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National Security Whistleblowers: To Be or Not To Be

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    Well, the first thing that I want to state
    is where I’m coming from, because this topic,
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    for one thing, to do in 11 minutes is virtually
    impossible, so I’m going to try and give
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    you kind of a 30,000 foot perspective, give
    you a little bit to think about. The work
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    that I do down in D.C. and across, really,
    the world is not only to represent whistle-blowers,
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    which is a topic that many people don’t
    fully understand, but to represent national
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    security whistle-blowers, which have their
    own sub-context, and then people who work,
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    just as an employment situation at the CIA,
    the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
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    Security Agency, and all these 3 letter agencies
    you hear about and you watch in movies. These
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    are people whose affiliation at times to the
    US Government is a classified secret. That
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    the work they do in other countries, if they
    were caught, they wouldn’t be simply determined
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    to be persona non grata and deported. They
    would be captured, tried, and possibly executed,
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    so the information that surrounds their activities
    can be significantly crucial, important, and
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    dangerous. So what’s a whistle-blower? You
    know, in the general sense, at least by law,
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    someone who’s going to disclose fraud, waste,
    abuse, gross mismanagement, unlawful activity.
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    In the context of a national security whistle-blower,
    that very information may be classified, and
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    the world that they live in is very compartmentalized.
    Someone in office one is working on an operation.
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    So is someone in office two and they have
    no idea what the other is doing? They have
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    pieces of this mosaic puzzle. So when you
    follow through in deciding to become a whistle-blower,
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    the ramifications for what you do can be incredibly
    serious. So when a regular whistle-blower
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    discloses information and it shows up on the
    Washington Post, the New York Times, the Democrat
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    & Chronicle, they can publicly appear. They
    can talk. They may be subject to retaliation,
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    as many whistle-blowers are. They may suffer
    repercussions at work. But generally speaking,
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    what they do is not going to necessarily put
    others lives in danger. Whistle-blowers, to
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    be one legally, they have to follow a certain
    process. Now, for most of you, that probably
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    doesn’t mean very much. You can look at
    an individual case and you go, “they’re
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    a whistle-blower,” in your mind. But legally
    they’re not, because they didn’t go through
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    the process, so they’re not subject to the
    protections that might exist under law. And
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    I’ll say right out, the protections are
    inadequate. Especially in the national security
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    field, they’re almost non-existent, which
    brings us to Edward Snowden, as my example.
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    So June of 2013, we first learned of this
    twenty nine year-old former systems administrator
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    for a defense contractor of the national security
    agency. He shows up in a hotel in Hong Kong,
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    China, having disclosed somewhere between
    tens of thousands to one point seven million
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    pages of highly classified information. Information
    that is so secret at times that very few people
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    inside the United States government was even
    aware of it. As someone in the intelligence
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    field, he had signed secrecy non-disclosure
    agreements that not only imposed a legal obligation
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    on him, but a moral obligation, in my view,
    because the ramifications of what his decisions
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    might be not just impact him, but they impact
    all of us. And they might not just impact
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    an individual life, but they impact the national
    security interests, the foreign relations,
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    the public interests that we have as Americans,
    and foreigners overseas, who are engaged in
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    operations with our people. His disclosures
    are in two categories primarily. One is the
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    one that you’ve all heard about, even if
    you didn’t want to pay any attention. It
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    was dominating the news. Domestic surveillance.
    Was the United States government collecting,
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    in particular metadata of all of our phone
    calls, and storing that in their massive computer
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    systems around the United States? Now metadata,
    if you remember from when we used to have
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    cell phone bills, years ago, that actually
    documented who we called, and when, for how
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    long because they wanted to charge us for
    the time. Now you get a master plan. Nobody
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    cares who you call. But all that data is collected
    by a third party. AT&T, Verizon, T-Mobile,
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    whoever. And the US government was collecting
    it from those companies. Now you can do a
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    lot with metadata, for sure. And some here
    may find that very disturbing. Some might
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    not. So far, one court has found it to be
    an unconstitutional collection, without warrants,
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    without permission from a federal court. Others,
    about five or six now have decided that it
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    was a constitutional collection, but it’s
    a very major topic, that he revealed as a
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    potential whistle-blower, not going through
    the system though. Not complaining up his
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    chain of command. Not going to an inspector
    general office. Not going to the congress.
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    Not going to a court of law. Instead, he went
    to several journalists, who, right or wrong,
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    have a certain ideological bent to their own
    agenda. The second category of information
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    is offensive intelligence operations that
    the US government was conducting overseas.
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    Engaging in espionage. That’s what they
    do. That’s what the NSA does. It’s what
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    the CIA does. It’s what is legal under our
    law. It might be illegal in the country they’re
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    engaged in. That’s, again, what espionage
    is all about. They’re doing it to us. We’re
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    doing it to them. You may not like that. You
    may think it’s what we do. One thing that
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    came out for example was that we were surveilling
    and intercepting phone calls of the German
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    Chancellor Angela Merkel. Now, you may think
    that’s a pretty stupid thing to do. It’s
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    definitely a questionable policy concern because
    they’re an ally. You’re not supposed to
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    be spying on your friends, right? Is that
    an issue for whistle-blowing? Is there anything
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    illegal about that? Is there anything that
    is fraudulent or abusive or wasteful? It’s
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    a policy issue, and you might not like it,
    but that’s what our leaders are supposed
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    to be deciding. What is best at that level
    in determining for example, whether or not
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    we were going to be able to engage in operations
    in Iraq and Afghanistan and use military bases
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    that we have in Germany, because the German
    population wasn’t in favor of it, so we
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    wanted to know what the German government
    was going to do. There are intelligence operational
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    issues that come into play with these types
    of disclosures and these types of surveillances.
