0:00:01.841,0:00:03.603
So I thought I'd talk about identity.

0:00:03.627,0:00:06.148
That's sort of an interesting[br]enough topic to me.

0:00:06.172,0:00:09.556
And the reason was,[br]because when I was asked to do this,

0:00:09.580,0:00:13.008
I'd just read in one of the papers,[br]I can't remember,

0:00:13.032,0:00:15.904
something from someone at Facebook saying,

0:00:15.928,0:00:18.513
"Well, we need to make everybody[br]use their real names,

0:00:18.537,0:00:20.981
and then that's basically[br]all the problems solved."

0:00:21.005,0:00:22.460
And that's so wrong,

0:00:22.484,0:00:26.207
that's such a fundamentally[br]reactionary view of identity,

0:00:26.231,0:00:28.629
and it's going to get us[br]into all sorts of trouble.

0:00:28.653,0:00:30.196
And so what I thought I'd do is,

0:00:30.220,0:00:34.177
I'll explain four sort of[br]problems about it,

0:00:34.201,0:00:35.999
and then I'll suggest a solution,

0:00:36.023,0:00:38.140
which, hopefully,[br]you might find interesting.

0:00:38.164,0:00:39.920
So just to frame the problem:

0:00:39.944,0:00:41.709
What does "authenticity" mean?

0:00:41.733,0:00:43.274
That's me,

0:00:43.298,0:00:47.918
that's a camera phone picture[br]of me looking at a painting.

0:00:47.942,0:00:49.004
[What's the Problem?]

0:00:49.028,0:00:51.810
That's a painting that was painted[br]by a very famous forger,

0:00:51.834,0:00:54.040
and because I'm not very good[br]at presentations,

0:00:54.064,0:00:56.804
I already can't remember the name[br]that I wrote on my card.

0:00:56.828,0:01:00.435
And he was incarcerated in,[br]I think, Wakefield Prison,

0:01:00.459,0:01:04.231
for forging masterpieces by,[br]I think, French Impressionists.

0:01:04.255,0:01:07.144
And he's so good at it[br]that when he was in prison,

0:01:07.168,0:01:09.364
everybody in prison,[br]the governor and whatever,

0:01:09.388,0:01:11.827
wanted him to paint masterpieces[br]to put on the walls

0:01:11.851,0:01:13.096
because they were so good.

0:01:13.120,0:01:16.297
And so that's a masterpiece,[br]which is a fake of a masterpiece,

0:01:16.321,0:01:23.007
and bonded into the canvas is a chip[br]which identifies that as a real fake,

0:01:23.031,0:01:24.191
if you see what I mean.

0:01:24.215,0:01:25.268
(Laughter)

0:01:25.292,0:01:27.575
So when we're talking about authenticity,

0:01:27.599,0:01:29.897
it's a little more fractal[br]than it appears,

0:01:29.921,0:01:32.105
and that's a good example to show it.

0:01:32.129,0:01:37.432
I tried to pick four problems[br]that will frame the issue properly.

0:01:37.456,0:01:39.946
So the first problem, I thought,[br]chip and PIN, right?

0:01:39.970,0:01:42.667
[Banks and legacies[br]bringing down the system from within]

0:01:42.691,0:01:44.512
[Offline solutions do not work online]

0:01:44.536,0:01:46.536
Everyone's got a chip and PIN card, right?

0:01:46.560,0:01:48.003
So why is that a good example?

0:01:48.027,0:01:50.804
That's the example[br]of how legacy thinking about identity

0:01:50.828,0:01:53.679
subverts the security[br]of a well-constructed system.

0:01:53.703,0:01:56.767
That chip-and-PIN card[br]that's in your pocket

0:01:56.791,0:01:59.812
has a little chip on it[br]that cost millions of pounds to develop,

0:01:59.836,0:02:01.261
is extremely secure,

0:02:01.285,0:02:03.653
you can put scanning[br]electron microscopes on it,

0:02:03.677,0:02:05.847
you can try and grind it down,[br]blah blah blah.

0:02:05.871,0:02:09.258
Those chips have never been broken,[br]whatever you read in the paper.

0:02:09.282,0:02:12.541
And for a joke,[br]we take that supersecure chip,

0:02:12.565,0:02:16.216
and we bond it to a trivially[br]counterfeitable magnetic stripe.

