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Introducer:

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Anyway, I believe I've killed enough time so, ladies and gentlemen, a person who

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in this crowd needs absolutely no introduction, Cory Doctorow!

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[Audience applauds]

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Doctorow:

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Thank you.

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So, when I speak in places where the first language of the nation is not English,

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there is a disclaimer and an apology, because I'm one of nature's fast talkers. When I was

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at the United Nations at the World Intellectual Property Organization, I was known as the

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"scourge" of the simultaneous translation corps; I would stand up and speak, and turn

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around, and there would be window after window of translator, and every one of them would

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be doing this [Doctorow facepalms]. [Audience laughs] So in advance, I give you permission

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when I start talking quickly to do this [Doctorow makes SOS motion] and I will slow down.

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So, tonight's talk -- wah, wah, waaah [Doctorow makes 'fail horn' sound, apparently

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in response to audience making SOS motion; audience laughs]] -- tonight's talk is not

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a copyright talk. I do copyright talks all the time; questions about culture and creativity

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are interesting enough, but to be honest, I'm quite sick of them. If you want to hear

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freelancer writers like me bang on about what's happening to the way we earn our living, by

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all means, go and find one of the many talks I've done on this subject on YouTube. But,

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tonight, I want to talk about something more important -- I want talk to talk about general

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purpose computers.

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Because general purpose computers are, in fact, astounding -- so astounding that our

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society is still struggling to come to grips with them: to figure out what they're for,

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to figure out how to accommodate them, and how to cope with them. Which, unfortunately,

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brings me back to copyright.

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Because the general shape of the copyright wars and the lessons they can teach

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us about the upcoming fights over the destiny of the general purpose computer are important.

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In the beginning, we had packaged software, and the attendant industry, and we had sneakernet.

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So, we had floppy disks in ziplock bags, or in cardboard boxes, hung on pegs in shops,

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and sold like candy bars and magazines. And they were eminently susceptible to duplication,

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and so they were duplicated quickly, and widely, and this was to the great chagrin of people

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who made and sold software.

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Enter DRM 0.96. They started to introduce physical defects to the disks or

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started to insist on other physical indicia which the software could check for -- dongles,

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hidden sectors, challenge/response protocols that required that you had physical possession

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of large, unwieldy manuals that were difficult to copy, and of course these failed, for two

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reasons. First, they were commercially unpopular, of course, because they reduced the usefulness

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of the software to the legitimate purchasers, while leaving the people who took the software

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without paying for it untouched. The legitimate purchasers resented the non-functionality

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of their backups, they hated the loss of scarce ports to the authentication dongles, and they

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resented the inconvenience of having to transport large manuals when they wanted to run their

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software. And second, these didn't stop pirates, who found it trivial to patch the software

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and bypass authentication. Typically, the way that happened is some expert who had possession

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of technology and expertise of equivalent sophistication to the software vendor itself,

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would reverse engineer the software and release cracked versions that quickly became widely

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circulated. While this kind of expertise and technology sounded highly specialized, it

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really wasn't; figuring out what recalcitrant programs were doing, and routing around the

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defects in shitty floppy disk media were both core skills for computer programmers, and

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were even more so in the era of fragile floppy disks and the rough-and-ready early days of

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software development. Anti-copying strategies only became more fraught as networks spread;

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once we had BBSes, online services, USENET newsgroups, and mailing lists, the expertise

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of people who figured out how to defeat these authentication systems could be packaged up

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in software as little crack files, or, as the network capacity increased, the cracked

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disk images or executables themselves could be spread on their own.

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Which gave us DRM 1.0. By 1996, it became clear to everyone in the halls of

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power that there was something important about to happen. We were about to have an information

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economy, whatever the hell that was. They assumed it meant an economy where we bought

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and sold information. Now, information technology makes things efficient, so imagine the markets

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that an information economy would have. You could buy a book for a day, you could sell

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the right to watch the movie for one Euro, and then you could rent out the pause button

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at one penny per second. You could sell movies for one price in one country, and another

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price in another, and so on, and so on; the fantasies of those days were a little like

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a boring science fiction adaptation of the Old Testament book of Numbers, a kind of tedious

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enumeration of every permutation of things people do with information and the ways we

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could charge them for it.