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    There was an article just came out last week
    in The Intercept. Laura Poitrace, who just
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    did a film on Ed Snowden has been released,
    which some of you may go and see. And it talks
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    about human intelligence, what we call “Hu
    mint.” People on the ground in several countries
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    including Germany, South Korea, and the Republic
    of China, and that these individuals working
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    for our government are engaged in offensive
    operations in those countries to gather intelligence
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    for whatever purpose it was, mostly involved
    with computers and hacking. Anything illegal
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    about that? Anything wasteful, fraudulent?
    Anything that goes against what we’re supposed
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    to be doing? Now again from an ideological
    standpoint, you might think so. But to reveal
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    human agents, sources, operatives who are
    engaged in companies and governments overseas,
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    to me, is a level of irresponsibility that
    can’t be accepted. There are notions where
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    when you are a national security whistle-blower
    you are going to make judgment decisions,
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    and you have to do so with not only this legal
    authority, but this moral authority. Now the
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    question comes, what can one do? He has legitimate
    questions. We all do on these programs. What
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    do you do as a national security whistle-blower
    when you can’t go and tell anybody? You
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    can’t even go and tell your spouse, your
    family members what you’re engaged in. So,
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    for Snowden, what could he have done? He says
    he talked to superiors within his company.
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    He might have. We don’t have any proof of
    it. We’ll take him for his word. It wouldn’t
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    of done anything. I’ll grant you that. It’s
    a defense contractor. They’re more engaged
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    with their contract with the government. There
    were some emails released of his communications
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    with the inspector general and the general
    counsel’s office of the NSA. They were very
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    bland. They only asked some perfunctory questions.
    They sent some answers back and that was it.
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    He could have gone to other Inspector General
    Offices within the US Government. The Office
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    of the Director of National Intelligence,
    ODNI. The Defense Department. He could have
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    gone to the Intelligence Committees that have
    oversight jurisdiction over the NSA. On the
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    house side and the senate side, which were
    created in the aftermath of Watergate, and
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    the abuses that occurred in the 1960s, 50’s
    60’s out of McCarthy era, in particular?
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    He could have gone to individual members of
    Congress. We saw when the disclosures came
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    about, Senator Rand Paul, in fact, has sued
    the United States government to challenge
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    the domestic surveillance programs. He could
    have, in fact, brought a lawsuit in his own
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    right anonymously, as I’ve done for other
    CIA operatives to try and expose the information
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    without revealing the secrecy aspects of it.
    To bring to light questions that the public
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    can ask about. Now, would these things be
    effective? I don’t know. I could never promise
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    that anything that I could have done, or a
    colleague could have done in these types of
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    contexts, where we as the lawyers are restricted
    in what we can do or say because we are bound
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    by our own secrecy non-disclosure agreements
    when we have these cases. But I do know that
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    when you get to a certain stage and you don’t
    know everything about what you’re talking
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    about, that you’ve got to go that extra
    mile. You’ve got to seek the advice from
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    others. You’ve got to try and make and take
    every effort you can to do what you can before
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    you release information that can never be
    taken back. Now Snowden said, “I looked
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    at other whistle blowers and how they were
    treated, and they were mistreated.” And
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    he’s right. They were. The contexts are
    a little bit different, but the examples were
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    still the same. So he did it on his own and
    he just released the information. Now again,
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    going back to the amount of information in
    question, tens of thousands of pages to one
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    point seven million pages. It’s physically
    impossible for him to have actually read through
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    what he stole, and he gives it to these journalists,
    and in fact the journalists say, and he says,
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    “I haven’t disclosed any classified information”.
    “I have not written about it.” I gave
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    it to the journalists and I asked them to
    decide what they think should be released.”
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    Well that’s like giving a loaded weapon
    to a child and saying, “I wasn’t the one
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    who fired it. It was a decision of the child.”
    Now these are individuals who have no background
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    in intelligence or national security. Doesn’t
    mean the stories aren’t newsworthy. Of course
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    they are. Doesn’t mean that maybe we have
    a right to know as the public. In fact, we
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    do. And the public debate that’s happened
    since has been very enlightening, and is that
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    type of debate that will keep us in ensuring
    that the government doesn’t conduct abuses
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    that we’ve seen in the past. But the moral
    of the story, whenever I talk to anyone who
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    comes to me as a national security whistle
    blower, is responsibility. It’s not just
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    to you and your own principles, whatever they
    might be. It’s to all of us, as well. And
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    what you do, what you advocate may have such
    profound impact, negative or positive, that
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    you have to think twice. Thank you.
Title:
National Security Whistleblowers: To Be or Not To Be
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Duration:
14:58

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