0:00:01.841,0:00:03.603 So I thought I'd talk about identity. 0:00:03.627,0:00:06.036 That's sort of an interesting[br]enough topic to me. 0:00:06.060,0:00:09.214 And the reason was,[br]because when I was asked to do this, 0:00:09.238,0:00:12.777 I'd just read, in one of the papers,[br]I can't remember, 0:00:12.801,0:00:16.180 something from someone at Facebook[br]saying, well, 0:00:16.204,0:00:17.820 "we need to make everybody[br]use their real names." 0:00:17.844,0:00:20.178 and then that's basically[br]all the problems solved. 0:00:20.202,0:00:22.123 And that's so wrong, 0:00:22.147,0:00:26.066 that's such a fundamentally,[br]reactionary view of identity, 0:00:26.090,0:00:28.471 and it's going to get us[br]into all sorts of trouble. 0:00:28.495,0:00:29.829 And so what I thought I'd do 0:00:29.853,0:00:33.834 is I'll explain four[br]sort of problems about it, 0:00:33.858,0:00:35.797 and then I'll suggest a solution, 0:00:35.821,0:00:37.869 which hopefully you[br]might find interesting. 0:00:37.893,0:00:39.920 So just to frame the problem, 0:00:39.944,0:00:41.510 what does authenticity mean? 0:00:41.534,0:00:46.600 That's me, that's[br]a camera phone picture of me 0:00:46.624,0:00:47.580 looking at a painting. 0:00:47.604,0:00:48.345 [What's the Problem?] 0:00:48.369,0:00:49.477 That's a painting that was painted 0:00:49.501,0:00:51.519 by a very famous forger, 0:00:51.543,0:00:53.782 and because I'm not very good[br]at presentations, 0:00:53.806,0:00:56.521 I already can't remember the name[br]that I wrote on my card. 0:00:56.545,0:01:00.399 And he was incarcerated[br]in, I think, Wakefield Prison 0:01:00.423,0:01:03.965 for forging masterpieces by,[br]I think, French Impressionists. 0:01:03.989,0:01:07.144 And he's so good at it,[br]that when he was in prison, 0:01:07.168,0:01:08.520 everybody in prison,[br]the governor and whatever, 0:01:08.544,0:01:11.367 wanted him to paint masterpieces[br]to put on the walls, 0:01:11.391,0:01:12.659 because they were so good. 0:01:12.683,0:01:14.043 And so that's a masterpiece, 0:01:14.067,0:01:16.042 which is a fake of a masterpiece, 0:01:16.066,0:01:22.705 and bonded into the canvas is a chip[br]which identifies that as a real fake, 0:01:22.729,0:01:24.237 if you see what I mean. 0:01:24.261,0:01:25.429 (Laughter) 0:01:25.453,0:01:27.672 So when we're talking about authenticity, 0:01:27.696,0:01:33.134 it's a little more fractal than it appears[br]and that's a good example to show it. 0:01:33.158,0:01:37.115 I tried to pick four problems[br]that will frame the issue properly. 0:01:37.139,0:01:38.663 So the first problem, I thought, 0:01:38.687,0:01:40.215 Chip and PIN, right? 0:01:40.239,0:01:41.729 [Banks and legacies[br]bringing down the system from within] 0:01:41.753,0:01:42.601 [Offline solutions do not work online] 0:01:42.625,0:01:45.217 I'm guessing everyone's got[br]a chip and PIN card, right? 0:01:45.241,0:01:46.983 So why is that a good example? 0:01:47.007,0:01:50.458 That's the example of how[br]legacy thinking about identity 0:01:50.482,0:01:53.376 subverts the security[br]of a well-constructed system. 0:01:53.400,0:01:56.167 That chip and PIN card[br]that's in your pocket 0:01:56.191,0:01:59.409 has a little chip on it[br]that cost millions of pounds to develop, 0:01:59.433,0:02:00.986 is extremely secure, 0:02:01.010,0:02:03.249 you can put scanning[br]electron microscopes on it, 0:02:03.273,0:02:05.425 you can try and grind it down,[br]blah blah blah. 0:02:05.449,0:02:08.914 Those chips have never been broken,[br]whatever you read in the paper. 