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But none of this would be possible unless we could control how people use their

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computers and the files we transfer to them. After all, it was well and good to talk about

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selling someone the 24 hour right to a video, or the right to move music onto an iPod, but

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not the right to move music from the iPod onto another device, but how the Hell could

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you do that once you'd given them the file? In order to do that, to make this work, you

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needed to figure out how to stop computers from running certain programs and inspecting

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certain files and processes. For example, you could encrypt the file, and then require

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the user to run a program that only unlocked the file under certain circumstances.

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But as they say on the Internet, "now you have two problems". You also, now,

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have to stop the user from saving the file while it's in the clear, and you have to stop

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the user from figuring out where the unlocking program stores its keys, because if the user

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finds the keys, she'll just decrypt the file and throw away that stupid player app.

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And now you have three problems [audience laughs], because now you have to

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stop the users who figure out how to render the file in the clear from sharing it with

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other users, and now you've got four! problems, because now you have to stop the users who

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figure out how to extract secrets from unlocking programs from telling other users how to do

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it too, and now you've got five! problems, because now you have to stop users who figure

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out how to extract secrets from unlocking programs from telling other users what the

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secrets were!

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That's a lot of problems. But by 1996, we had a solution. We had the WIPO Copyright

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Treaty, passed by the United Nations World Intellectual Property Organization, which

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created laws that made it illegal to extract secrets from unlocking programs, and it created

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laws that made it illegal to extract media cleartexts from the unlocking programs while

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they were running, and it created laws that made it illegal to tell people how to extract

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secrets from unlocking programs, and created laws that made it illegal to host copyrighted

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works and secrets and all with a handy streamlined process that let you remove stuff from the

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internet without having to screw around with lawyers, and judges, and all that crap. And

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with that, illegal copying ended forever [audience laughs very hard, applauds], the information

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economy blossomed into a beautiful flower that brought prosperity to the whole wide

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world; as they say on the aircraft carriers, "Mission Accomplished". [audience laughs]

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Well, of course that's not how the story ends because pretty much anyone who

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understood computers and networks understood that while these laws would create more problems

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than they could possibly solve; after all, these were laws that made it illegal to look

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inside your computer when it was running certain programs, they made it illegal to tell people

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what you found when you looked inside your computer, they made it easy to censor material

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on the internet without having to prove that anything wrong had happened; in short, they

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made unrealistic demands on reality and reality did not oblige them. After all, copying only

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got easier following the passage of these laws -- copying will only ever get easier!

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Here, 2011, this is as hard as copying will get! Your grandchildren will turn to you around

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the Christmas table and say "Tell me again, Grandpa, tell me again, Grandma, about when

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it was hard to copy things in 2011, when you couldn't get a drive the size of your fingernail

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that could hold every song ever recorded, every movie ever made, every word ever spoken,

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every picture ever taken, everything, and transfer it in such a short period of time

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you didn't even notice it was doing it, tell us again when it was so stupidly hard to copy

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things back in 2011". And so, reality asserted itself, and everyone had a good laugh over

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how funny our misconceptions were when we entered the 21st century, and then a lasting

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peace was reached with freedom and prosperity for all. [audience chuckles]

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Well, not really. Because, like the nursery rhyme lady who swallows a spider

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to catch a fly, and has to swallow a bird to catch the spider, and a cat to catch the

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bird, and so on, so must a regulation that has broad general appeal but is disastrous

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in its implementation beget a new regulation aimed at shoring up the failure of the old

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one. Now, it's tempting to stop the story here and conclude that the problem is that

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lawmakers are either clueless or evil, or possibly evilly clueless, and just leave it

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there, which is not a very satisfying place to go, because it's fundamentally a council

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of despair; it suggests that our problems cannot be solved for so long as stupidity

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and evilness are present in the halls of power, which is to say they will never be solved.

