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#rC3 - CIA vs. Wikileaks

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    rC3 preroll music
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    Herald: As we said the years before, the
    force merged to main. Andy is commonly
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    known in our scene. His current talk "CIA
    vs. WikiLeaks: intimidation, surveillance,
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    and other tactics observed and
    experienced". In this talk Andy aims to
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    report and show us a collection of his
    observations, physical, visual and other
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    evidences of the last year incidents that
    strongly indicate the context of US
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    Central Intelligence Agency and
    potentially other entities of the US
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    government acting against WikiLeaks and
    surrounding persons and organizations.
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    Please welcome, with a very warm digital
    applause, Andy.
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    Andy: OK, I have no idea how a digital
    applause works here, but thanks for it
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    anyhow. At the beginning, I want to make
    and I have to make a few disclaimers, so
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    that you know which perspective you're
    getting here. I'm working as a data
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    journalist for quite a while around the
    topics of surveillance, signal
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    intelligence, data security. I'm running
    this funny buggedplanet, even started that
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    buggedplanet.info before Snowden came with
    all his documents. But I did work a while
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    with his documents. However, this talk is
    a bit different as I'm not talking about
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    things that I learned, studied or
    whatever, but I experienced myself. I'm
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    describing events here where I was
    targeted. So, I might not be the most
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    neutral person in this scenario, but I'm
    trying to be technically as accurate as
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    possible anyhow. So forgive me if I'm a
    bit grumpy about these people. That's just
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    because of their perspective. Secondly,
    while I've also and the CCC, of course,
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    has been addressing human rights issues in
    the digital age for a long time, we, and I
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    personally, co-founded EDRI, the European
    Digital Rights Initiative, to ensure the
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    enforcement of human rights in the digital
    environment. However, what happened here
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    is slightly beyond digital rights. It goes
    into real life. And while I'm a German
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    citizen, and I know roughly what kind of
    laws have been violated here, in respect
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    to the German environment, I absolutely
    would welcome people who help me analyze
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    and understand it from the perspective of
    the universal human rights, because there
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    is similar cases with people living in
    other jurisdictions and so on. Second
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    slide of disclaimers, sorry that it's so
    much, so I'm addressing with this talk
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    activities against people surrounding and
    have been and/or surrounding Julian and/or
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    WikiLeaks and/or other members of
    WikiLeaks. Whatever I describe here, I
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    have personally observed and experienced
    it. So it is for sure very incomplete.
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    It's at best a fragment of what's gone on.
    But you will, in case you haven't heard
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    about it yet, that Pompeo made some very
    clear statements when he was head of CIA.
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    It's pretty clear where to attribute these
    things. And lastly, there is, of course,
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    other persons mentioned. But I'm keeping
    them out here for all kinds of reasons.
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    But there will be the time when we will
    hear more reports and other perspective of
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    this particular situation. So, here's my
    little overview. I want to get you an idea
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    how to get into such a mess. Just in case,
    you know, you want it. The context and the
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    timeline, a bit of psychology as it's
    important because at some point you not
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    only get paranoid, you have this drive
    to... no this can't be true. Right? You
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    have this cognitive dissonance drive
    inside of you that you would like to stay
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    sane. The new normal of "IT-incidents".
    We're all used to that, covert vs. overt.
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    What I mean with the term intimidation
    surveillance, physical events and their
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    impact about the elephant in the room, the
    problem of the missing socks. And at the
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    end, a little bit of questions. Am I
    infectious, how to get out of this mess?
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    Maybe also. So, how to get into such a
    beautiful mess? Wait, it's not beautiful.
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    Well, there are some ideas we share in the
    hacker community usually, and even it's
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    not far from there to get into the
    journalist community. Information should
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    be free. Free flow of information is a bit
    of a requirement for world peace. And we
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    had this and I personally also had this
    type of self conception, self
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    understanding consciousness. Twenty years
    already when WikiLeaks started around
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    2006. So this is not that I was jumping or
    anybody in the scene was jumping onto
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    something that didn't exist until then.
    But WikiLeaks turned out to be an
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    extremely good concept as a democracy
    test. If governments cannot deal with full
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    transparency, well, that tells you a lot
    about them. But, of course, that is
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    similar to jumping to the last point,
    similar to working in journalism. When you
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    expose things in journalism be it
    corruption, be it hypocrisy of
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    politicians, be it blunt lies or whatever.
    It's not always about making friends. It's
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    yes, partly making friends, and partly
    pissing people off. That happens. However,
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    in this particular environment that Julian
    inspired to create. There's some
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    cultural, even misunderstandings. For
    example, the word conspiracy. For us in
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    Europe, I think many of us indeed German
    hacker scene are inspired by Robert and
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    Wilton's way of saying, oh, a conspiracy
    is like the world is full of them and we
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    should join the best of them. But in the
    American context, the word conspiracy is a
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    legal term, unfortunately. And when you
    are with American citizens in a room and
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    talk about conspiracies, they often get
    very nervous. And it's kind of a complete
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    different attitude. Because it's like the
    U.S. term to define people who belong to a
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    group like, organized criminals or
    organized, you know, this T word, this
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    other type of entities. And of course,
    that's absolutely not what we want to get
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    into involved here. But sometimes, we
    mistakenly are misunderstandingly joke
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    about conspiracies and people listening to
    this get it completely wrong. And I fear
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    that is also what happened and how me and
    others got into such a mess. So at the
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    end, of course, in journalism and that's
    similar to dealing with data from a
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    hackers perspective is about supporting
    media with data and information and so on.