0:02:08.938,0:02:12.148 And for a joke,[br]we take that super-secure chip 0:02:12.172,0:02:15.662 and we bond it to a trivially[br]counterfeitable magnetic stripe 0:02:15.686,0:02:19.284 and for very lazy criminals,[br]we still emboss the card. 0:02:19.308,0:02:22.791 So if you're a criminal in a hurry[br]and you need to copy someone's card, 0:02:22.815,0:02:24.992 you can just stick a piece of paper on it[br]and rub a pencil over it 0:02:25.016,0:02:26.875 just to sort of speed things up. 0:02:26.899,0:02:29.971 And even more amusingly,[br]and on my debit card too, 0:02:29.995,0:02:32.362 we print the name and the SALT code[br]and everything else on the front too. 0:02:32.386,0:02:35.701 Why? 0:02:35.725,0:02:39.810 There is no earthly reason why your name[br]is printed on a chip and PIN card. 0:02:39.834,0:02:41.445 And if you think about it, 0:02:41.469,0:02:44.563 it's even more insidious and perverse[br]than it seems at first. 0:02:44.587,0:02:46.377 Because the only people that benefit 0:02:46.401,0:02:48.951 from having the name[br]on the card are criminals. 0:02:48.975,0:02:50.592 You know what your name is, right? 0:02:50.616,0:02:51.493 (Laughter) 0:02:51.517,0:02:53.745 And when you go into[br]a shop and buy something, 0:02:53.769,0:02:56.705 it's a PIN, he doesn't care[br]what the name is. 0:02:56.729,0:02:59.364 The only place where you ever have[br]to write your name on the back 0:02:59.388,0:03:00.534 is in America at the moment. 0:03:00.558,0:03:01.745 And whenever I go to America, 0:03:01.769,0:03:03.545 and I have to pay with a mag stripe[br]on the back of the card, 0:03:03.569,0:03:05.427 I always sign it Carlos Tethers anyway, 0:03:05.451,0:03:07.235 just as a security mechanism, 0:03:07.259,0:03:09.473 because if a transaction[br]ever gets disputed, 0:03:09.497,0:03:11.450 and it comes back and it says Dave Birch, 0:03:11.474,0:03:13.189 I know it must have been a criminal, 0:03:13.213,0:03:16.024 because I would never sign it Dave Birch. 0:03:16.048,0:03:17.714 (Laughter) 0:03:17.738,0:03:19.505 So if you drop your card in the street, 0:03:19.529,0:03:21.277 it means a criminal[br]can pick it up and read it. 0:03:21.301,0:03:21.982 They know the name, 0:03:22.006,0:03:23.911 from the name they can find the address, 0:03:23.935,0:03:26.326 and then they can go off[br]and buy stuff online. 0:03:26.350,0:03:28.538 Why do we put the name on the card? 0:03:28.562,0:03:32.257 Because we think identity[br]is something to do with names, 0:03:32.281,0:03:35.952 and because we're rooted[br]in the idea of the identity card, 0:03:35.976,0:03:37.068 which obsesses us. 0:03:37.092,0:03:39.664 And I know it crashed and burned[br]a couple of years ago, 0:03:39.688,0:03:44.219 but if you're someone in politics[br]or the home office or whatever, 0:03:44.243,0:03:45.624 and you think about identity, 0:03:45.648,0:03:48.839 you can only think of identity[br]in terms of cards with names on them. 0:03:48.863,0:03:51.985 And that's very subversive[br]in a modern world. 0:03:52.009,0:03:54.241 So the second example I thought I'd use 0:03:54.265,0:03:56.307 is chatrooms. 0:03:56.331,0:03:57.111 [Chatrooms and Children] 0:03:57.135,0:03:59.301 I'm very proud of that picture,[br]that's my son 0:03:59.325,0:04:03.377 playing in his band with his friends[br]for the first-ever gig, 0:04:03.401,0:04:05.346 I believe you call it, where he got paid. 0:04:05.370,0:04:06.133 (Laughter) 0:04:06.157,0:04:08.011 And I love that picture. 0:04:08.035,0:04:10.777 I like the picture of him[br]getting into medical school a lot better, 0:04:10.801,0:04:11.477 (Laughter) 0:04:11.501,0:04:13.590 I like that picture for the moment. 0:04:13.614,0:04:14.565 Why do I use that picture? 0:04:14.589,0:04:19.654 Because that was very interesting,[br]watching that experience as an old person. 