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Mary's Room: A philosophical thought experiment - Eleanor Nelsen

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    Imagine a brilliant neuroscientist
    named Mary.
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    Mary lives in a black and white room,
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    she only reads black and white books,
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    and her screens only display
    black and white.
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    But even though she has never seen color,
    Mary is an expert in color vision
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    and knows everything ever discovered
    about its physics and biology.
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    She knows how different
    wavelengths of light
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    stimulate three types of cone cells
    in the retina,
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    and she knows how electrical signals
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    travel down the optic nerve
    into the brain.
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    There, they create patterns
    of neural activity
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    that correspond to the millions
    of colors most humans can distinguish.
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    Now image that one day,
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    Mary's black and white screen
    malfunctions
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    and an apple appears in color.
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    For the first time,
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    she can experience something
    that she's known about for years.
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    Does she learn anything new?
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    Is there anything about perceiving color
    that wasn't captured in all her knowledge?
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    Philosopher Frank Jackson proposed
    this thought experiment,
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    called Mary's room, in 1982.
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    He argued that if Mary already knew
    all the physical facts about color vision,
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    and experiencing color still teaches
    her something new,
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    then mental states, like color perception,
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    can't be completely described
    by physical facts.
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    The Mary's room thought experiment
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    describes what philosophers call
    the knowledge argument,
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    that there are non-physical properties
    and knowledge
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    which can only be discovered
    through conscious experience.
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    The knowledge argument contradicts
    the theory of physicalism,
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    which says that everything,
    including mental states,
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    has a physical explanation.
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    To most people hearing Mary's story,
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    it seems intuitively obvious
    that actually seeing color
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    will be totally different
    than learning about it.
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    Therefore, there most be some quality
    of color vision
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    that transcends its physical description.
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    The knowledge argument isn't just
    about color vision.
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    Mary's room uses color vision
    to represent conscious experience.
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    If physical science can't entirely
    explain color vision,
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    then maybe it can't entirely explain
    other conscious experiences, either.
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    For instance, we could know every
    physical detail
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    about the structure and function
    of someone else's brain,
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    but still not understand
    what it feels like to be that person.
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    These ineffable experiences
    have properties called qualia,
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    subjective qualities that you can't
    accurately describe or measure.
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    Qualia are unique to the person
    experiencing them,
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    like having an itch,
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    being in love,
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    or feeling bored.
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    Physical facts can't completely explain
    mental states like this.
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    Philosophers interested
    in artificial intelligence
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    have used the knowledge argument
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    to theorize that recreating
    a physical state
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    won't necessarily recreate
    a corresponding mental state.
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    In other words,
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    building a computer which mimicked
    the function of every single neuron
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    of the human brain
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    won't necessarily create a conscious
    computerized brain.
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    Not all philosophers agree that
    the Mary's room experiment is useful.
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    Some argue that her extensive knowledge
    of color vision
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    would have allowed her to create
    the same mental state
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    produced by actually seeing the color.
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    The screen malfunction wouldn't
    show her anything new.
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    Others say that her knowledge
    was never complete in the first place
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    because it was based only
    on those physical facts
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    that can be conveyed in words.
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    Years after he proposed it,
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    Jackson actually reversed his own
    stance on his thought experiment.
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    He decided that even
    Mary's experience of seeing red
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    still does correspond to a measurable
    physical event in the brain,
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    not unknowable qualia beyond
    physical explanation.
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    But there still isn't a definitive answer
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    to the question of whether Mary would
    learn anything new
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    when she sees the apple.
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    Could it be that there are fundamental
    limits to what we can know
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    about something we can't experience?
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    And would this mean there are certain
    aspects of the Universe
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    that lie permanently beyond
    our comprehension?
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    Or will science and philosophy allow
    us to overcome our mind's limitations?
Title:
Mary's Room: A philosophical thought experiment - Eleanor Nelsen
Speaker:
Eleanor Nelsen
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Team:
closed TED
Project:
TED-Ed
Duration:
04:52

English subtitles

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