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    So here is a bit of a timeline to give you
    a time frame. I'm now after I was a bit
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    long for about two decades a CCC
    spokesperson and board member blah blah
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    blah, I moved to the board of the Wau
    Holland Foundation. Wau Holland Foundation
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    collects actually money for WikiLeaks
    under the aspect of Wau's idea of
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    supporting Freedom of Information since
    2010 or so. I joint a little later.
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    However, when WikiLeaks started to publish
    the Afghanistan, the Iraq war logs and
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    diplomatic cables that already triggered
    legal investigations, and of course, the
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    arrest of then still Bradley, now Chelsea
    Manning, later. So there was always, it
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    was always clear, more or less right from
    the beginning, that there's legal trouble
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    on the way, that there's a secret grand
    jury and that the Americans didn't really
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    appreciate their war crimes to be exposed
    and the diplomatic cables to be in the
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    Internet, to be understood and readable
    for all of us and the media worldwide and
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    so on. Of course, when people come
    together and gather in any project, you
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    have human beings, you have, they have
    characters, they have mistakes. They do
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    things that are not always great. So I'm
    not trying to say here that everything was
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    always great and it was only the CIA
    messing it up. No, humans make mistakes
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    and these mistakes in such an environment,
    of course, get exploited, get amplified
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    and so on. In 2007, WikiLeaks started
    publishing some CIA documents and a whole
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    series of it, the so-called 'Vault 7'
    documents. And those documents describe
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    technology, exploit programs from the CIA.
    You probably, most of you will know them.
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    If not, you can now look them up. And
    these included tools that allowed the CIA
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    to pretend to be someone else, including
    coming from another country, speaking
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    another language, be from Russia, in
    Russia be from Iran and Farsi and so on.
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    And Pompeo, who was at that moment still
    head of the CIA, got very upset. And there's
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    two references from this, one from April
    2017, and another is from February 2018.
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    In his first public speech as a CIA
    director in 13 of April 2017, he made a
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    speech at a conference working in
    Washington and he said things like
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    WikiLeaks walks like a hostile
    intelligence service and talks like an
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    intelligence service. And called WikiLeaks
    a non-state hostile intelligence service.
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    So for those of you who know a little bit
    about information science, there's this
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    idea of data is actually something you can
    technically measure. Information is data
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    in a context and intelligence is
    information processed to a level where you
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    can make decisions based on it. So being a
    public intelligence service, I would say
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    from that perspective is like an honorable
    term. However, the way Pompeo emphasized
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    it, I think was slightly not that
    honorable. He was more comparing it to,
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    you know, other state actors and evil
    forces and so on, because the US
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    understanding of intelligence service far
    away from entities... sorry, I need a
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    water... Is far away from entities just
    collecting information, but as you know,
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    they also mess up with other people's life
    and so on. However, a year later, in
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    February 2018, he even upgraded this type
    of statement. The Zeit, German newspaper,
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    reported about what he said at the Munich
    Security Conference Intelligence
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    Roundtable, and he said, a really nasty
    sentence like that. Most of his time he's
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    dealing with the non-state actors. And
    that's like al-Qaida, Islamic State,
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    WikiLeaks or Hezbollah. Like what a list.
    So I have no idea what he has. What turned
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    him into comparing these kind of things? I
    mean, Hezbollah, I could say we in Berlin,
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    we know they provide actually yummy
    halloumi and some things. But yes, they
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    are money launderers and are a suspected
    terrorist in some areas or whatever, or
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    have been declared terrorist. But their
    hummus is really good, I can say. However,
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    the point I'm trying to come to. So Pompeo
    got very upset. He made all this
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    comparison and he seems to have allocated
    resources to deal with WikiLeaks and
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    everybody jumping around. And it's no
    surprise that as Wau Holland Foundation
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    finances selected activities of specific
    publications there, that we also got in
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    the focus with us collecting donations
    and, you know, talking with the guys and
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    financing some projects. So before I'm
    coming to very concrete events, I want to
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    get one second into psychology. So, of
    course, when things happen to you, from
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    the intelligence perspective, they always
    come with what's called plausible
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    deniability. When there's a guy standing
    in front of the door watching, you know,
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    if you come in and out, it's not just
    someone watching your door. It's someone
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    reading the newspaper or repairing some
    electrical pipes or some water pipe or
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    whatever. I mean, that's always a good
    reason for him to be there that has
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    nothing to do with what he's doing and
    that's a basic principle. Plausible
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    deniability, how intelligence agencies act
    in the so-called field. So meaning in your
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    home or on the street, following you or
    whatever. So over time, of course, if you
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    have too much of this, you're seeing these
    patterns, and that's probably mainly
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    called paranoia. So you get like, you
    know, suspicious of everything that
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    happens that might be very legitimate, but
    you get like the feeling that something is
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    wrong and so on. And that can be, we could
    also instead of paranoia, call it
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    situational awareness at some points,
    because if it really happens, it has
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    nothing to do with your mind getting
    crazy. It's just an accurate observation
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    of patterns that happen around of you. But
    you might know that and your two friends
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    who experience the same might know that
    your girlfriend, your partner, the normal
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    people you deal with, they might all not
    understand this and think that you're
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    driving nuts. And this driving nuts is, of
    course, an element that you always have to
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    be self-critical, because on the one hand
    side, you might indeed see too much things
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    happening that do not really happen. And
    on the other hand side, there's also the
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    human drive that we don't want these CIA
    guys to be in our life. We want everything
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    to be fine. And to some extent, maybe
    that's even healthy to not see the
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    monsters all the time. But if they are
    really there and you start denying them
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    while they sit in front of you, that's
    also not so helpful. So I found myself in
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    this kind of weird environment where all
    these kind of thoughts come up all the
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    time. And I'm starting with the most
    harmless stuff. So Internet attacks or
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    well Internet incidents. I would... IT-
    incidents, I called it here. Due to the
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    pure volume of it, I will put this into a
    separate presentation one day or report
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    and in the next days or weeks or months.