0:04:19.678,0:04:21.097 So him and his friends, 0:04:21.121,0:04:23.975 they get together, they booked a room,[br]like a church hall, 0:04:23.999,0:04:25.825 and they got all their friends[br]who had bands, 0:04:25.849,0:04:27.135 and they got them together, 0:04:27.159,0:04:28.636 and they do it all on Facebook, 0:04:28.660,0:04:32.434 and then they sell tickets,[br]and the first band on the - 0:04:32.458,0:04:33.319 I was going to say "menu," 0:04:33.343,0:04:35.629 that's probably[br]the wrong word for it, isn't it? 0:04:35.653,0:04:37.559 The first band on the list of bands 0:04:37.583,0:04:42.116 that appears at some[br]public music performance of some kind 0:04:42.140,0:04:44.285 gets the sales from the first 20 tickets, 0:04:44.309,0:04:46.105 then the next band gets the next 20, 0:04:46.129,0:04:47.091 and so on. 0:04:47.115,0:04:48.427 They were at the bottom of the menu, 0:04:48.451,0:04:50.545 they were like fifth,[br]I thought they had no chance. 0:04:50.569,0:04:52.807 He actually got 20 quid. Fantastic, right? 0:04:52.831,0:04:54.904 But my point is,[br]that all worked perfectly, 0:04:54.928,0:04:57.685 except on the web. 0:04:57.709,0:04:59.878 So they're sitting on Facebook, 0:04:59.902,0:05:02.744 and they're sending these messages[br]and arranging things 0:05:02.768,0:05:05.063 and they don't know who anybody is, right? 0:05:05.087,0:05:06.694 That's the big problem[br]we're trying to solve. 0:05:06.718,0:05:08.661 If only they were using the real names, 0:05:08.685,0:05:11.352 Then you wouldn't be worried[br]about them on the Internet. 0:05:11.376,0:05:12.597 And so when he says to me, 0:05:12.621,0:05:16.963 "Oh, I want to go to a chatroom[br]to talk about guitars" or something, 0:05:16.987,0:05:20.212 I'm like, "oh, well,[br]I don't want you to go into a chatroom 0:05:20.236,0:05:23.570 to talk about guitars, because[br]they might not all be your friends, 0:05:23.594,0:05:25.833 and some of the people[br]that are in the chatroom 0:05:25.857,0:05:29.390 might be perverts and teachers[br]and vicars." 0:05:29.414,0:05:31.215 (Laughter) 0:05:31.239,0:05:34.144 I mean, they generally are,[br]when you look in the paper, right? 0:05:34.168,0:05:37.200 So I want to know who[br]all the people in the chatroom are. 0:05:37.224,0:05:38.939 So okay, you can go in the chatroom, 0:05:38.963,0:05:41.963 but only if everybody in the chatroom[br]is using their real names, 0:05:41.987,0:05:46.328 and they submit full copies[br]of their police report. 0:05:46.352,0:05:49.448 But of course, if anybody[br]in the chatroom asked for his real name, 0:05:49.472,0:05:51.690 I'd say no.[br]You can't give them your real name. 0:05:51.714,0:05:54.390 Because what happens[br]if they turn out to be perverts, 0:05:54.414,0:05:57.063 and teachers and whatever. 0:05:57.087,0:05:58.802 So you have this odd sort of paradox 0:05:58.826,0:06:01.133 where I'm happy for him[br]to go into this space 0:06:01.157,0:06:03.075 if I know who everybody else is, 0:06:03.099,0:06:05.438 but I don't want anybody else[br]to know who he is. 0:06:05.462,0:06:07.614 And so you get[br]this sort of logjam around identity 0:06:07.638,0:06:09.250 where you want full disclosure[br]from everybody else, 0:06:09.274,0:06:10.545 but not from yourself. 0:06:10.569,0:06:12.552 And there's no progress, we get stuck. 0:06:12.576,0:06:14.862 And so the chatroom thing[br]doesn't work properly, 0:06:14.886,0:06:19.227 and it's a very bad way[br]of thinking about identity. 0:06:19.251,0:06:22.162 So on my RSS feed,[br]I saw this thing about - 0:06:22.186,0:06:24.758 I just said something bad[br]about my RSS feed, didn't I? 0:06:24.782,0:06:26.513 I should stop saying it like that. 0:06:26.537,0:06:28.046 For some random reason, I can't imagine, 0:06:28.070,0:06:30.202 something about cheerleaders[br]turned up in my inbox. 0:06:30.226,0:06:32.179 And I read this story about cheerleaders, 0:06:32.203,0:06:33.628 and it's a fascinating story. 