0:02:16.240,0:02:19.431
And for very lazy criminals,[br]we still emboss the card.

0:02:19.455,0:02:23.106
So if you're a criminal in a hurry[br]and you need to copy someone's card,

0:02:23.130,0:02:26.271
you can just stick a piece of paper on it[br]and rub a pencil over it

0:02:26.295,0:02:27.474
just to speed things up.

0:02:27.498,0:02:30.332
And even more amusingly,[br]and on my debit card, too,

0:02:30.356,0:02:33.634
we print the name and the sort code[br]and everything else on the front.

0:02:33.658,0:02:35.208
Why?

0:02:35.754,0:02:39.867
There is no earthly reason why your name[br]is printed on a chip-and-PIN card.

0:02:39.891,0:02:41.788
And if you think about it,

0:02:41.812,0:02:44.812
it's even more insidious and perverse[br]than it seems at first.

0:02:44.836,0:02:48.349
Because the only people that benefit[br]from having the name on the card

0:02:48.373,0:02:49.528
are criminals.

0:02:49.552,0:02:51.173
You know what your name is, right?

0:02:51.197,0:02:52.204
(Laughter)

0:02:52.228,0:02:54.553
And when you go into a shop[br]and buy something,

0:02:54.577,0:02:56.972
it's a PIN -- he doesn't care[br]what the name is.

0:02:56.996,0:02:59.774
The only place you ever have to write[br]your name on the back

0:02:59.798,0:03:00.953
is in America.

0:03:00.977,0:03:02.178
Whenever I go to America,

0:03:02.202,0:03:05.035
and I have to pay with a magstripe[br]on the back of the card,

0:03:05.059,0:03:08.414
I always sign it "Carlos Tethers" anyway,[br]just as a security mechanism,

0:03:08.438,0:03:10.498
because if a transaction[br]ever gets disputed,

0:03:10.522,0:03:12.528
and it comes back[br]and it says "Dave Birch,"

0:03:12.552,0:03:14.279
I know it must have been a criminal,

0:03:14.303,0:03:16.527
because I would never[br]sign it "Dave Birch."

0:03:16.551,0:03:17.805
(Laughter)

0:03:17.829,0:03:19.872
So if you drop your card in the street,

0:03:19.896,0:03:22.101
it means a criminal[br]can pick it up and read it.

0:03:22.125,0:03:24.983
They know the name,[br]from the name, they can find the address,

0:03:25.007,0:03:27.178
and then they can go off[br]and buy stuff online.

0:03:27.202,0:03:28.881
Why do we put the name on the card?

0:03:28.905,0:03:32.486
Because we think identity[br]is something to do with names,

0:03:32.510,0:03:36.552
and because we're rooted[br]in the idea of the identity card,

0:03:36.576,0:03:37.754
which obsesses us.

0:03:37.778,0:03:40.370
And I know it crashed and burned[br]a couple of years ago,

0:03:40.394,0:03:44.304
but if you're someone in politics[br]or the Home Office or whatever,

0:03:44.328,0:03:45.752
and you think about identity,

0:03:45.776,0:03:48.992
you can only think of identity[br]in terms of cards with names on.

0:03:49.016,0:03:51.831
And that's very subversive[br]in a modern world.

0:03:52.427,0:03:54.680
So the second example I thought I'd use

0:03:54.704,0:03:56.499
is chat rooms.

0:03:56.523,0:03:57.679
[Chatrooms and Children]

0:03:57.703,0:03:59.191
I'm very proud of that picture.

0:03:59.215,0:04:01.709
That's my son playing[br]in his band with his friends

0:04:01.733,0:04:05.668
for the first-ever gig,[br]I believe you call it, where he got paid.

0:04:05.692,0:04:06.733
(Laughter)

0:04:06.757,0:04:08.484
And I love that picture.

0:04:08.508,0:04:11.800
I'll like the picture of him[br]getting into medical school a lot better,

0:04:11.824,0:04:12.840
(Laughter)

0:04:12.864,0:04:14.360
I like that one for the moment.

0:04:14.384,0:04:15.635
Why do I use that picture?

0:04:15.659,0:04:20.145
Because that was very interesting,[br]watching that experience as an old person.