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But I have another theory about what's happened.

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It's not that regulators don't understand information technology, because it should

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be possible to be a non-expert and still make a good law! M.P.s and Congressmen and so on

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are elected to represent districts and people, not disciplines and issues. We don't have

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a Member of Parliament for biochemistry, and we don't have a Senator from the great state

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of urban planning, and we don't have an M.E.P. from child welfare. (But perhaps we should.)

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And yet those people who are experts in policy and politics, not technical disciplines, nevertheless,

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often do manage to pass good rules that make sense, and that's because government relies

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on heuristics -- rules of thumbs about how to balance expert input from different sides

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of an issue.

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But information technology confounds these heuristics -- it kicks the crap out

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of them -- in one important way, and this is it. One important test of whether or not

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a regulation is fit for a purpose is first, of course, whether it will work, but second

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of all, whether or not in the course of doing its work, it will have lots of effects on

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everything else. If I wanted Congress to write, or Parliament to write, or the E.U. to regulate

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a wheel, it's unlikely I'd succeed. If I turned up and said "well, everyone knows that wheels

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are good and right, but have you noticed that every single bank robber has four wheels on

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his car when he drives away from the bank robbery? Can't we do something about this?",

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the answer would of course be "no". Because we don't know how to make a wheel that is

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still generally useful for legitimate wheel applications but useless to bad guys. And

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we can all see that the general benefits of wheels are so profound that we'd be foolish

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to risk them in a foolish errand to stop bank robberies by changing wheels. Even if there

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were an /epidemic/ of bank robberies, even if society were on the verge of collapse thanks

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to bank robberies, no-one would think that wheels were the right place to start solving

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our problems.

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But. If I were to show up in that same body to say that I had absolute proof

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that hands-free phones were making cars dangerous, and I said, "I would like you to pass a law

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that says it's illegal to put a hands-free phone in a car", the regulator might say "Yeah,

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I'd take your point, we'd do that". And we might disagree about whether or not this is

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a good idea, or whether or not my evidence made sense, but very few of us would say "well,

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once you take the hands-free phones out of the car, they stop being cars". We understand

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that we can keep cars cars even if we remove features from them. Cars are special purpose,

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at least in comparison to wheels, and all that the addition of a hands-free phone does

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is add one more feature to an already-specialized technology. In fact, there's that heuristic

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that we can apply here -- special-purpose technologies are complex. And you can remove

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features from them without doing fundamental disfiguring violence to their underlying utility.

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This rule of thumb serves regulators well, by and large, but it is rendered null

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and void by the general-purpose computer and the general-purpose network -- the PC and

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the Internet. Because if you think of computer software as a feature, that is a computer

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with spreadsheets running on it has a spreadsheet feature, and one that's running World of Warcraft

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has an MMORPG feature, then this heuristic leads you to think that you could reasonably

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say, "make me a computer that doesn't run spreadsheets", and that it would be no more

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of an attack on computing than "make me a car without a hands-free phone" is an attack

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on cars. And if you think of protocols and sites as features of the network, then saying

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"fix the Internet so that it doesn't run BitTorrent", or "fix the Internet so that thepiratebay.org

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no longer resolves", then it sounds a lot like "change the sound of busy signals", or

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"take that pizzeria on the corner off the phone network", and not like an attack on

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the fundamental principles of internetworking.

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Not realizing that this rule of thumb that works for cars and for houses and

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for every other substantial area of technological regulation fails for the Internet does not

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make you evil and it does not make you an ignoramus. It just makes you part of that

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vast majority of the world for whom ideas like "Turing complete" and "end-to-end" are

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meaningless. So, our regulators go off, and they blithely pass these laws, and they become

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part of the reality of our technological world. There are suddenly numbers that we aren't

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allowed to write down on the Internet, programs we're not allowed to publish, and all it takes

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to make legitimate material disappear from the Internet is to say "that? That infringes

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copyright.". It fails to attain the actual goal of the regulation; it doesn't stop people

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from violating copyright, but it bears a kind of superficial resemblance to copyright enforcement

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-- it satisfies the security syllogism: "something must be done, I am doing something, something

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has been done." And thus any failures that arise can be blamed on the idea that the regulation

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doesn't go far enough, rather than the idea that it was flawed from the outset.