0:06:33.652,0:06:35.843 This happened a couple of years ago[br]in the U.S. 0:06:35.867,0:06:38.568 There were some cheerleaders[br]in a team at a high school 0:06:38.592,0:06:41.451 in the U.S., and they said mean things 0:06:41.475,0:06:42.637 about their cheerleading coach, 0:06:42.661,0:06:44.848 as I'm sure kids do[br]about all of their teachers 0:06:44.872,0:06:46.175 all of the time, 0:06:46.199,0:06:48.255 and somehow the cheerleading coach[br]found out about this. 0:06:48.279,0:06:49.719 She was very upset. 0:06:49.743,0:06:51.886 And so she went to one of the girls,[br]and said, 0:06:51.910,0:06:54.006 "you have to give me[br]your Facebook password." 0:06:54.030,0:06:57.695 I read this all the time,[br]where even at some universities 0:06:57.719,0:06:58.595 and places of education, 0:06:58.619,0:07:00.324 kids are forced to hand over[br]their Facebook passwords. 0:07:00.348,0:07:03.079 So you've got to give them[br]your Facebook password. 0:07:03.103,0:07:03.952 She was a kid! 0:07:03.976,0:07:05.138 What she should have said 0:07:05.162,0:07:06.368 is, "my lawyer will be calling you 0:07:06.392,0:07:07.158 first thing in the morning. 0:07:07.182,0:07:09.279 It's an outrageous imposition 0:07:09.303,0:07:11.138 on my 4th Amendment right to privacy, 0:07:11.162,0:07:11.923 and you're going to be sued 0:07:11.947,0:07:12.518 for all the money you've got." 0:07:12.542,0:07:13.574 That's what she should have said. 0:07:13.598,0:07:14.553 But she's a kid, 0:07:14.577,0:07:16.372 so she hands over the password. 0:07:16.396,0:07:18.422 The teacher can't log into Facebook, 0:07:18.446,0:07:21.594 because the school[br]has blocked access to Facebook. 0:07:21.618,0:07:23.507 So the teacher can't log into Facebook[br]until she gets home. 0:07:23.531,0:07:25.205 So the girl tells her friends, 0:07:25.229,0:07:25.766 guess what happened? 0:07:25.790,0:07:27.362 The teacher logged in, she knows. 0:07:27.386,0:07:29.203 So the girls just all logged into Facebook[br]on their phones, 0:07:29.227,0:07:31.070 and deleted their profiles. 0:07:31.094,0:07:33.955 And so when the teacher logged in,[br]there was nothing there. 0:07:33.979,0:07:39.607 My point is, those identities,[br]they don't think about them the same way. 0:07:39.631,0:07:43.336 Identity is, especially when[br]you're a teenager, a fluid thing. 0:07:43.360,0:07:44.941 You have lots of identities. 0:07:44.965,0:07:47.191 And you can have an identity,[br]you don't like it, 0:07:47.215,0:07:50.787 because it's subverted in some way,[br]or it's insecure, or it's inappropriate, 0:07:50.811,0:07:52.869 you just delete it and get another one. 0:07:52.893,0:07:56.193 The idea that you have an identity[br]that's given to you by someone, 0:07:56.217,0:07:57.012 the government or whatever, 0:07:57.036,0:07:59.131 and you have to stick with that identity[br]and use it in all places, 0:07:59.155,0:08:00.839 that's absolutely wrong. 0:08:00.863,0:08:03.871 Why would you want to really know[br]who someone was on Facebook, 0:08:03.895,0:08:06.753 unless you wanted to abuse them[br]and harass them in some way? 0:08:06.777,0:08:09.384 And it just doesn't work properly. 0:08:09.408,0:08:11.598 And my fourth example is[br]there are some cases 0:08:11.622,0:08:14.031 where you really want to be - 0:08:14.055,0:08:17.601 In case you're wondering,[br]that's me at the G20 protest. 0:08:17.625,0:08:21.277 I wasn't actually at the G20 protest,[br]but I had a meeting at a bank 0:08:21.301,0:08:24.710 on the day of the G20 protest,[br]and I got an email from the bank 0:08:24.734,0:08:29.271 saying please don't wear a suit,[br]because it'll inflame the protesters. 