0:04:20.169,0:04:21.524
So him and his friends,

0:04:21.548,0:04:24.403
they get together, they booked a room,[br]like a church hall,

0:04:24.427,0:04:27.490
and they got all their friends[br]who had bands, got them together,

0:04:27.514,0:04:28.992
and they do it all on Facebook,

0:04:29.016,0:04:32.604
and then they sell tickets,[br]and the first band on the --

0:04:32.628,0:04:36.229
I was going to say "menu," that's[br]probably the wrong word for it, isn't it?

0:04:36.253,0:04:38.159
The first band on the list of bands

0:04:38.183,0:04:42.000
that appears at some[br]public music performance of some kind

0:04:42.024,0:04:44.603
gets the sales from the first 20 tickets,

0:04:44.627,0:04:46.348
then the next band gets the next 20,

0:04:46.372,0:04:47.541
and so on.

0:04:47.565,0:04:49.851
They were at the bottom[br]of the menu, like, fifth,

0:04:49.875,0:04:51.259
I thought they had no chance.

0:04:51.283,0:04:53.341
He actually got 20 quid. Fantastic, right?

0:04:53.365,0:04:55.399
But my point is,[br]that all worked perfectly,

0:04:55.423,0:04:57.727
except on the web.

0:04:57.751,0:05:00.343
So they're sitting on Facebook,

0:05:00.367,0:05:03.007
and they're sending these messages[br]and arranging things,

0:05:03.031,0:05:05.616
and they don't know who anybody is, right?

0:05:05.640,0:05:07.606
That's the problem we're trying to solve.

0:05:07.630,0:05:09.301
If only they were using real names,

0:05:09.325,0:05:11.952
then you wouldn't be worried[br]about them on the internet.

0:05:11.976,0:05:13.136
So when he says to me,

0:05:13.160,0:05:17.205
"Oh, I want to go to a chat room[br]to talk about guitars" or something,

0:05:17.229,0:05:20.354
I'm like, "Oh, well,[br]I don't want you to go into a chat room

0:05:20.378,0:05:22.062
to talk about guitars,

0:05:22.086,0:05:24.111
because they might[br]not all be your friends,

0:05:24.135,0:05:26.408
and some of the people[br]that are in the chat room

0:05:26.432,0:05:29.653
might be, you know, perverts[br]and teachers and vicars --"

0:05:29.677,0:05:31.447
(Laughter)

0:05:31.471,0:05:34.742
I mean, they generally are,[br]when you look in the paper, right?

0:05:34.766,0:05:37.747
"So I want to know who all the people[br]in the chat room are.

0:05:37.771,0:05:39.534
So, OK, you can go in the chat room,

0:05:39.558,0:05:42.658
but only if everybody in the chat room[br]is using their real names,

0:05:42.682,0:05:45.646
and they submit full copies[br]of their police report."

0:05:45.670,0:05:46.824
(Laughter)

0:05:46.848,0:05:50.043
But of course, if anybody[br]in the chat room asked for his real name,

0:05:50.067,0:05:52.587
I'd say, "No. You can't[br]give them your real name,

0:05:52.611,0:05:55.109
because what happens[br]if they turn out to be perverts

0:05:55.133,0:05:57.317
and teachers and whatever?"

0:05:57.341,0:05:59.152
So you have this odd sort of paradox

0:05:59.176,0:06:01.327
where I'm happy for him[br]to go into this space

0:06:01.351,0:06:03.193
if I know who everybody else is,

0:06:03.217,0:06:05.820
but I don't want anybody else[br]to know who he is.

0:06:05.844,0:06:08.257
And so you get this sort of[br]logjam around identity,

0:06:08.281,0:06:10.683
where you want full disclosure[br]from everybody else,

0:06:10.707,0:06:11.863
but not from yourself.

0:06:11.887,0:06:13.735
And there's no progress, we get stuck.

0:06:13.759,0:06:15.876
So the chat room thing[br]doesn't work properly,

0:06:15.900,0:06:18.506
and it's a very bad way[br]of thinking about identity.

0:06:18.937,0:06:22.762
Cheerleading ... so, on my RSS feed,[br]I saw this thing about --

0:06:22.786,0:06:25.358
I just said something bad[br]about my RSS feed, didn't I?

0:06:25.382,0:06:27.008
I should stop saying it like that.