    And you can all have fun with it. But here
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    is just some basic pattern. So devices you
    use as communication terminals or
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    communication devices, they always have
    issues when you start to do encrypted
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    stuff, and it's always when you do it with
    specific people. So that's hm... Then,
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    mobile phones with data service. At some
    point, all of them have start to have
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    issues. Very high volume of used data,
    apps disappear if you use them at all. I
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    stopped using them at all. High battery
    usage. When you did nothing with your
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    phone over hours and you were wondering
    what's going on. OK, yes, we have buried
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    their bags. We put them somewhere else.
    But still, it's a little weird when your
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    battery is empty half day. On LTE when I
    configured my phone to be on LTE only it
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    worked mainly fine. Next to that, I
    couldn't make normal phone calls, but when
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    I had to do the normal mode, it got
    downgraded to 3G and there my encrypted
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    connections started to have problems. On
    my fixed lines, my VPNs when I tried to
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    build up a VPN shows me certificate errors
    and problems. And then of course you deal
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    with journalists, which I'm doing with my
    colleagues all the time. And they are not
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    technical experts. They all have their
    Macs and so on. So they have funny issues
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    with their PGP keys not working anymore,
    with their PGP setup not working anymore.
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    Yes, it's also because it's open source
    software, but there's also something going
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    on. But this is kind of the world we all
    know and we got used to it. You know, this
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    is like, OK, IT doesn't work. Secure
    connections break, well, happens all the
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    time. From about mid 2017 when I still
    regularly, like once or twice a month was
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    flying over to see Julian in the embassy,
    I realized that there was something
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    changing with my treatment at the border.
    That's of course, that's yeah, that's
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    purely UK border police uncles. And they
    like started to ask funny questions like
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    "Do you live in the UK?", "What's your
    occupation?", "How long do you stay?",
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    "What do you do in the UK?". Before then
    there was maybe one question, but not
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    three or four of them. And the most
    important was that I realized that he did
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    not even listen to my answers. Sometimes
    he started the first question after I
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    answered the third, and it was feeling
    like in a limbo, like with a machine who
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    would randomly ask me things. But I then
    realized he was just waiting for the green
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    light on the screens to let me go. And
    that green light probably meant that the
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    team outside was ready to pick me up and
    that's what happened. So I get into the UK
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    and have people follow me like the whole
    fucking day, not only on the way to the
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    embassy, from the embassy back and so on.
    I once spotted one of those persons like
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    sitting at the street level on the other
    side watching the whole time I was in an
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    office, ground level. And because I had a
    bit of experience with that in continental
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    Europe, like in Germany, if you realized
    these guys just go after you and you put
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    your camera on your table or start even to
    make photos of them, they're very quickly
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    gone because they don't want to be
    relocated, they don't like to be exposed
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    and so on. But the British behaved in this
    time, this scenario completely different.
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    So he was like getting like, you know,
    very aggressively body language, try
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    spotting, looking back and so on. So that
    was a little weird. That same day at three
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    o'clock in the night when my friends drove
    me to the place where I was sleeping in a
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    one way street, there was still a car
    following us, even in the one way street.
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    So actually he had to turn back and so on.
    That was no more covert surveillance. That
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    was already at the edge to intimidation.
    And then over the next months, I started
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    to have new favorites, but not only in
    England, also in other countries that I
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    would see homeless looking like people on
    the street level sitting there begging or
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    leaning to some buildings. And at some
    point I had to realize that the cheap
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    plastic bags that they were wearing were
    just a cover for cameras that were
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    actually with Zoom and digital getting
    into my direction. And so that felt a
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    little, um. And so the idea of this
    measures meant, if you look at their
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    manuals, which you'll find somehow in the
    Internet, is that the difference between
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    discovered surveillance, which is to find
    out where you are and to open
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    surveillance, which I call intimidation
    surveillance. The idea is you create in
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    the person in this case and yeah, for me,
    a state of distress. So you like
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    constantly having this, like, you know,
    looking around and you obviously have the
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    idea that something is going on and they
    let you know. They want to let you know
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    and that's a little weird. So in April
    2018, exiting in March 2018, I brought one
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    of my Cryptophones, in this case a desk
    phone based on a SIP phone called Snom 870
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    back to our workshop here to repair. The
    display had been exposed to heat and got a
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    little melted. It's not so super high
    quality LCD display, so I wanted just to
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    replace the display. So I opened the thing
    and I found actually a bug and that bug
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    turned out to be a very sophisticated
    thing. So there was a battery pack, there
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    was a shielded thing. Behind that shielded
    thing there was a module that had been
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    soldered into. It was based on an FPGA,
    some hardware crypto element. 16 GB of
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    flash ROM. It was completely passive. So I
    wouldn't have found it in any sweep
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    because it just recorded whatever I talked
    on that encrypted phone and would be
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    triggered by high frequency to send out
    the recorded stuff, encrypted in a signal.
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    And you see here a URL to find more
    pictures online. To give you an idea this
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    is the thing I found. This is how it
    looked like at the beginning. The phone
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    itself has to PCB's one for the keyboards
    and one for the connectors, processing and
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    so on. This was the modified version of
    the keyboard PCB with this battery pack
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    in blue, the shielded module. And here
    you get an idea of what was in there.
