>> In some circumstances, a court will refuse to enforce a contract on the grounds that to do so is against public policy. To give an extreme example, based on an actual case from Japan, a woman hired a hitman to murder her husband and his mistress. The hitman botched the job and failed to kill either, and the woman sued him for breach of contract. Despite the existence of mutual assent and consideration, the court dismissed her case, refusing to enforce the contract. Given that murder is a crime, it is not hard to see that a contract for murder, that is, a contract to commit a crime, is a contract against public policy. But the problem with refusing to enforce a contract on the grounds that it is against public policy is that the concept of public policy is very malleable and has a tendency to become tinged with a judge's views on morality. For instance, in jurisdictions where prostitution and gambling are crimes, courts have refused to enforce contracts involving these activities, such as promises to pay gambling debts. Such cases are analogous to the hitman contract. Courts refuse to enforce contracts involving criminal activity. But some courts have also refused to enforce gambling debts in jurisdictions where gambling is not a crime. Those courts have reason that although gambling may not be illegal, it is nevertheless immoral behavior. Section 178, subsection 1, of the second restatement states that a promise is unenforceable on the grounds of public policy in two instances. First, where specific legislation renders certain kinds of promises unenforceable. Second, where the interest in enforcement of the promise, such as the party's expectations, is clearly outweighed by a public policy against enforcement of those kinds of promises such as gambling. The section goes on to identify some relevant factors. But because the factors are themselves vague and because different courts assign different weights to different factors, it is difficult to predict the outcome in any given case. Your text gives two other examples of contractual relationships that may be challenged as against public policy; covenants to not compete against a former employer and surrogacy agreements. An interesting line of cases examine the issue whether it is against public policy for one party to release the other from any liability arising out of the other's negligence. Such releases are fairly common. Many entities that provide recreational activities such as horseback riding or scuba diving, routinely require their patrons to sign such releases. In deciding whether to uphold such releases, courts have not adopted many bright line rules. However, one well accepted rule is that a party cannot contractually disclaim liability for its own gross negligence. But when ordinary negligence is involved, courts have not established the bright line rules. Instead, they employ a multi-factor balancing test. Economics often plays a role in this balancing test. For example, back when cameras required film and film was relatively inexpensive, the manufacturers of film regularly limited their liability for defective film to the cost of the film itself. Purchasers of defective film would sometimes challenge such limitations on the ground that they were against public policy. The purchasers would argue that their losses far exceeded the cost of the film. In one case, a wedding photographer's film was defective, and the plaintiff alleged that it costs several thousand dollars to restage the wedding to have the pictures taken. Moreover, purchasers would argue that the defective film was the manufacturer's fault and public policy should hold negligent parties accountable for the losses they cause. The contractual disclaimer of liability violated public policy. Nevertheless, in the cases involving film, courts pretty regularly upheld contractual disclaimers of liability. The courts reason that the manufacturer's risk of being held accountable for large losses would result in a steep increase in the price of film for the rest of all of us. As the manufacturers would pass on the cost of insuring against such losses to their customers, and that on balance this would not be beneficial to society as a whole. But this balancing act gets more problematic when personal injury as opposed to just economic loss is involved. Let's say the cost of a recreational activity is fairly modest, say, $40 an hour to go horseback riding. But risks are unavoidable and regularly occur because horses are regularly frightened by an unexpected noise and they may react by rearing. Moreover, there is a risk of a catastrophic injury such as a spinal or brain injury from a fall. In such cases, should the provider of the activity be allowed to bargain for a release of liability even if the provider is negligent? Courts will have to weigh the extent of injury against the cost of insuring against that injury, while factoring in the social utility of having such recreational activities available at a modest price. It is very difficult to predict what a court would conclude. To enforce a release of liability puts the whole economic loss on the injured party. But to refuse to enforce the release increases the cost of the activity and may result in decreased availability of that activity. Conversely, to enforce the release absolves a negligent party of responsibility, which may decrease the incentive of other horse stables to avoid future negligence and lead to a greater number of injuries.