0:06:27.032,0:06:28.892
For some random reason I can't imagine,

0:06:28.916,0:06:31.357
something about cheerleaders[br]turned up in my in-box.

0:06:31.381,0:06:34.735
And I read this story about cheerleaders,[br]and it's a fascinating story.

0:06:34.759,0:06:36.913
This happened a couple[br]of years ago in the US.

0:06:36.937,0:06:40.240
There were some cheerleaders[br]in a team at a high school in the US,

0:06:40.264,0:06:43.046
and they said mean things[br]about their cheerleading coach,

0:06:43.070,0:06:46.842
as I'm sure kids do about[br]all of their teachers all of the time,

0:06:46.866,0:06:49.545
and somehow, the cheerleading coach[br]found out about this.

0:06:49.569,0:06:50.728
She was very upset.

0:06:50.752,0:06:52.738
So she went to one of the girls and said,

0:06:52.762,0:06:54.875
"You have to give me[br]your Facebook password."

0:06:54.899,0:06:56.106
I read this all the time,

0:06:56.130,0:06:58.800
where even at some universities[br]and places of education,

0:06:58.824,0:07:01.363
kids are forced to hand over[br]their Facebook passwords.

0:07:01.387,0:07:03.637
So you have to give them[br]your Facebook password.

0:07:03.661,0:07:06.442
So the kid -- she was a kid![br]What she should have said is,

0:07:06.466,0:07:09.200
"My lawyer will be calling[br]you first thing in the morning.

0:07:09.224,0:07:12.596
It's an outrageous imposition[br]on my Fourth Amendment right to privacy.

0:07:12.620,0:07:14.722
You'll be sued[br]for all the money you've got!"

0:07:14.746,0:07:16.332
That's what she should have said.

0:07:16.356,0:07:18.610
But she's a kid,[br]so she hands over the password.

0:07:18.634,0:07:20.112
The teacher can't log in,

0:07:20.136,0:07:22.533
because the school[br]has blocked access to Facebook.

0:07:22.557,0:07:25.340
So the teacher can't log into Facebook[br]till she gets home.

0:07:25.364,0:07:26.801
So the girl tells her friends,

0:07:26.825,0:07:29.516
"Guess what happened?[br]The teacher logged in. She knows."

0:07:29.540,0:07:32.675
So the girls all logged into Facebook[br]and deleted their profiles.

0:07:32.699,0:07:35.289
So when the teacher logged in,[br]there was nothing there.

0:07:35.313,0:07:39.295
My point is: those identities,[br]they don't think about them the same way.

0:07:39.319,0:07:43.169
Identity is -- especially when[br]you're a teenager -- a fluid thing.

0:07:43.193,0:07:45.729
You have lots of identities,[br]you experiment with them.

0:07:45.753,0:07:49.433
And if you have an identity you don't[br]like because it's subverted in some way

0:07:49.457,0:07:51.315
or it's insecure or it's inappropriate,

0:07:51.339,0:07:53.207
you just delete it and get another one.

0:07:53.231,0:07:56.458
The idea that you have an identity[br]that's given to you by someone,

0:07:56.482,0:07:57.781
the government or whatever,

0:07:57.805,0:08:00.869
and you have to stick with that identity[br]and use it in all places

0:08:00.893,0:08:02.046
is absolutely wrong.

0:08:02.070,0:08:04.997
Why would you want to really know[br]who someone was on Facebook,

0:08:05.021,0:08:07.846
unless you wanted to abuse them[br]and harass them in some way?

0:08:07.870,0:08:09.766
It just doesn't work properly.

0:08:09.790,0:08:11.240
And my fourth example is,

0:08:11.264,0:08:14.470
there are some cases[br]where you really want to be --

0:08:14.494,0:08:18.041
in case you're wondering,[br]that's me at the G20 protest.

0:08:18.065,0:08:19.827
I wasn't actually at the G20 protest,

0:08:19.851,0:08:23.907
but I had a meeting at a bank[br]on the day of the G20 protest.

0:08:23.931,0:08:25.913
And I got an email from the bank, saying,

0:08:25.937,0:08:29.215
"Please don't wear a suit,[br]because it'll inflame the protesters."