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    That's pretty high tech. We did, of
    course, look into what exactly do we have
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    here, when were this chips produced, what
    does it do and so on. But it's pretty
  • 23:39 - 23:46
    obvious that this is like for those who
    have read the Snowden documents intensely,
  • 23:46 - 23:50
    it's what's called special collection
    service. Inside there, there's a group
  • 23:50 - 23:57
    called a target access operations TAO, and
    they work together with a thing called
  • 23:57 - 24:04
    PAG, the Physical Access Group because
    someone and that was the thing, it was not
  • 24:04 - 24:09
    only built into this phone, that phone had
    been, of course, in a locked room. And I
  • 24:09 - 24:14
    had to ask myself, OK, what happened here?
    Here you see how they grabbed the audio
  • 24:14 - 24:21
    with a glued mini PCB from the other main
    controller into their little technology.
  • 24:21 - 24:27
    And here you see a comparison picture, to
    the right you see the original PCB
  • 24:27 - 24:31
    keyboard, which has almost nothing on it.
    And to the left, you see the modified
  • 24:31 - 24:41
    version. A friend of mine made a bit of a
    diagram and yeah, I'll just leave it for
  • 24:41 - 24:46
    you. You can review it later. I'll upload
    these PDF slides, of course. So here's
  • 24:46 - 24:52
    some aspects of what was going through my
    head over the time. Of course, the first
  • 24:52 - 25:02
    question was: How long was this there? No
    idea. Could be years. Um, the components
  • 25:02 - 25:11
    we identified were produced around, oh no,
    not earlier than April 2013. So if you
  • 25:11 - 25:17
    remember, Snowden came with his revelation
    mid of 2013 roughly. And I've been working
  • 25:17 - 25:22
    for the Spiegel with others on the Snowden
    documents next to that phone and
  • 25:22 - 25:29
    coordinating a lot of it in the year 2013.
    So in theory, it could be even related to
  • 25:29 - 25:35
    that. Who knows. The dimensions such as
    Kadian nonmetric origin, the antenna
  • 25:35 - 25:44
    would, you know, work in the range of 800
    MHz. So you find a mentioning of a PDF
  • 25:44 - 25:49
    that tells you something about these
    groups. But I did talk to some people who
  • 25:49 - 25:55
    do professional sweeping, meaning, looking
    for audio bugs and so on in devices and
  • 25:55 - 26:00
    rooms. And they told me from the
    experience of the Cold War until today,
  • 26:00 - 26:05
    the operation to bring something into a
    room, into a device, that's quite an
  • 26:05 - 26:10
    effort because you need to secure, you
    need to ensure you don't get caught and so
  • 26:10 - 26:15
    on. And so what you normally do is,
    because technology can fail, is you do not
  • 26:15 - 26:21
    install one bug, you install at least two.
    And the Cold War people told me, from the
  • 26:21 - 26:26
    elder generation, that the relationship
    was one to eight, so that because
  • 26:26 - 26:32
    technology failed a lot back then.
    However, that made me, of course, think,
  • 26:32 - 26:38
    OK, what else could there be? You know,
    what can I do to find the rest and so on.
  • 26:38 - 26:43
    Does it even make sense? Can I secure all
    the rooms that I use to work here and
  • 26:43 - 26:49
    there in such a way that I could be sure.
    And of course, I can't be. So this was the
  • 26:49 - 26:55
    first hard confrontation with my own
    cognitive dissonance, because all that
  • 26:55 - 26:59
    surveillance theater where I said, OK,
    Julian has some trouble, I don't think I
  • 26:59 - 27:03
    had something to do with it. And when I
    traveled to England, OK, they follow me,
  • 27:03 - 27:08
    you know, you get used to that kind of
    things, but like something you can have in
  • 27:08 - 27:14
    your hand and that's outside of IT
    incidents. That means that all your
  • 27:14 - 27:20
    encrypted communications have been
    listened to. Well, that feels shitty. So
  • 27:20 - 27:26
    that's what I call a hot confrontation
    with my own cognitive dissonance. The next
  • 27:26 - 27:32
    thing I want to talk about is very recent.
    It's about one and a half months old now.
  • 27:32 - 27:40
    When here in Berlin, um, I went out
    actually very early in the morning to get
  • 27:40 - 27:44
    some stuff from a grocery in a time of
    pandemic when no one is in the shop at
  • 27:44 - 27:49
    seven or something in the morning. I come
    back half an hour later and the key to my
  • 27:49 - 27:56
    apartment door does not fit in the
    cylinder anymore. That felt a bit shitty.
  • 27:56 - 28:02
    Um, it was not a normal cylinder. It was a
    so-called stealth cylinder. You might want
  • 28:02 - 28:07
    to look in the Internet what it is. It's a
    Swiss company, it's doing nice keys that
  • 28:07 - 28:13
    you cannot photograph and copy because it
    has inner elements with a sophisticated
  • 28:13 - 28:20
    mechanical, a way of opening. I did,
    however, when I bumped into my door and
  • 28:20 - 28:26
    had to first I called my locksmith dude or
    my friend from the lock picking industry,
  • 28:26 - 28:34
    I could say, who had advised me to buy
    that cylinder. I talked with my lawyer and
  • 28:34 - 28:39
    we agreed it's a good idea to call the
    police, to put it on the other list of
  • 28:39 - 28:44
    things they had collected until then. I
    then realized that I had been followed
  • 28:44 - 28:48
    that morning, but I didn't take any
    attention to it because I was just
  • 28:48 - 28:53
    walking, you know in half-automatic mode to the
    grocery and there was a couple talking
  • 28:53 - 28:58
    such a bullshit. They will probably listen
    to this talk and will remember the dialog.