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This kind of superficial resemblance and underlying divergence happens in other

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engineering contexts. I've a friend who was once a senior executive at a big consumer

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packaged goods company who told me about what happened when the marketing department told

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the engineers that they'd thought up a great idea for detergent: from now on, they were

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going to make detergent that made your clothes newer every time you washed them! Well after

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the engineers had tried unsuccessfully to convey the concept of "entropy" to the marketing

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department [audience laughs], they arrived at another solution -- "solution" -- they'd

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develop a detergent that used enzymes that attacked loose fiber ends, the kind that you

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get with broken fibers that make your clothes look old. So every time you washed your clothes

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in the detergent, they would look newer. But that was because the detergent was literally

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digesting your clothes! Using it would literally cause your clothes to dissolve in the washing

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machine! This was the opposite of making clothes newer; instead, you were artificially aging

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your clothes every time you washed them, and as the user, the more you deployed the "solution",

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the more drastic your measures had to be to keep your clothes up to date -- you actually

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had to go buy new clothes because the old ones fell apart.

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So today we have marketing departments who say things like "we don't need computers,

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we need... appliances. Make me a computer that doesn't run every program, just a program

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that does this specialized task, like streaming audio, or routing packets, or playing Xbox

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games, and make sure it doesn't run programs that I haven't authorized that might undermine

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our profits". And on the surface, this seems like a reasonable idea -- just a program that

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does one specialized task -- after all, we can put an electric motor in a blender, and

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we can install a motor in a dishwasher, and we don't worry if it's still possible to run

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a dishwashing program in a blender. But that's not what we do when we turn a computer into

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an appliance. We're not making a computer that runs only the "appliance" app; we're

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making a computer that can run every program, but which uses some combination of rootkits,

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spyware, and code-signing to prevent the user from knowing which processes are running,

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from installing her own software, and from terminating processes that she doesn't want.

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In other words, an appliance is not a stripped-down computer -- it is a fully functional computer

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with spyware on it out of the box.

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[audience applauds loudly] Thanks.

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Because we don't know how to build the general purpose computer that is capable

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of running any program we can compile except for some program that we don't like, or that

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we prohibit by law, or that loses us money. The closest approximation that we have to

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this is a computer with spyware -- a computer on which remote parties set policies without

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the computer user's knowledge, over the objection of the computer's owner. And so it is that

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digital rights management always converges on malware.

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There was, of course, this famous incident, a kind of gift to people who have

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this hypothesis, in which Sony loaded covert rootkit installers on 6 million audio CDs,

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which secretly executed programs that watched for attempts to read the sound files on CDs,

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and terminated them, and which also hid the rootkit's existence by causing the kernel

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to lie about which processes were running, and which files were present on the drive.

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But it's not the only example; just recently, Nintendo shipped the 3DS, which opportunistically

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updates its firmware, and does an integrity check to make sure that you haven't altered

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the old firmware in any way, and if it detects signs of tampering, it bricks itself.

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Human rights activists have raised alarms over U-EFI, the new PC bootloader,

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which restricts your computer so it runs signed operating systems, noting that repressive

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governments will likely withhold signatures from OSes unless they have covert surveillance

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operations.

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And on the network side, attempts to make a network that can't be used for copyright

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infringement always converges with the surveillance measures that we know from repressive governments.

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So, SOPA, the U.S. Stop Online Piracy Act, bans tools like DNSSec because they can be

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used to defeat DNS blocking measures. And it blocks tools like Tor, because they can

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be used to circumvent IP blocking measures. In fact, the proponents of SOPA, the Motion

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Picture Association of America, circulated a memo, citing research that SOPA would probably

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work, because it uses the same measures as are used in Syria, China, and Uzbekistan,

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and they argued that these measures are effective in those countries, and so they would work

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in America, too!