0:08:29.295,0:08:31.045 I look pretty good in a suit, frankly, 0:08:31.069,0:08:32.735 so you can see why it would drive them 0:08:32.759,0:08:34.236 into an anti-capitalist frenzy. 0:08:34.260,0:08:34.771 (Laughter) 0:08:34.795,0:08:35.700 So I thought, well, look. 0:08:35.724,0:08:38.869 If I don't want to inflame the protesters, 0:08:38.893,0:08:39.785 the obvious thing to do 0:08:39.809,0:08:41.190 is go dressed as a protester. 0:08:41.214,0:08:43.208 So I went dressed completely in black, 0:08:43.232,0:08:45.092 you know, with a black balaclava, 0:08:45.116,0:08:45.926 I had black gloves on, 0:08:45.950,0:08:47.563 but I've taken them off[br]to sign the visitor's book. 0:08:47.587,0:08:48.135 (Laughter) 0:08:48.159,0:08:50.318 I'm wearing black trousers, black boots, 0:08:50.342,0:08:51.724 I'm dressed completely in black. 0:08:51.748,0:08:52.898 I go into the bank at 10 o'clock, 0:08:52.922,0:08:53.863 go, "Hi, I'm Dave Birch, 0:08:53.887,0:08:55.139 I've got a 3 o'clock[br]with so and so there." 0:08:55.163,0:08:56.580 Sure. They sign me in. 0:08:56.604,0:08:59.351 There's my visitor's badge. 0:08:59.375,0:09:00.242 (Laughter) 0:09:00.266,0:09:01.560 So this nonsense 0:09:01.584,0:09:03.614 about you've got to have real names[br]on Facebook and whatever, 0:09:03.638,0:09:05.849 that gets you that kind of security. 0:09:05.873,0:09:10.368 That gets you security theater,[br]where there's no actual security, 0:09:10.392,0:09:13.706 but people are sort of playing parts[br]in a play about security. 0:09:13.730,0:09:14.831 And as long as[br]everybody learns their lines, 0:09:14.855,0:09:16.367 everyone's happy. 0:09:16.391,0:09:19.231 But it's not real security. 0:09:19.255,0:09:22.473 Especially because I hate banks[br]more than the G20 protesters do, 0:09:22.497,0:09:23.658 because I work for them. 0:09:23.682,0:09:26.485 I know that things are actually worse[br]than these guys think. 0:09:26.509,0:09:28.282 (Laughter) 0:09:29.872,0:09:34.942 But suppose I worked[br]next to somebody in a bank 0:09:34.966,0:09:37.974 who was doing something. 0:09:44.744,0:09:46.910 Suppose I was sitting[br]next to a rogue trader, 0:09:46.934,0:09:49.213 and I want to report it[br]to the boss of the bank. 0:09:49.237,0:09:50.629 So I log on to do[br]a little bit of whistleblowing. 0:09:50.653,0:09:53.094 I send a message,[br]this guy's a rogue trader. 0:09:53.118,0:09:54.892 That message is meaningless 0:09:54.916,0:09:57.840 if you don't know[br]that I'm a trader at the bank. 0:09:57.864,0:09:59.769 If that message just comes from anybody, 0:09:59.793,0:10:02.426 it has zero information value. 0:10:02.450,0:10:04.919 There's no point in sending that message. 0:10:06.463,0:10:09.206 But if I have to prove who I am, 0:10:09.230,0:10:10.611 I'll never send that message. 0:10:10.635,0:10:14.464 It's just like the nurse in the hospital[br]reporting the drunk surgeon. 0:10:14.488,0:10:17.385 That message will only happen[br]if I'm anonymous. 0:10:17.409,0:10:22.176 So the system has to have ways[br]of providing anonymity there, 0:10:22.200,0:10:24.439 otherwise we don't get[br]where we want to get to. 0:10:24.463,0:10:27.109 So four issues.[br]So what are we going to do about it? 0:10:27.133,0:10:31.796 Well, what we tend to do about it 0:10:31.820,0:10:34.184 is we think about Orwell space. 0:10:34.208,0:10:37.330 And we try to make electronic versions 0:10:37.354,0:10:39.637 of the identity card[br]that we got rid of in 1953. 0:10:39.661,0:10:42.394 So we think if we had a card, 0:10:42.418,0:10:43.733 call it a Facebook login, 0:10:43.757,0:10:45.030 which proves who you are, 0:10:45.054,0:10:46.921 and I make you carry it all the time, 0:10:46.945,0:10:47.739 that solves the problem. 0:10:47.763,0:10:49.897 And of course, for all those reasons[br]I've just outlined, 0:10:49.921,0:10:50.889 it doesn't, and it might, actually, 0:10:50.913,0:10:51.961 make some problems worse. 