  • 28:58 - 29:03
    It was just not making any sense, but I
    was too polite to point it out. And they
  • 29:03 - 29:08
    were very closely. So it was not about
    where I was going. It was about that I was
  • 29:08 - 29:13
    not at home. So they ensured that in the
    time frame that I was there, the other
  • 29:13 - 29:19
    guys could operate and so on. Yeah, that
    is an ongoing investigation. But I can
  • 29:19 - 29:26
    tell you, this is the next incident where
    like cognitive dissonance and the illusion
  • 29:26 - 29:31
    you want to give this of, you know, I'm
    not important in this game. Yeah. This
  • 29:31 - 29:35
    guy is following me here and there. And this
    feels kind of different. This is no more
  • 29:35 - 29:40
    nice. Um, here's a little bit to get the
    idea of the cylinder. You cannot really
  • 29:40 - 29:46
    see the object that was inserted. But at
    the end, we didn't get it out. For
  • 29:46 - 29:50
    forensic reasons. We had to drill. Police
    went through the apartment and so on.
  • 29:50 - 29:59
    Yeah. Another interesting day you can
    have. Um, so here's some aspects that I
  • 29:59 - 30:07
    asked myself. Um, so was it even my
    cylinder that I couldn't open? Maybe they
  • 30:07 - 30:15
    could not lockpick the original stealth cylinder
    I had. They had to open it in a violent way.
  • 30:15 - 30:22
    They were in the apartment to whatever put
    another bug in there. Um, but as they
  • 30:22 - 30:26
    couldn't replace it with the original
    cylinder as they had destroyed it, like
  • 30:26 - 30:32
    they put another one in. And that's why my
    key wasn't fitting. It's an option. Next
  • 30:32 - 30:37
    option: Was it maybe a trap to make me
    replace the broken cylinder with a cheaper
  • 30:37 - 30:43
    one with a more simple one that they could
    open then afterwards, when I was gone. The
  • 30:43 - 30:51
    next option, or maybe was it not about the
    door at all? Was it maybe just to freak me
  • 30:51 - 30:56
    out? Um, of course it feels not so great
    if you can't open your own apartment door
  • 30:56 - 31:02
    and so on. And the first question was, of
    course: How much time did I spend that day
  • 31:02 - 31:07
    with, you know, with the police, drilling
    open the door with all that kind of
  • 31:07 - 31:16
    things? It more or less cost me a day. And
    what maybe happened to my machines,
  • 31:16 - 31:23
    meaning my computers, my other things,
    maybe? Where was my attention not in that
  • 31:23 - 31:27
    time frame? Because it could be, was a
    pure distraction thing. It would freak him
  • 31:27 - 31:31
    out a little bit. And while he's freaking
    out, we do other things in his office or
  • 31:31 - 31:38
    whatever, I can't rule it out. And then of
    course, I mean, the police sent me some
  • 31:38 - 31:42
    funny questions. I'm still working on
    that, like, yeah, should I name Pompeo as
  • 31:42 - 31:50
    a suspect? Not sure, but maybe I should.
    Discussing it with my lawyer and so on.
  • 31:50 - 31:56
    And also is it maybe related to the date?
    This was the 3rd of November, just in case
  • 31:56 - 31:59
    to have it said the 3rd of November is the
    election day, or was the election day in
  • 31:59 - 32:04
    the United States. And there were some
    accusation that had something to do with
  • 32:04 - 32:14
    the election some years ago. Um, so
    however, the next event, incident number
  • 32:14 - 32:19
    three, has to do with something that
    happened in between, because on Monday,
  • 32:19 - 32:23
    the day before they messed up with my
    door, I had shipped some documents to
  • 32:23 - 32:29
    Spain, I realized then. That was legal
    documents that required me and a friend
  • 32:29 - 32:35
    going to the Spanish embassy. We gave
    power of attorney and so on because we are
  • 32:35 - 32:40
    also accusing this company, UC Global,
    which I talked about last year, which was
  • 32:40 - 32:46
    the company running the surveillance or
    the protections/surveliance at the
  • 32:46 - 32:49
    beginning on behalf of the Ecuadorians in
    that embassy and later turned out to be
  • 32:49 - 32:56
    working, for (inaudible)'s company or at
    least having a site arrangement there,
  • 32:56 - 32:59
    which is still subject to an ongoing
    lawsuit. And we participate in that
  • 32:59 - 33:04
    lawsuit because not only Julian was spied
    on, everybody was spied on, who was
  • 33:04 - 33:11
    visiting him and so on. So I had shipped
    documents on that Monday, almost six
  • 33:11 - 33:16
    o'clock on the local post office here by
    DHL Express. I put that documents in a
  • 33:16 - 33:22
    sealed bag, that's like a bag was a serial
    number and so on. That went together with
  • 33:22 - 33:28
    the describing list what's inside the bag
    into a white envelope that again, I sealed
  • 33:28 - 33:32
    with, you know, seal tape. Then I gave
    that to the post office. But they insisted
  • 33:32 - 33:37
    that it gets in a DHL Express back. That's
    what you get for the 70 Euro to be
  • 33:37 - 33:47
    arriving within two days. So, yeah, the
    stuff arrived on Wednesday, but all opened
  • 33:47 - 33:54
    and the Spanish lawyers freaked completely
    out. They were very sure that this was a
  • 33:54 - 34:00
    meddling. You would see that it was sliced
    open and so on. Yes. You see this funny
  • 34:00 - 34:06
    duct tape here called Zoll. But why would
    the German customs open a document
  • 34:06 - 34:11
    shipment within Europe? That just not
    makes a lot of sense. It's still on the
  • 34:11 - 34:17
    way to be checked. In theory, they could
    do that. But also this incident has some
  • 34:17 - 34:21
    aspects. It's a breach of attorney client
    privilege. That's why the Spanish lawyers
  • 34:21 - 34:26
    insisted as we bring this to a criminal
    complaint. They did on their end right
  • 34:26 - 34:33
    when they received it and they made those
    photos. So was German customs even
  • 34:33 - 34:39
    involved or was just their duct tape used
    by some funny people. Why when I emailed
  • 34:39 - 34:44
    all this to my lawyer with the picture
    sent to one, why did he not receive the
  • 34:44 - 34:51
    email until he realized on Monday that it
    somehow ended in his trash? He also
  • 34:51 - 34:57
    freaked out. And then I talked with DHL of
    course, I made a big fuss there and they
  • 34:57 - 35:02
    were like, no, we cannot tell you on which
    legal grounds the shipment was opened. We
  • 35:02 - 35:07
    cannot tell you who did it. But if you
    have an inquiry, why don't you send it to
  • 35:07 - 35:12
    the customs? So without giving me even
    which customs entity it would be or
  • 35:12 - 35:17
    whatever. And again, of course, this is
    kind of an interesting story, but I have
  • 35:17 - 35:22
    normally other priorities in my life. So
    I'm asking myself, oh gosh, how many days
  • 35:22 - 35:27
    shall I waste here with finding out who
    opened the fucking shipment. But, you
  • 35:27 - 35:32
    know, this is, again, the state of
    distress. This is, again, the effort. And
  • 35:32 - 35:36
    it's, again, a reminder. We are after you.
