19.880
this came across correctly sufficiently,[br]but this is really the core issue that we
0:42:19.880,0:42:25.619
have with the PNR directive. They are[br]claiming that they can find suspects of
0:42:25.619,0:42:31.690
crimes or future crimes. Imagine! Not not[br]someone that has committed a crime or that
0:42:31.690,0:42:36.890
will definitely commit a crime, but that[br]can reasonably be suspected of committing
0:42:36.890,0:42:43.960
a crime in the future, and then act upon[br]that. And that is really a huge step into
0:42:43.960,0:42:49.220
what I called voodoo, about the[br]expectation that you can take data and
0:42:49.220,0:42:55.400
prevent crime. Minority Report times.[br]Yeah. To the power five. I don't know.
0:42:55.400,0:43:00.534
Herald: Sit back and relax. Thank you[br]Bijan and thank you, Walter, for this
0:43:00.534,0:43:08.520
fantastic lecture. Please support them at[br]noPNR dot EU, go to their booth as well.
0:43:08.520,0:43:10.520
And thank you all.
0:43:10.520,0:43:22.010
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0:43:22.010,0:43:38.000
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