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[audience laughs and applauds] Don't applaud me, applaud the MPAA!

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Now, it may seem like SOPA is the end game in a long fight over copyright, and

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the internet, and it may seem like if we defeat SOPA, we'll be well on our way to securing

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the freedom of PCs and networks. But as I said at the beginning of this talk, this isn't

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about copyright, because the copyright wars are just the 0.9 beta version of the long

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coming war on computation. The entertainment industry were just the first belligerents

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in this coming century-long conflict. We tend to think of them as particularly successful

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-- after all, here is SOPA, trembling on the verge of passage, and breaking the internet

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on this fundamental level in the name of preserving Top 40 music, reality TV shows, and Ashton

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Kutcher movies! [laughs, scattered applause]

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But the reality is, copyright legislation gets as far as it does precisely because it's

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not taken seriously, which is why on one hand, Canada has had Parliament after Parliament

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introduce one stupid copyright bill after another, but on the other hand, Parliament

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after Parliament has failed to actually vote on the bill. It's why we got SOPA, a bill

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composed of pure stupid, pieced together molecule-by-molecule, into a kind of "Stupidite 250", which is normally

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only found in the heart of newborn star, and it's why these rushed-through SOPA hearings

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had to be adjourned midway through the Christmas break, so that lawmakers could get into a

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real vicious nationally-infamous debate over an important issue, unemployment insurance.

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It's why the World Intellectual Property Organization is gulled time and again into enacting crazed,

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pig-ignorant copyright proposals because when the nations of the world send their U.N. missions

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to Geneva, they send water experts, not copyright experts; they send health experts, not copyright

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experts; they send agriculture experts, not copyright experts, because copyright is just

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not important to pretty much everyone! [applause]

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Canada's Parliament didn't vote on its copyright bills because, of all the

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things that Canada needs to do, fixing copyright ranks well below health emergencies on first

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nations reservations, exploiting the oil patch in Alberta, interceding in sectarian resentments

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among French- and English-speakers, solving resources crises in the nation's fisheries,

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and thousand other issues! The triviality of copyright tells you that when other sectors

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of the economy start to evince concerns about the internet and the PC, that copyright will

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be revealed for a minor skirmish, and not a war. Why would other sectors nurse grudges

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against computers? Well, because the world we live in today is /made/ of computers. We

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don't have cars anymore, we have computers we ride in; we don't have airplanes anymore,

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we have flying Solaris boxes with a big bucketful of SCADA controllers [laughter]; a 3D printer

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is not a device, it's a peripheral, and it only works connected to a computer; a radio

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is no longer a crystal, it's a general-purpose computer with a fast ADC and a fast DAC and

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some software.

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The grievances that arose from unauthorized copying are trivial, when compared

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to the calls for action that our new computer-embroidered reality will create. Think of radio for a

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minute. The entire basis for radio regulation up until today was based on the idea that

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the properties of a radio are fixed at the time of manufacture, and can't be easily altered.

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You can't just flip a switch on your baby monitor, and turn it into something that interferes

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with air traffic control signals. But powerful software-defined radios can change from baby

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monitor to emergency services dispatcher to air traffic controller just by loading and

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executing different software, which is why the first time the American telecoms regulator

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(the FCC) considered what would happen when we put SDRs in the field, they asked for comment

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on whether it should mandate that all software-defined radios should be embedded in trusted computing

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machines. Ultimately, whether every PC should be locked, so that the programs they run are

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strictly regulated by central authorities.

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And even this is a shadow of what is to come. After all, this was the year in

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which we saw the debut of open sourced shape files for converting AR-15s to full automatic.

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This was the year of crowd-funded open-sourced hardware for gene sequencing. And while 3D

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printing will give rise to plenty of trivial complaints, there will be judges in the American

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South and Mullahs in Iran who will lose their minds over people in their jurisdiction printing

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out sex toys. [guffaw from audience] The trajectory of 3D printing will most certainly raise real

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grievances, from solid state meth labs, to ceramic knives.