    We check your things. We don't like
  • 35:36 - 35:44
    your're suing the CIA, a suspected company
    and so on and so on. So coming to a bit of
  • 35:44 - 35:51
    a conclusion of this talk, as we also want
    to have time for questions and so on. I
  • 35:51 - 35:54
    want to talk about three aspects. The one
    is the elephant in the room and the
  • 35:54 - 36:02
    problem of the missing socks. So at some
    point, I don't want to say that I have
  • 36:02 - 36:07
    been completely not in a state of
    distress. And so I don't know how this
  • 36:07 - 36:13
    affects my sanity and those people
    surrounding me. So your cognitive systems
  • 36:13 - 36:20
    get kind of otherwise triggered and you
    start to see these things everywhere. And
  • 36:20 - 36:27
    when then you wash some socks and it turns
    out there's a sock missing. The other
  • 36:27 - 36:32
    person in my life was like, OK, CIA.
    However, I did suspect the bed sheets and we
  • 36:32 - 36:37
    found one of the socks in a bed sheet. So
    when you know, the problem is socks get in
  • 36:37 - 36:41
    the drum sometimes, Hanging, then you wash
    something different then like a bed sheet
  • 36:41 - 36:45
    and a bed sheet is an excellent place to
    hide things that have been in the drum.
  • 36:45 - 36:50
    Get into the bed sheet and you just try it
    with it and you don't even realize it and
  • 36:50 - 36:57
    so on.. So while I'm a complete, I for
    entertainment reasons and also for, you
  • 36:57 - 37:02
    know, you need to relax your brain in such
    a situation once in a while, I'm totally
  • 37:02 - 37:07
    OK to say the CIA is responsible for
    everything, including the missing socks,
  • 37:07 - 37:12
    but I suspect the bed sheet first and
    realize that yes, this is a joke and this
  • 37:12 - 37:18
    is escapism and it helps you maybe to stay
    sane for a little moment. But in the long
  • 37:18 - 37:24
    term, I don't know. So and that's the I
    don't know part is the other two slides
  • 37:24 - 37:27
    that are coming now. So what should I do?
    And I should invite some friends and
  • 37:27 - 37:35
    declare my office here like a laboratory
    for surveillance. Yeah, it has been
  • 37:35 - 37:38
    before. I looked at one technology, but
    this case is surveillance technology,
  • 37:38 - 37:44
    looking at me and my friends. So it's
    slightly different. And it's maybe also
  • 37:44 - 37:51
    important to not get into some kind of
    auto response mode when things happen.
  • 37:51 - 37:55
    Because I was thinking also, what the
    fuck? Why are they doing all these things?
  • 37:55 - 38:00
    It cost them money. It costs them effort.
    Is it to freak me out? Is it that they
  • 38:00 - 38:07
    think that like like like I'm seriously in
    such an evil mode organization that, you
  • 38:07 - 38:11
    know, they will escalate things and I will
    start to throw bombs at the U.S. Embassy
  • 38:11 - 38:19
    or I don't know. I have no idea what their
    idea is, but I just try to stay like slow
  • 38:19 - 38:28
    motion and think about it. The next aspect
    is how ever do I infect other people? And
  • 38:28 - 38:32
    now I'm not talking about my paranoia or
    my situational awareness, as I would call
  • 38:32 - 38:41
    it, which, of course, at some point it's
    ongoing and it's no more sometimes. But
  • 38:41 - 38:48
    when I talk with normal people, with other
    journalist, with people I deal with for
  • 38:48 - 38:56
    normal things, and they visit me and we do
    whatever kind of social things, like
  • 38:56 - 39:00
    normal things, like having food. And
    afterwards, the way they call me a day
  • 39:00 - 39:05
    later and say, oh, finally my phone
    started rebooting twice yesterday and
  • 39:05 - 39:10
    these kind of things so that you think,
    OK, it's not my paranoia that is
  • 39:10 - 39:16
    infectious. It's actually they obviously
    want to not only know what kind of people
  • 39:16 - 39:19
    I'm dealing with and look into their
    technology, they also want to freak them
  • 39:19 - 39:27
    out. So this is not cool. And it also
    means that the type of ignorance you could
  • 39:27 - 39:32
    normally apply and say, well, ignorance is
    a bliss. Come on, let's have have a nice
  • 39:32 - 39:38
    day and forget about all this. That's kind
    of limited. That's no more an option. Um,
  • 39:38 - 39:44
    and also while I've been dealing with that
    type of stress and that type of thing for
  • 39:44 - 39:51
    a while now, and I can say, yeah, well,
    that's how it is. And, um, it doesn't mean
  • 39:51 - 39:56
    that everybody dealing with you can do
    that. There's people that are seriously
  • 39:56 - 40:02
    freaked out by such a situation and it
    creates fear, it creates anger, stress and
  • 40:02 - 40:08
    so on. So that's not cool. So, um, my last
    slide that ends up with a question to you
  • 40:08 - 40:15
    guys is how to get out of this mess. So,
    you know, option one, I managed to get
  • 40:15 - 40:21
    proper authorities to make the CIA stop
    acting illegal. OK, I heard the laughing.