0:08:29.239,0:08:31.579
I look pretty good in a suit, frankly,

0:08:31.603,0:08:34.897
so you can see why it would drive them[br]into an anticapitalist frenzy.

0:08:34.921,0:08:35.929
(Laughter)

0:08:35.953,0:08:39.196
So I thought, "Well, if I don't[br]want to inflame the protesters,

0:08:39.220,0:08:41.825
the obvious thing to do[br]is go dressed as a protester."

0:08:41.849,0:08:45.230
So I went dressed completely in black,[br]you know, black balaclava ...

0:08:45.254,0:08:48.416
I had black gloves on but took them off[br]to sign the visitors' book.

0:08:48.440,0:08:49.442
(Laughter)

0:08:49.466,0:08:52.764
I'm wearing black trousers and boots,[br]I'm dressed completely in black.

0:08:52.788,0:08:55.378
I go into the bank at 10am[br]and go, "Hi, I'm Dave Birch,

0:08:55.402,0:08:57.172
I've got a 3 o'clock with so-and-so."

0:08:57.196,0:08:59.868
"Sure!" And they sign me in.[br]There's my visitor's badge.

0:08:59.892,0:09:00.894
(Laughter)

0:09:00.918,0:09:04.766
So this nonsense about "you've got to have[br]real names on Facebook" and whatever,

0:09:04.790,0:09:06.566
that gets you that kind of security.

0:09:06.590,0:09:08.691
That gets you "security theater,"

0:09:08.715,0:09:10.662
where there's no actual security,

0:09:10.686,0:09:13.988
but people are sort of playing parts[br]in a play about security,

0:09:14.012,0:09:16.111
and as long as everybody[br]learns their lines,

0:09:16.135,0:09:17.288
everyone's happy.

0:09:17.312,0:09:19.284
But it's not real security, right?

0:09:20.036,0:09:23.073
Especially because I hate banks[br]more than the G20 protesters do,

0:09:23.097,0:09:24.258
because I work for them.

0:09:24.282,0:09:27.465
I know that things are actually worse[br]than these guys think.

0:09:27.489,0:09:29.532
(Laughter)

0:09:30.472,0:09:35.353
But suppose I worked[br]next to somebody in a bank

0:09:35.377,0:09:36.764
who was doing something --

0:09:36.788,0:09:41.487
you know, they were like people who take[br]the money from banks and don't ...

0:09:41.511,0:09:43.095
you know, they take the money ...

0:09:43.119,0:09:45.505
Oh -- "traders."[br]That's the word I was thinking of.

0:09:45.529,0:09:47.633
Suppose I was sitting[br]next to a rogue trader,

0:09:47.657,0:09:49.917
and I want to report it[br]to the boss of the bank.

0:09:49.941,0:09:51.947
So I log on to do a little whistleblowing.

0:09:51.971,0:09:54.128
I send a message,[br]"This guy's a rogue trader."

0:09:54.152,0:09:55.484
That message is meaningless

0:09:55.508,0:09:58.076
if you don't know[br]that I'm a trader at the bank.

0:09:58.100,0:10:00.037
If that message just comes from anybody,

0:10:00.061,0:10:02.695
it has zero information value.

0:10:02.719,0:10:04.750
There's no point in sending that message.

0:10:04.774,0:10:06.841
You have to know that I'm ...

0:10:06.865,0:10:09.283
But if I have to prove who I am,

0:10:09.307,0:10:11.052
I'll never send that message.

0:10:11.076,0:10:14.665
It's just like the nurse in the hospital[br]reporting the drunk surgeon.

0:10:14.689,0:10:17.770
That message will only happen[br]if I'm anonymous.

0:10:17.794,0:10:22.218
So the system has to have ways[br]of providing anonymity in it,

0:10:22.242,0:10:24.520
otherwise, we don't get[br]where we want to get to.

0:10:24.544,0:10:26.628
So, four issues.

0:10:26.652,0:10:28.963
So what are we going to do about it?

0:10:28.987,0:10:32.087
Well, what we tend to do about it

0:10:32.111,0:10:34.681
is we think about Orwell space.

0:10:34.705,0:10:38.545
And we try to make electronic versions[br]of the identity card

0:10:38.569,0:10:40.141
that we got rid of in 1953.