0:10:51.985,0:10:54.784 The more times you're forced[br]to use your real identity, 0:10:54.808,0:10:57.024 certainly in transactional terms, 0:10:57.048,0:10:59.906 the more likely that identity[br]is to get stolen and subverted. 0:10:59.930,0:11:02.170 The goal is to stop people[br]from using identity 0:11:02.194,0:11:04.347 in transactions which don't need identity, 0:11:04.371,0:11:06.856 which is actually almost all transactions. 0:11:06.880,0:11:09.153 Almost all of the transactions you do 0:11:09.177,0:11:10.841 are not, who are you? 0:11:10.865,0:11:12.975 They're, are you allowed to drive the car, 0:11:12.999,0:11:14.523 are you allowed in the building, 0:11:14.547,0:11:15.380 are you over 18, 0:11:15.404,0:11:17.495 etcetera, etcetera. 0:11:17.519,0:11:19.326 So my suggestion-I, like James, 0:11:19.350,0:11:22.487 think that there should be[br]a resurgence of interest in R & D. 0:11:22.511,0:11:23.272 I think this is a solvable problem. 0:11:23.296,0:11:25.092 It's something we can do about. 0:11:25.116,0:11:27.040 Naturally, in these circumstances, 0:11:27.064,0:11:28.414 I turn to Doctor Who. 0:11:28.438,0:11:30.550 Because in this, 0:11:30.574,0:11:32.194 as in so many other walks of life, 0:11:32.218,0:11:35.147 Doctor Who has already shown[br]us the answer. 0:11:35.171,0:11:35.961 So I should say, 0:11:35.985,0:11:38.292 for some of our foreign visitors, 0:11:38.316,0:11:42.146 Doctor Who is the greatest[br]living scientist in England, 0:11:42.170,0:11:43.723 (Laughter) 0:11:43.747,0:11:46.523 and a beacon of truth and enlightenment[br]to all of us. 0:11:46.547,0:11:50.593 And this is Doctor Who[br]with his psychic paper. 0:11:50.617,0:11:52.763 Come on, you guys must have seen[br]Doctor Who's psychic paper. 0:11:52.787,0:11:54.763 You're not nerds if you say yes. 0:11:54.787,0:11:56.899 Who's seen Doctor Who's psychic paper? 0:11:56.923,0:11:59.329 Oh right, you were in the library[br]the whole time studying I guess. 0:11:59.353,0:12:01.399 Is that what you're going to tell us? 0:12:01.423,0:12:02.661 Doctor Who's psychic paper 0:12:02.685,0:12:04.781 is when you hold up the psychic paper, 0:12:04.805,0:12:06.319 the person, in their brain, 0:12:06.343,0:12:08.668 sees the thing that they need to see. 0:12:08.692,0:12:11.027 So I want to show you a British passport, 0:12:11.051,0:12:12.053 I hold up the psychic paper, 0:12:12.077,0:12:13.533 you see a British passport. 0:12:13.557,0:12:15.329 I want to get into a party, 0:12:15.353,0:12:16.936 I hold up the psychic paper, 0:12:16.960,0:12:18.389 I show you a party invitation. 0:12:18.413,0:12:20.464 You see what you want to see. 0:12:20.488,0:12:23.679 So what I'm saying is we need[br]to make an electronic version of that, 0:12:23.703,0:12:25.876 but with one tiny, tiny change, 0:12:25.900,0:12:28.472 which is that it'll only show you[br]the British passport 0:12:28.496,0:12:29.688 if I've actually got one. 0:12:29.712,0:12:30.907 It'll only show you the party invitation 0:12:30.931,0:12:32.304 if I actually have one. 0:12:32.328,0:12:35.328 It will only show you that I'm over 18[br]if I actually am over 18. 0:12:35.352,0:12:37.652 But nothing else. 0:12:37.676,0:12:42.427 So you're the bouncer at the pub,[br]you need to know that I'm over 18, 0:12:42.451,0:12:44.451 instead of showing you my driving license, 0:12:44.475,0:12:46.292 which shows you I know how to drive, 0:12:46.316,0:12:48.888 what my name is, my address,[br]all these kind of things, 0:12:48.912,0:12:50.467 I show you my psychic paper, 0:12:50.491,0:12:53.633 and all it tells you is[br]am I over 18 or not. 0:12:53.657,0:12:55.069 Right. 0:12:55.093,0:12:56.407 Is that just a pipe dream? 