  • 40:21 - 40:28
    I know this is ridiculous, but, you know,
    it would be so beautiful. Justice
  • 40:28 - 40:33
    prevails. The German authorities, the
    European ones pick it up. I finally
  • 40:33 - 40:36
    managed to escalate it to the
    Generalbundesanwaltschaft. And I do not
  • 40:36 - 40:40
    have to talk with the German intelligence
    services as I'm not sure they would be
  • 40:40 - 40:48
    helpful in this game. And they make the
    stop, the CIA stop acting illegal and
  • 40:48 - 40:53
    against me and the other person
    surrounding beautiful dream. But OK, not
  • 40:53 - 41:00
    very realistic. Maybe option two, Pompeo
    realizes Jesus loves WikiLeaks and
  • 41:00 - 41:05
    whatever shall become true will become
    true. He reads it on the Bible. Pompeo
  • 41:05 - 41:09
    seems to me if you look at his Twitter
    account, reasonable believe in Jesus
  • 41:09 - 41:14
    Christ and all that thing. So he realizes
    it's all wrongdoing against Julian,
  • 41:14 - 41:20
    WikiLeaks and all the people targeted in
    that context and stops it. I know. OK,
  • 41:20 - 41:27
    shit happens. What? But if that's
    realistic, I don't know. You tell me. And
  • 41:27 - 41:31
    the third option. I don't know. Maybe you
    have some ideas. And that's my question to
  • 41:31 - 41:39
    you at the audience and that's the end of
    my prepared part of the talk.
  • 41:39 - 41:48
    Herald: And with these words. Thank you,
    Andy, for the brilliant talk. In the
  • 41:48 - 41:53
    meantime, I received some messages. A
    third option would be to have a great
  • 41:53 - 41:59
    vinyard, vinyard. Sorry, I personally
    Andy: Yes, yes it's completely right. I
  • 41:59 - 42:03
    considered actually maybe I should do
    something with goats, become a farmer or,
  • 42:03 - 42:09
    you know, yeah, there's these options. But
    I thought before I give it up and find my
  • 42:09 - 42:15
    way on the countryside, I outsource the
    problem to the community and see what they
  • 42:15 - 42:20
    think.
    Herald: In the meantime, I think there is
  • 42:20 - 42:28
    plenty of time for a great white wine, but
    to our questions, we have indeed plenty of
  • 42:28 - 42:33
    questions. The first question would be: How
    would you compare the surveillance of the
  • 42:33 - 42:40
    CIA or other to surveillance of the DDR?
    So for the Deutsche Demokratische
  • 42:40 - 42:45
    Republik.
    Andy: Well, I'm born in Hamburg in West
  • 42:45 - 42:51
    Germany. I lived in East Germany when the
    government was already falling into
  • 42:51 - 42:58
    pieces. It was technically still there. So
    I'm not the best person to compare it. But
  • 42:58 - 43:04
    I did talk with a person I know who worked
    for the foreign intelligence services
  • 43:04 - 43:08
    because there was, you know I simplified
    here, of course, the incidents a little
  • 43:08 - 43:14
    bit. There was one scene when later I went
    into my kitchen that day when my door lock
  • 43:14 - 43:20
    got tampered with and I found a blue
    plastic glove and I don't have blue
  • 43:20 - 43:24
    plastic gloves. And I asked my locksmith
    guy, he was like, no, it's not for me. And
  • 43:24 - 43:29
    the police had black ones. So I thought,
    what the fuck? Maybe the guys have been
  • 43:29 - 43:33
    inside the apartment, which I didn't
    thought earlier because of a second look
  • 43:33 - 43:39
    and the police checked and so on. Um, and
    then I talked to discuss it with this
  • 43:39 - 43:43
    person I know. He's a quite friendly man,
    was working in the foreign intelligence of
  • 43:43 - 43:49
    that country. And so and he was like, you
    know, you have to look at it from a cost
  • 43:49 - 43:54
    effectiveness point of view, like that
    piece of plastic costs you ten cents,
  • 43:54 - 44:00
    nothing, and it freaks you out three
    months. So see how much how cost effective
  • 44:00 - 44:07
    it is. And I mean, that's a good aspect.
    That's a good point. And so I think that
  • 44:07 - 44:13
    the East German Stasi, the guys, the East
    intelligence guys, they also they knew
  • 44:13 - 44:18
    very well the difference. And they had
    both instruments in there, you know, in
  • 44:18 - 44:24
    their program to either do covert
    surveillance really like not let you know.
