WEBVTT 00:00:00.106 --> 00:00:03.887 ♪ [music] ♪ 00:00:08.213 --> 00:00:10.402 - [Mary Clare] Today, we're going to learn more about Game Theory 00:00:10.402 --> 00:00:12.558 by using it to solve a simple problem. 00:00:13.069 --> 00:00:16.289 Bob and Al are two prestigious rival magicians 00:00:16.289 --> 00:00:19.215 who have developed a new trick that is quite popular. 00:00:19.215 --> 00:00:21.366 They've then agreed to limit performances 00:00:21.366 --> 00:00:23.144 so they can charge more. 00:00:23.519 --> 00:00:26.485 If both magicians perform only one show a week, 00:00:26.485 --> 00:00:29.234 each will earn $10,000. 00:00:29.619 --> 00:00:32.135 However, if one magician breaks the agreement 00:00:32.135 --> 00:00:33.876 and performs five times a week 00:00:33.876 --> 00:00:36.753 while the other continues to perform once a week -- 00:00:36.753 --> 00:00:40.289 that double-crosser will make $15,000 00:00:40.289 --> 00:00:43.278 while the other magician will make only $1,000. 00:00:43.867 --> 00:00:45.789 And if both magicians break the agreement 00:00:45.789 --> 00:00:49.979 and perform five times a week, each will earn $6,000. 00:00:50.582 --> 00:00:52.929 So, what is the Nash equilibrium of how many shows 00:00:52.929 --> 00:00:54.450 they will each perform? 00:00:54.758 --> 00:00:57.966 The Nash equilibrium means that no person has an incentive 00:00:57.966 --> 00:00:59.899 to change their behavior or strategy 00:00:59.899 --> 00:01:03.631 unless someone else changes their behavior or strategy. 00:01:04.485 --> 00:01:06.174 In order to find the Nash equilibrium 00:01:06.174 --> 00:01:08.243 of Bob and Al's performances, 00:01:08.243 --> 00:01:10.377 we have to first analyze Bob's behavior 00:01:10.377 --> 00:01:13.326 based on Al's behavior and vice versa. 00:01:13.595 --> 00:01:15.265 It will be easier to track everything 00:01:15.265 --> 00:01:17.471 if we fill out a 2-by-2 matrix. 00:01:17.855 --> 00:01:20.513 There are two individuals with two options. 00:01:20.878 --> 00:01:24.467 In each box of the matrix we'll list each person's path 00:01:24.467 --> 00:01:26.129 given the state of the world. 00:01:26.446 --> 00:01:29.741 So we'll list Bob's path first and Al's second. 00:01:30.246 --> 00:01:32.785 So let's first look at Bob's best strategy 00:01:32.785 --> 00:01:34.414 based on Al's behavior. 00:01:34.634 --> 00:01:37.965 Al will either keep her promise to perform once a week, 00:01:37.965 --> 00:01:41.116 or she'll break her promise and perform five shows. 00:01:41.825 --> 00:01:44.336 If she cooperates and performs one show, 00:01:44.336 --> 00:01:46.096 what is Bob's best strategy? 00:01:46.488 --> 00:01:49.026 Again, if we just look at what he stands to gain, 00:01:49.026 --> 00:01:51.266 then his best option would be to cheat 00:01:51.266 --> 00:01:53.015 and perform five times a week 00:01:53.015 --> 00:01:56.476 and make $15,000 versus performing once a week 00:01:56.476 --> 00:01:58.346 and making $10,000. 00:01:58.647 --> 00:02:03.645 Now, what if Al backstabs Bob and performs five shows? 00:02:04.127 --> 00:02:07.456 Bob's best strategy here is also to perform five shows a week 00:02:07.456 --> 00:02:10.623 and make $6,000 versus performing once a week 00:02:10.623 --> 00:02:12.819 and making only $1,000. 00:02:13.533 --> 00:02:17.687 Given that Bob's best strategy is to cheat and perform five shows 00:02:17.687 --> 00:02:22.892 regardless of what Al does, cheating is his dominant strategy. 00:02:23.553 --> 00:02:26.374 Now, let's look at it from Al's perspective. 00:02:26.374 --> 00:02:28.421 I bet you can see where this is going. 00:02:28.421 --> 00:02:32.048 If Bob keeps his promise and performs one show per week, 00:02:32.048 --> 00:02:35.961 then Al's best option is to perform five shows. 00:02:36.243 --> 00:02:39.317 She'll earn $15,000 instead of $10,000. 00:02:39.558 --> 00:02:41.766 And, if Bob decides to break his promise 00:02:41.766 --> 00:02:43.458 and perform five shows, 00:02:43.458 --> 00:02:47.176 Al's best option is also to cheat and perform five shows 00:02:47.176 --> 00:02:50.459 because she'll earn $6,000 instead of $1,000. 00:02:50.898 --> 00:02:54.346 Given that Al's best strategy is to perform five times per week -- 00:02:54.346 --> 00:02:57.488 again, regardless of what Bob does -- 00:02:57.488 --> 00:03:00.497 this is also considered her dominant strategy. 00:03:00.965 --> 00:03:03.607 So if Bob's dominant strategy is to cheat as well, 00:03:03.607 --> 00:03:05.797 then the Nash equilibrium in this game 00:03:05.797 --> 00:03:08.818 is for both of them to break their promises. 00:03:09.183 --> 00:03:12.456 They'll each perform five shows and earn $6,000. 00:03:12.838 --> 00:03:15.525 Notice that this isn't an optimal outcome. 00:03:15.927 --> 00:03:18.047 It would be so much better for them to each perform 00:03:18.047 --> 00:03:19.842 only one show per week. 00:03:19.842 --> 00:03:21.389 They'd earn a lot more money, 00:03:21.389 --> 00:03:23.790 and they'd also have a lot more free time on their hands. 00:03:24.099 --> 00:03:26.489 But if we're just evaluating what to do 00:03:26.489 --> 00:03:28.839 from the payoffs listed in our matrix, 00:03:28.839 --> 00:03:33.450 it is in both Bob's best interest and Al's best interest to cheat. 00:03:33.450 --> 00:03:35.236 Thus, it's the Nash equilibrium. 00:03:35.500 --> 00:03:38.726 Of course, there's a real world outside of the matrix. 00:03:38.726 --> 00:03:41.433 The world is much more complicated than this. 00:03:41.433 --> 00:03:43.279 People care about keeping promises, 00:03:43.279 --> 00:03:44.648 and they think about the long run, 00:03:44.648 --> 00:03:46.598 rather than just week to week. 00:03:46.840 --> 00:03:49.350 So think of this example as just a simple 00:03:49.350 --> 00:03:50.940 but powerful starting point 00:03:50.940 --> 00:03:53.378 to better understand human decision-making. 00:03:53.578 --> 00:03:55.713 As always, let us know what you think. 00:03:55.713 --> 00:03:57.309 And, if you'd like more practice, 00:03:57.309 --> 00:03:59.229 check out our additional challenge questions 00:03:59.229 --> 00:04:00.460 at the end of this video. 00:04:00.561 --> 00:04:03.359 ♪ [music] ♪