0:10:40.165,0:10:42.696
So we think if we had a card --

0:10:42.720,0:10:44.134
call it a Facebook login --

0:10:44.158,0:10:45.354
which proves who you are,

0:10:45.378,0:10:47.159
and I make you carry it all the time,

0:10:47.183,0:10:48.339
that solves the problem.

0:10:48.363,0:10:51.593
And of course, for all those[br]reasons I've just outlined, it doesn't,

0:10:51.617,0:10:53.443
and it might make some problems worse.

0:10:53.467,0:10:56.069
The more times you're forced[br]to use your real identity,

0:10:56.093,0:10:57.672
certainly in transactional terms,

0:10:57.696,0:11:00.593
the more likely that identity[br]is to get stolen and subverted.

0:11:00.617,0:11:02.770
The goal is to stop people[br]from using identity

0:11:02.794,0:11:04.815
in transactions which don't need identity,

0:11:04.839,0:11:07.097
which is actually almost all transactions.

0:11:07.121,0:11:11.175
Almost all of the transactions you do[br]are not "Who are you?"

0:11:11.199,0:11:13.269
They're "Are you allowed[br]to drive the car?"

0:11:13.293,0:11:15.807
"Are you allowed in the building?"[br]"Are you over 18?"

0:11:15.831,0:11:17.784
etcetera, etcetera.

0:11:17.808,0:11:19.495
So my suggestion -- I, like James,

0:11:19.519,0:11:22.540
think that there should be[br]a resurgence of interest in R and D.

0:11:22.564,0:11:24.238
I think this is a solvable problem.

0:11:24.262,0:11:25.746
It's something we can do about.

0:11:25.770,0:11:28.799
Naturally, in these circumstances,[br]I turn to Doctor Who.

0:11:28.823,0:11:29.976
Because in this --

0:11:30.000,0:11:31.001
(Laughter)

0:11:31.025,0:11:32.690
as in so many other walks of life,

0:11:32.714,0:11:35.413
Doctor Who has already[br]shown us the answer.

0:11:35.437,0:11:38.610
So I should say,[br]for some of our foreign visitors:

0:11:38.634,0:11:42.390
Doctor Who is the greatest[br]living scientist in England --

0:11:42.414,0:11:44.079
(Laughter)

0:11:44.103,0:11:46.909
and a beacon of truth[br]and enlightenment to all of us.

0:11:46.933,0:11:49.948
And this is Doctor Who[br]with his "psychic paper."

0:11:49.972,0:11:52.919
Come on, you guys must have seen[br]Doctor Who's "psychic paper."

0:11:52.943,0:11:54.886
You're not nerds if you say yes.

0:11:54.910,0:11:57.196
Who's seen Doctor Who's psychic paper?

0:11:57.220,0:12:00.429
Oh right, you were in the library[br]the whole time studying, I guess.

0:12:00.453,0:12:02.234
Is that what you're going to tell us?

0:12:02.258,0:12:03.702
Doctor Who's psychic paper is:

0:12:03.726,0:12:05.393
when you hold up the psychic paper,

0:12:05.417,0:12:06.764
the person, in their brain,

0:12:06.788,0:12:08.915
sees the thing that they need to see.

0:12:08.939,0:12:11.341
So I want to show you a British passport,

0:12:11.365,0:12:12.717
I hold up the psychic paper,

0:12:12.741,0:12:14.056
you see a British passport.

0:12:14.080,0:12:15.707
I want to get into a party,

0:12:15.731,0:12:17.115
I hold up the psychic paper,

0:12:17.139,0:12:18.569
I show you a party invitation.

0:12:18.593,0:12:20.526
You see what you want to see.

0:12:20.550,0:12:23.840
So what I'm saying is, we need[br]to make an electronic version of that,

0:12:23.864,0:12:26.070
but with one tiny, tiny change,

0:12:26.094,0:12:28.667
which is that it'll only show you[br]the British passport

0:12:28.691,0:12:29.884
if I've actually got one.

0:12:29.908,0:12:32.911
It'll only show you the party invitation[br]if I actually have one.

0:12:32.935,0:12:35.981
It will only show you that I'm over 18[br]if I actually am over 18.

0:12:36.005,0:12:37.237
But nothing else.

0:12:37.998,0:12:42.804
So you're the bouncer at the pub,[br]you need to know that I'm over 18.