295
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And it doesn't take a science fiction writer to understand why regulators might

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be nervous about the user-modifiable firmware on self-driving cars, or limiting interoperability

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for aviation controllers, or the kind of thing you could do with bio-scale assemblers and

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sequencers. Imagine what will happen the day that Monsanto determines that it's really...

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really... important to make sure that computers can't execute programs that cause specialized

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peripherals to output organisms that eat their lunch... literally. Regardless of whether

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you think these are real problems or merely hysterical fears, they are nevertheless the

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province of lobbies and interest groups that are far more influential than Hollywood and

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big content are on their best days, and every one of them will arrive at the same place

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-- "can't you just make us a general purpose computer that runs all the programs, except

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the ones that scare and anger us? Can't you just make us an Internet that transmits any

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message over any protocol between any two points, unless it upsets us?"

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And personally, I can see that there will be programs that run on general

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purpose computers and peripherals that will even freak me out. So I can believe that people

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who advocate for limiting general purpose computers will find receptive audience for

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their positions. But just as we saw with the copyright wars, banning certain instructions,

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or protocols, or messages, will be wholly ineffective as a means of prevention and remedy;

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and as we saw in the copyright wars, all attempts at controlling PCs will converge on rootkits;

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all attempts at controlling the Internet will converge on surveillance and censorship, which

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is why all this stuff matters. Because we've spent the last 10+ years as a body sending

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our best players out to fight what we thought was the final boss at the end of the game,

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but it turns out it's just been the mini-boss at the end of the level, and the stakes are

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only going to get higher.

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As a member of the Walkman generation, I have made peace with the fact that I will

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require a hearing aid long before I die, and of course, it won't be a hearing aid, it will

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be a computer I put in my body. So when I get into a car -- a computer I put my body

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into -- with my hearing aid -- a computer I put inside my body -- I want to know that

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these technologies are not designed to keep secrets from me, and to prevent me from terminating

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processes on them that work against my interests. [vigorous applause from audience] Thank you

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[applause continues]

325
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Thank you. So, last year, the Lower Merion School District,

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in a middle-class, affluent suburb of Philadelphia,

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found itself in a great deal of trouble,

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because it was caught distributing PCs to its students, equipped with rootkits

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that allowed for remote covert surveillance through the computer's camera and network connection.

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It transpired that they had been photographing students thousands of times,

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at home and at school, awake and asleep, dressed and naked.

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Meanwhile, the latest generation of lawful intercept technology

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can covertly operate cameras, mics, and GPSes on PCs, tablets, and mobile devices.

334
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Freedom in the future will require us to have the capacity to monitor our devices

335
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and set meaningful policy on them, to examine and terminate the processes that run on them,

336
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to maintain them as honest servants to our will,

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and not as traitors and spies working for criminals, thugs, and control freaks.

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And we haven't lost yet, but we have to win the copyright wars

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to keep the Internet and the PC free and open.

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Because these are themateriel in the wars that are to come, we won't be able to fight on without them.

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And I know this sounds like a counsel of despair, but as I said, these are early days.

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We have been fighting the mini-boss, and that means that great challenges are yet to come,

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but like all good level designers, fate has sent us a soft target to train ourselves on.

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We have a chance, a real chance, and if we support open and free systems,

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and the organizations that fight for them -- EFF, Bits of Freedom , EDRI, ORG, CC, Netzpolitik,

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La Quadrature du Net, and all the others, who are thankfully, too numerous to name here

347
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-- we may yet win the battle, and secure the ammunition we'll need for the war.

348
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Thank you.

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[Sustained applause]

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[Doctorow] So, either questions or long, rambling statements followed by "What do you think of that?"

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[laughter]

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[Doctorw] Yes. Any questions?