0:12:56.431,0:12:58.100 Of course not, otherwise[br]I wouldn't be here talking to you. 0:12:58.124,0:13:01.184 So in order to build that[br]and make it work, 0:13:01.208,0:13:03.955 I'm only going to name these things,[br]I'll not go into them, 0:13:03.979,0:13:05.132 we need a plan, 0:13:05.156,0:13:06.381 which is we're going to build this 0:13:06.405,0:13:08.405 as an infrastructure for everybody to use, 0:13:08.429,0:13:10.259 to solve all of these problems. 0:13:10.283,0:13:12.307 We're going to make a utility, 0:13:12.331,0:13:13.855 the utility has to be universal, 0:13:13.879,0:13:14.738 you can use it everywhere, 0:13:14.762,0:13:17.953 I'm just giving you little flashes[br]of the technology as we go along. 0:13:17.977,0:13:19.336 That's a Japanese ATM, 0:13:19.360,0:13:22.444 the fingerprint template[br]is stored inside the mobile phone. 0:13:22.468,0:13:23.431 So when you want to draw money out, 0:13:23.455,0:13:24.928 you put the mobile phone on the ATM, 0:13:24.952,0:13:26.193 and touch your finger, 0:13:26.217,0:13:28.265 your fingerprint goes through[br]to the phone, 0:13:28.289,0:13:29.956 the phone says yes, that's whoever, 0:13:29.980,0:13:32.160 and the ATM then gives you some money. 0:13:32.184,0:13:35.197 It has to be a utility[br]that you can use everywhere. 0:13:35.221,0:13:36.983 It has to be absolutely convenient, 0:13:37.007,0:13:40.150 that's me going into the pub. 0:13:40.174,0:13:42.943 All the device on the door[br]of the pub is allowed is, 0:13:42.967,0:13:46.616 is this person over 18[br]and not barred from the pub? 0:13:46.640,0:13:49.946 And so the idea is,[br]you touch your ID card to the door, 0:13:49.970,0:13:51.905 and if I am allowed in,[br]it shows my picture, 0:13:51.929,0:13:53.366 if I'm not allowed in,[br]it shows a red cross. 0:13:53.390,0:13:54.981 It doesn't disclose any other information. 0:13:55.005,0:13:56.893 It has to have no special gadgets. 0:13:56.917,0:13:58.528 That can only mean one thing, 0:13:58.552,0:14:00.219 following on from Ross's statement, 0:14:00.243,0:14:01.697 which I agree with completely. 0:14:01.721,0:14:02.809 If it means no special gadgets, 0:14:02.833,0:14:04.183 it has to run on a mobile phone. 0:14:04.207,0:14:05.286 That's the only choice we have, 0:14:05.310,0:14:07.165 we have to make it work on mobile phones. 0:14:07.189,0:14:08.099 There are 6.6 billion 0:14:08.123,0:14:09.023 mobile phone subscriptions. 0:14:09.047,0:14:11.059 My favorite statistic of all time, 0:14:11.083,0:14:13.036 only 4 billion toothbrushes in the world. 0:14:13.060,0:14:14.095 That means something, 0:14:14.119,0:14:15.352 I don't know what. 0:14:15.376,0:14:15.730 (Laughter) 0:14:15.754,0:14:19.193 I rely on our futurologists to tell me. 0:14:19.217,0:14:20.903 It has to be a utility[br]which is extensible. 0:14:20.927,0:14:22.188 So it has to be something 0:14:22.212,0:14:23.778 that anybody could build on. 0:14:23.802,0:14:25.666 Anybody should be able[br]to use this infrastructure, 0:14:25.690,0:14:28.120 you don't need permissions,[br]licenses, whatever, 0:14:28.144,0:14:31.311 anyone should be able[br]to write some code to do this. 0:14:33.176,0:14:34.417 You know what symmetry is, 0:14:34.441,0:14:36.764 so you don't need a picture of it. 0:14:36.788,0:14:37.928 This is how we're going to do it. 0:14:37.952,0:14:38.962 We're going to do it using phones, 0:14:38.986,0:14:39.588 and we're going to do it 0:14:39.612,0:14:40.744 using mobile proximity. 0:14:40.768,0:14:41.880 I'm going to suggest to you 0:14:41.904,0:14:43.216 the technology to implement 0:14:43.240,0:14:44.502 Doctor Who's psychic paper 0:14:44.526,0:14:46.146 is already here, and if any of you 0:14:46.170,0:14:48.625 have got one of the new[br]Barclay's debit cards 0:14:48.649,0:14:49.854 with the contactless interface on it, 0:14:49.878,0:14:51.545 you've already got that technology. 