0:12:42.828,0:12:44.849
Instead of showing you my driving license,

0:12:44.873,0:12:46.598
which shows you I know how to drive,

0:12:46.622,0:12:49.392
what my name is, my address,[br]all these kind of things,

0:12:49.416,0:12:50.905
I show you my psychic paper,

0:12:50.929,0:12:53.362
and all it tells you is,[br]am I over 18 or not.

0:12:54.051,0:12:55.395
Right.

0:12:55.419,0:12:56.893
Is that just a pipe dream?

0:12:56.917,0:12:59.495
Of course not, otherwise[br]I wouldn't be here talking.

0:12:59.519,0:13:01.575
So, in order to build that[br]and make it work,

0:13:01.599,0:13:04.362
I'm only going to name these things,[br]I'll not go into them:

0:13:04.386,0:13:05.825
we need a plan,

0:13:05.849,0:13:08.484
which is, we're going to build[br]this as an infrastructure

0:13:08.508,0:13:10.959
for everybody to use[br]to solve all of these problems.

0:13:10.983,0:13:12.611
We're going to make a utility.

0:13:12.635,0:13:15.412
The utility has to be universal,[br]you can use it everywhere.

0:13:15.436,0:13:18.647
I'm just giving you little flashes[br]of the technology as we go along.

0:13:18.671,0:13:19.831
That's a Japanese ATM,

0:13:19.855,0:13:22.633
the fingerprint template[br]is stored inside the mobile phone.

0:13:22.657,0:13:24.363
So when you want to draw money out,

0:13:24.387,0:13:26.793
you put the phone on the ATM[br]and touch your finger,

0:13:26.817,0:13:28.828
your fingerprint[br]goes through to the phone,

0:13:28.852,0:13:30.662
the phone says, "Yes, that's whoever,"

0:13:30.686,0:13:32.508
and the ATM then gives you some money.

0:13:32.532,0:13:35.543
It has to be a utility[br]that you can use everywhere.

0:13:35.567,0:13:37.406
It has to be absolutely convenient.

0:13:37.430,0:13:40.574
That's me going into the pub.

0:13:40.598,0:13:43.487
All the device on the door[br]of the pub is allowed is:

0:13:43.511,0:13:47.161
Is this person over 18[br]and not barred from the pub?

0:13:47.185,0:13:50.339
And so the idea is,[br]you touch your ID card to the door,

0:13:50.363,0:13:52.377
and if I'm allowed in,[br]it shows my picture,

0:13:52.401,0:13:53.974
if I'm not, it shows a red cross.

0:13:53.998,0:13:56.001
It doesn't disclose any other information.

0:13:56.025,0:13:57.648
It has to have no special gadgets.

0:13:57.672,0:14:00.727
That can only mean one thing,[br]following on from Ross's statement,

0:14:00.751,0:14:03.664
which I agree with completely:[br]if it means no special gadgets,

0:14:03.688,0:14:05.214
it has to run on a mobile phone.

0:14:05.238,0:14:08.287
That's the only choice we have,[br]to make it work on mobile phones.

0:14:08.311,0:14:10.613
There are 6.6 billion[br]mobile phone subscriptions.

0:14:10.637,0:14:14.231
My favorite statistic of all time:[br]only 4 billion toothbrushes in the world.

0:14:14.255,0:14:16.160
That means something. I don't know what.

0:14:16.184,0:14:17.252
(Laughter)

0:14:17.276,0:14:19.476
I rely on our futurologists to tell me.

0:14:19.500,0:14:21.581
It has to be a utility[br]which is extensible.

0:14:21.605,0:14:24.138
So it has to be something[br]that anybody could build on.

0:14:24.162,0:14:26.505
Anybody should be able[br]to use this infrastructure;

0:14:26.529,0:14:28.783
you don't need permissions,[br]licenses, whatever.

0:14:28.807,0:14:32.539
Anyone should be able[br]to write some code to do this.

0:14:33.427,0:14:36.656
Well, you know what symmetry is,[br]so you don't need a picture of it.

0:14:36.680,0:14:38.262
This is how we're going to do it.

0:14:38.286,0:14:40.872
We're going to do it using phones[br]and mobile proximity.