353
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[Organizer (?)] If you have questions, can you go to the microphones that are in the aisles, here

354
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and just ask away. If you form a neat, orderly line, we'll go, you know, left-right left-right

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[Question] So if you game this out all the way to the end

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You end up with a situation where either the censorship people have to

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outlaw von Neumann and Herbert's architectures and replace them with something that's not a universal Turing machine,

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or they lose, full stop. I mean, and there is a big spectrum in between the two.

359
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don't let me distract from that. I mean, you know.

360
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I'm talking about the very last bastion line of freedom, there.

361
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Do you think a bunch of assholes that don't even understand how DNS works

362
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are going to be willing to shoot themselves in the - head that hard?

363
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[Doctorow] I guess my answer is that the fact that there's no

364
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such thing as witchcraft, didn't stop them from burning a lot of witches, right? So...

365
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[Laughter, applause]

366
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By the same token, I think the ineffectiveness of the remedy is actually even worse for us, right?

367
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Because this is like the five year plan that produces no wheat,

368
00:31:43,875 --> 00:31:50,248
that yields an even more drastic five year plan that also produces no corn, right?

369
00:31:50,248 --> 00:31:53,891
I mean, this will make them angrier, and cause them

370
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to expand the scope of the regulation, you know.

371
00:31:56,715 --> 00:32:00,340
"The beatings will continue until morale improves" as the T-shirt goes, right?

372
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That's actually my worry.

373
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I think that if they saw some success, they might actually back off.

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The fact that this will be a dismo failure over and over and over again,

375
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the fact that terrorist will continue to communicate terrorist messages

376
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and child pornographers will continue to communicate child pornographic messages

377
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and so on, will just make them try harder at ineffective remedies

378
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[interlocutor] yeah, i mean a specialized Touring machine on an Asic[?]

379
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is actually really,really hard, 'cause you have to make one

380
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for every application,and that sucks...

381
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[Doctorow] Yeah, so again, I don't think they are going to ban general purpose computers.

382
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I think what they're going to do

383
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is they're going to say "We want more spyware in computers",

384
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"we want more U-EFI",we want... and not just like U-EFI that

385
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helps you detect spyware,but U-EFI where the signings

386
00:32:44,923 --> 00:32:47,732
are controlled by third parties,you don't have an easy owner override

387
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and all the rest of it.

388
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I think that that's going to be the trajectory of this stuff.

389
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Not "gosh, you know, that stupid policy that we pursued

390
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at great expense for 10 years was a complete failure.

391
00:32:59,969 --> 00:33:02,961
We should admit it and move on". I think that the answer is going to be

392
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"Oh my God, you know, look at what idiots we look like...

393
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we can't possibly admit defeat." You know, see the war on drugs.

394
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[laughs and claps]

395
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I'll answer you in a second 'cause there's someone already ready for a question.

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[Conductor] We'll take… We actually got quite a bit of time. here. So, next question.

397
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[Question] Regarding the recent initiative by a big software company

398
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to promote secure boot on U-EFI, do you think that personal computers

399
00:33:45,807 --> 00:33:58,950
will arrive like the situation in the… like the Playstation platforms soon?

400
00:33:58,950 --> 00:34:08,809
And what do you think that we'll have some means to counterattack or to…

401
00:34:08,809 --> 00:34:11,806
[Doctorow] Yeah, so the question is really "Is U-EFI going to be a means

402
00:34:11,806 --> 00:34:14,522
of freezing out alternative operating systems

403
00:34:14,522 --> 00:34:21,801
on the desktop. And I kinda feel like, kind of technocratic, well educated, western, northern...

404
00:34:21,801 --> 00:34:26,591
middle class people are gonna be able to figure how to get around this stuff

405
00:34:26,748 --> 00:34:31,878
what i am more concerned about not least because I think organizations like the FTC

406
00:34:31,878 --> 00:34:35,478
will probably eject pretty strenuously unless there is

407
00:34:35,478 --> 00:34:38,578
you know you can take a lid off and press a little red button to reset

408
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which is what they are talking aboout now

409
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