0:14:51.569,0:14:53.469 If you've ever been up to the big city, 0:14:53.493,0:14:54.970 and used an Oyster card at all, 0:14:54.994,0:14:57.065 does that ring any bells to anybody? 0:14:57.089,0:14:57.811 The technology already exists. 0:14:57.835,0:14:59.201 The first phones 0:14:59.225,0:14:59.831 that have the technology built in, 0:14:59.855,0:15:02.130 the Google Nexus, the S2, 0:15:02.154,0:15:02.839 the Samsung Wifi 7.9, 0:15:02.863,0:15:04.331 the first phones that have 0:15:04.355,0:15:05.423 the technology built into them 0:15:05.447,0:15:06.257 are already in the shops. 0:15:06.281,0:15:07.969 So the idea that the gas man 0:15:07.993,0:15:10.161 can turn up at my mom's door 0:15:10.185,0:15:12.363 and he can show my mom his phone, 0:15:12.387,0:15:13.698 and she can tap it with her phone, 0:15:13.722,0:15:16.005 and it will come up with green[br]if he really is from British Gas 0:15:16.029,0:15:17.217 and allowed in, 0:15:17.241,0:15:18.887 and it'll come up with red if he isn't, 0:15:18.911,0:15:19.497 end of story. 0:15:19.521,0:15:21.347 We have the technology to do that. 0:15:21.371,0:15:22.582 And what's more, 0:15:22.606,0:15:24.727 although some of those things[br]sounded a bit counter-intuitive, 0:15:24.751,0:15:27.515 like proving I'm over 18[br]without proving who I am, 0:15:27.539,0:15:29.740 the cryptography to do that[br]not only exists, 0:15:29.764,0:15:31.969 it's extremely well-known[br]and well-understood. 0:15:31.993,0:15:34.624 Digital signatures, the blinding[br]of public key certificates, 0:15:34.648,0:15:36.368 these technologies have been around[br]for a while, 0:15:36.392,0:15:38.440 we've just had no way[br]of packaging them up. 0:15:38.464,0:15:41.157 So the technology already exists. 0:15:41.181,0:15:44.845 We know it works, 0:15:44.869,0:15:46.593 There are a few examples[br]of the technology being used 0:15:46.617,0:15:48.263 in experimental places. 0:15:48.287,0:15:49.591 That's London Fashion Week, 0:15:49.615,0:15:51.465 where we built a system with O2, 0:15:51.489,0:15:54.232 that's for the Wireless Festival[br]in Hyde Park, 0:15:54.256,0:15:55.355 you can see the persons 0:15:55.379,0:15:57.116 walking in with their VIP band, 0:15:57.140,0:15:57.600 it's just being checked 0:15:57.624,0:15:58.700 by the Nokia phone[br]that's reading the band. 0:15:58.724,0:16:00.398 I'm only putting those up to show you 0:16:00.422,0:16:01.627 these things are prosaic, 0:16:01.651,0:16:03.509 this stuff works in these environments. 0:16:03.533,0:16:04.962 They don't need to be special. 0:16:04.986,0:16:10.881 So finally, I know that you can do this, 0:16:11.789,0:16:14.669 because if you saw[br]the episode of Doctor Who, 0:16:14.693,0:16:16.569 the Easter special of Doctor Who, 0:16:16.593,0:16:19.945 where he went to Mars in a bus, 0:16:19.969,0:16:21.507 I should say again[br]for our foreign students, 0:16:21.531,0:16:23.180 that doesn't happen every episode. 0:16:23.204,0:16:24.651 This was a very special case. 0:16:24.675,0:16:27.892 So in the episode where[br]he goes to Mars in a London bus, 0:16:27.916,0:16:29.565 I can't show you the clip, 0:16:29.589,0:16:32.589 due to the outrageous restrictions[br]of Queen Anne-style copyright 0:16:32.613,0:16:34.482 by the BBC, 0:16:34.506,0:16:37.221 but in the episode[br]where he goes to Mars in a London bus, 0:16:37.245,0:16:41.355 Doctor Who is clearly shown[br]getting on to the bus 0:16:41.379,0:16:42.655 with the Oyster card reader 0:16:42.679,0:16:44.223 using his psychic paper. 0:16:44.247,0:16:46.315 Which proves that psychic paper 0:16:46.339,0:16:48.030 has an MSE interface. 0:16:48.054,0:16:50.064 Thank you very much.