0:14:40.896,0:14:42.361
I'm going to suggest to you

0:14:42.385,0:14:45.857
the technology to implement Doctor Who's[br]psychic paper is already here,

0:14:45.881,0:14:48.846
and if any of you have got[br]one of the new Barclay's debit cards

0:14:48.870,0:14:50.641
with the contactless interface on it,

0:14:50.665,0:14:52.865
you've already got that technology.

0:14:52.889,0:14:55.825
Have you ever been up to the big city[br]and used an Oyster card?

0:14:55.849,0:14:57.003
Does that ring a bell?

0:14:57.027,0:14:58.465
The technology already exists.

0:14:58.489,0:15:00.973
The first phones that have[br]the technology built in --

0:15:00.997,0:15:03.550
the Google Nexus, the S II,[br]the [Samsung Wave 578] --

0:15:03.574,0:15:07.503
the first phones that have the technology[br]built into them are already in the shops.

0:15:07.527,0:15:10.421
So the idea that the gasman[br]can turn up at my mum's door,

0:15:10.445,0:15:12.376
and he can show my mum his phone,

0:15:12.400,0:15:14.110
and she can tap it with her phone,

0:15:14.134,0:15:17.003
and it'll come up with green[br]if he really is from British Gas

0:15:17.027,0:15:18.183
and allowed in,

0:15:18.207,0:15:20.644
and will come up with red[br]if he isn't, end of story.

0:15:20.668,0:15:22.294
We have the technology to do that.

0:15:22.318,0:15:23.471
And what's more,

0:15:23.495,0:15:26.262
although some of those things[br]sound a bit counterintuitive,

0:15:26.286,0:15:28.631
like proving I'm over 18[br]without proving who I am,

0:15:28.655,0:15:30.711
the cryptography to do that[br]not only exists,

0:15:30.735,0:15:32.889
it's extremely well-known[br]and well-understood.

0:15:32.913,0:15:35.840
Digital signatures, the blinding[br]of public key certificates --

0:15:35.864,0:15:38.118
these technologies[br]have been around for a while,

0:15:38.142,0:15:40.152
we've just had no way[br]of packaging them up.

0:15:40.176,0:15:41.760
So the technology already exists.

0:15:41.784,0:15:45.084
We know it works.

0:15:45.108,0:15:47.591
There are a few examples[br]of the technology being used

0:15:47.615,0:15:48.850
in experimental places.

0:15:48.874,0:15:50.179
That's London Fashion Week,

0:15:50.203,0:15:52.054
where we built a system with O2.

0:15:52.078,0:15:54.694
That's for the Wireless[br]Festival in Hyde Park.

0:15:54.718,0:15:57.382
You can see the person's[br]walking in with their VIP band,

0:15:57.406,0:16:00.321
it's being checked by the Nokia phone[br]that's reading the band.

0:16:00.345,0:16:03.326
I'm only putting those up to show you[br]these things are prosaic,

0:16:03.350,0:16:05.209
this stuff works in these environments.

0:16:05.233,0:16:06.663
They don't need to be special.

0:16:06.687,0:16:12.168
So finally, I know that you can do this,

0:16:12.192,0:16:16.789
because if you saw[br]the Easter special of Doctor Who,

0:16:16.813,0:16:20.352
where he went to Mars in a bus --

0:16:20.376,0:16:22.553
I should say, again,[br]for our foreign students:

0:16:22.577,0:16:24.344
that doesn't happen in every episode.

0:16:24.368,0:16:25.782
This was a very special case.

0:16:25.806,0:16:28.730
So in the episode where he goes[br]to Mars in a London bus --

0:16:28.754,0:16:30.002
I can't show you the clip,

0:16:30.026,0:16:33.104
due to the outrageous restrictions[br]of Queen Anne-style copyright

0:16:33.128,0:16:34.414
by the BBC --

0:16:34.438,0:16:37.360
but in the episode where he goes[br]to Mars in a London bus,

0:16:37.384,0:16:41.419
Doctor Who is clearly shown[br]getting onto the bus

0:16:41.443,0:16:42.885
with the Oyster card reader

0:16:42.909,0:16:44.471
using his psychic paper.

0:16:44.495,0:16:47.947
Which proves that psychic paper[br]has an NFC interface.

0:16:47.971,0:16:49.146
Thank you very much.

0:16:49.170,0:16:50.396
(Applause)