This is Stewart Patrick
On this installment of the internationalist,
we'll be talking about one of the biggest problems
confronting the international community. That's the scourge of transnational crime.
We're fortunate today to be joined by one of the major experts in global crime,
Phil Williams who's the Posvar Chair in international security at the
University of Pittsburgh. Phil it's great to have you here.
-Stewart, it's great to be here. -Absolutely delighted to see you again.
It's often said that transnational criminals have been one of the
biggest beneficiaries of globalization.
Is it true that transnational crime has exploded since the end of the cold war?
And why has it been so hard for nation states, either individually,
or collectively, to actually come to grips with this phenomenon?
Two great questions. I think the first is, I think it's clear, globalization has
been very beneficial trans-nationally in several ways
First of all it's been a great facilitator so the increase in global flows,
for example, and the intermodal container have been absolutely wonderful for
various kinds of smuggling and trafficking.
So that's the first way. The second way is that globalization
hasn't raised all boats, it's actually had winners and losers.
Its disruptive effect I think has actually caused people to have to go into organized
crime and criminal activities and operate in illicit markets as coping mechanisms.
(Stewart) Has there been a connection at all between
the increase in transnational criminal activity and movements towards
liberalization of financial flows as well and sort of the
creation of global capital markets and global -------?
Yeah, what you saw from the 70's onward was the deregulation of global franchises.
And we got some new regulation to try to deal with money laundering, but it's not
been particularly effective I would argue. That took on further dimension after 9/11
when money laundering and terrorist finance were conflated even though they
are in fact very different. Terrorists are about raising money and using it for
nefarious purposes, they generally don't launder much money. Whereas for criminals,
it's all about the proceeds of crime, turning those proceeds from being
illegitimate to seeming to be the product of a legitimate activity.
(Stewart) You mentioned terrorism, a lot has been made,
especially since 9/11, of this supposed nexus that is emerging between
transnational organized criminal networks on the one hand,
and transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda and Hezbolla.
What's the evidence, how do you see this relationship?
I think there's an awful lot of nonsense talked about that relationship.
I think the term nexus is politically appealing,
analytically appalling in this context.
But there is some basis for it and the basis is that what we've seen is
a variety of violent armed groups, terrorists, insurgents, warlords, engage in
criminal activities as a funding mechanism and I think that's the key.
Sometimes when they engage in a criminal activity, they come into contact with
criminal organizations. But for the most part, the direct group to group link
is not that important or is just a market activity or supplier kind of relationship.
There are exceptions. I think particularly in insurgencies where the insurgents
and criminals are collocated, both geographically, and in a common
opportunity space, in those circumstances you tend to get cooperation.
A good example is kidnapping in Iraq. Where there were groups in it
just for profit but would sometimes kidnap people to order
from jihadi groups and would sometimes kidnap people on speculation that they
could then sell them off.
(Stewart) You mean as a fundraiser
Well, for them it was all about the profit.
For the jihadi groups, it was both profit and politics.
When you think about conventional wisdom and international criminals, the idea you
often have in mind is the mafia, the hierarchical organization,
the Pablo Escobars and this sort of previous generation.
(Stewart) When we're talking about networks, has
the nature of how these operations are organized changed?
I think it has. I think we're seeing a lot more networked organizations which are not
the strict hierarchy. But again, we have to be very careful because there is no
single model of a criminal organization. I think you've got a great variety of
different kinds of organizational structure.
One of the things we thought about for many years was the 'Ndrangheta, the
Calabrian group over in Calabria, but also operating extensively in Milan,
and with a global presence. The standard view was
that the 'Ndrangheta was, essentially networked,
and then as a result, a couple years ago,
of a major electronic eavesdropping operation and 300 arrests,
they actually found that is was more hierarchical than they thought.
There was a kind of directing group at the top.
(Stewart) So there are still some models-
There are still, and I think there are a lot of hybrids, too,
that we don't fully understand.
But I think the problem with a lot of people who study it is
we tend to think sometimes, this is the model, it's the only one.
And the world is really much more diverse and complex than that.
A lot of people have pointed to the relationship between
transnational criminal networks on the one hand, and
weak and failing states.
I'm wondering how you see the relationship between the sovereign,
territorial state and criminal networks. What sort of attributes,
if you were going to exploit a state,
do they look for that and are they even as dependent on states as much as
conventional wisdom would have?
I think they are.
These are what Jim Rosenau once called sovereignty-free actors.
And I think states are very bad at dealing with sovereignty-free actors.
States are geared up, they're organized, both their diplomatic and military
capabilities are organized to deal with other states.
So I think they found it very hard to adapt to non-states,
or sovereignty-free actors.
So that's the big problem, and I think you can see this in many ways.
I mean, when the US went into Iraq, in the summer of 2003,
there was a UN delegation that actually came and looked at organized crime.
They did a fabulous 30 page report, saying this is going to be a huge problem.
One of the people on that delegation once told me that when
they tried to brief US military and civilian leaders in Iraq,
they were met with a mixture of hostility and indifference.
(Stewart) A sort of not my lane?
This is not my lane and yet, it contributed to that enormous
sense of security in the years after 2003,
and then the insurgents jumped on the bandwagon, and realized
this could also be a big moneymaker.
And I think this is true, in general, of insurgencies everywhere, now.
We've seen it with Farc, where some people actually think it's actually even
transforming into just a drug trafficking ring.
(Stewart) Exactly
Although I don't buy that completely, I think it's much more a hybrid group.
But we see it in Farc, we see it with groups like the Taliban,
the Haqqani network in Afghanistan.
So this is a global phenomenon where a lot of political groups are using
criminal activities as a funding mechanism.
(Stewart) Now the Obama administration
But, we didn't deal with the weak state part of it.
Generally, I think, organized crime loves weak states.
It doesn't want failed states, but it likes weak states.
(Stewart) Failed states are too complicated for everybody to deal with.
That's right. But a weak state is wonderful. All states have
weaknesses, capacity gaps and functional holes.
Criminals can exploit those, and sometimes they become a surrogate
for the state. This is why I think many organized crime groups and certain
insurgencies provide alternative forms of government.
The Pentagon's had this notion of ungoverned spaces.
I can think of very few ungoverned spaces.
There are a lot of spaces that are alternatively governed
by someone we don't like.
(Stewart) Right, alternatively governed, not ungoverned.
Final question relates to what can be done at the multilateral level.
I know the Obama administration came out with a national strategy for confronting
transnational organized crime. The US seems to come up with one about every
10 years or so. And the European security strategy of earlier, not quite a decade
ago, talked about organized crime as one of the biggest threats
but at the international level, what are the major failings or weakness
in the UN system or organizations that you'd like to see filled?
Well, I think generally, multi-lateralism is problematic.
I think you've got to do it, but I think we tend to see
lowest common denominator solutions, we see buck passing,
we see kind of dilution of policies
because you've got to try to bring everybody
on board through consensus.
So I think there are inherent weaknesses in multi-lateralism.
I also think both states, and the community of states
are still bureaucratic, hierarchical, slow to operate, slow to respond
to groups that are very agile, very networked, very flexible
and able to respond very quickly both to opportunities and to dangers.
(Stewart) Well, Phil Williams, thank you so much for joining us
on this installment of the internationals. If you'd like to join the conversation,
please join us on my blog, The Internationalist, at cfr.org