  • 44:24 - 44:30
    And the department for "we let him know
    and see how he reacts" or "we let him know
  • 44:30 - 44:35
    because he's ongoing doing things that we
    want him to, you know, stop it and get
  • 44:35 - 44:39
    intimidated". And so on, and get scared
    maybe or his wife gets scared or this kind
  • 44:39 - 44:48
    of thing. So I think it is comparable.
    Herald: Cool. Well, not cool. Speaking of
  • 44:48 - 44:54
    covert versus overt civilians.
    As you now know, does it still
  • 44:54 - 45:01
    bother you emotionally?
    Andy: Um, well, what bothers me sometimes
  • 45:01 - 45:06
    is, you know, it's also it has a sometimes
    it's nice to be alone and it's sometimes
  • 45:06 - 45:14
    nice to not think about the CIA guys being
    in the apartment next door or in my case,
  • 45:14 - 45:22
    an apartment under me or in the
    surrounding environments. Um, but thinking
  • 45:22 - 45:28
    about normal things like playing a puzzle
    or seeing some funny spy movies. Oh,
  • 45:28 - 45:35
    that's almost relaxing. No, seriously, at
    some point it sucks a little bit. I get my
  • 45:35 - 45:42
    kind of deal with it. But I mean, this
    20/20 era has of course, complicated or
  • 45:42 - 45:47
    has made it almost impossible to travel.
    So normally I escape my intensity of my
  • 45:47 - 45:54
    work situation with travels. Maybe I can
    do that this year. So it feels a little
  • 45:54 - 46:00
    more intense and annoys a little bit.
    And I would like to get these guys out of
  • 46:00 - 46:05
    my life and do something useful with their
    life or whatever.
  • 46:05 - 46:17
    Herald: Now, the next question, he or she
    or the person or creature probably missed
  • 46:17 - 46:21
    it: Do you dissemble all your devices on a
    regular basis?
  • 46:21 - 46:30
    Andy: No, I usually do just regular and
    seal them. In this case, the seal had
  • 46:30 - 46:35
    an issue with with the heat as well. So,
    and I was lousy on checking it. I have to
  • 46:35 - 46:42
    say so. Yes, that's something. I mean, if
    you have one office, you can do that. I
  • 46:42 - 46:49
    tend to work on different continents even,
    and that turned out to be a bit of an
  • 46:49 - 46:54
    issue. So, yes, you need to have safes
    everywhere and seals and duh, duh, duh,
  • 46:54 - 47:01
    duh. But even then, you know, Pompeo
    seems to have justified or have given
  • 47:01 - 47:07
    orders to do these things no matter the
    costs. And my expectation to have like a
  • 47:07 - 47:16
    "private" or "secure" encrypted channel so
    is very limited for a while, watching that
  • 47:16 - 47:21
    effort. The encryption of the cryptophone
    obviously was good. Otherwise they
  • 47:21 - 47:26
    wouldn't have had the effort to, you know,
    build something in. But at the end of the
  • 47:26 - 47:33
    day, for me, it has the same impact. It's
    like, well, you know, it's a phone, it's a
  • 47:33 - 47:38
    piece of device, it's in a room. The room
    has windows. We've seen what they've done
  • 47:38 - 47:44
    with the embassy windows and so on. So
    it's like, yeah, security. What a nice
  • 47:44 - 47:51
    idea, but it doesn't really exist.
    Herald: Yeah. Do you try giving a few
  • 47:51 - 47:57
    coins to the homeless looking people to do
    either some reverse intimidation or good
  • 47:57 - 48:04
    deed if they are not CIA?
    Andy: Yeah, that's, I mean, I had this one
  • 48:04 - 48:12
    particular situation where I was waiting
    for someone on kind of a shopping street,
  • 48:12 - 48:19
    and I just said something is wrong with
    the guy. But when I saw the camera and saw
  • 48:19 - 48:24
    and he also rushed away. So, no, I didn't
    give them the money. The second
  • 48:24 - 48:31
    scenario... No, but it's a good idea. Um,
    the thing is, what I started to do is to
  • 48:31 - 48:36
    always have a camera with me. That turns
    out for me to be important, to be able to
  • 48:36 - 48:41
    document things. And also most of them,
    except the British, don't like it when
  • 48:41 - 48:45
    they are being photographed. And you
    either, they, it's very interesting
  • 48:45 - 48:49
    because normal people do realize when they
    are being photographed. But these guys are
  • 48:49 - 48:55
    either pretending, no, I don't see that
    you photograph me. You know, they look a
  • 48:55 - 49:02
    little bit with too much energy away from
    it or they are seriously disturbed and go
  • 49:02 - 49:05
    away.
    Herald: So the best solution would be to
  • 49:05 - 49:10
    have the boldest, biggest, largest camera
    always in hand.
  • 49:10 - 49:14
    Andy: Yeah, let me say it like this. I
    mean, I've not been a fan of surveillance
  • 49:14 - 49:21
    technology and for sure not of CCTV for a
    long part of my life. But I start to like
  • 49:21 - 49:27
    the idea of CCTV at some places in my own
    environment. I'm sorry to say that, but
  • 49:27 - 49:32
    there's compromises you can make like
    surveil feet, you know, other parts you
  • 49:32 - 49:37
    don't always need the faces. If you need
    the faces , yeah there's options.
  • 49:37 - 49:43
    Herald: And still, analog photography is a
    great thing. But that's my personal
  • 49:43 - 49:49
    opinion. Um. You maybe you want to, you
    can talk, maybe you cannot talk about: Do
  • 49:49 - 49:54
    you use other counter measurements you
    want to talk about or can talk about?
  • 49:54 - 49:59
    Andy: You know, I obviously don't want to
    talk about it. But I mean, I've been, um.
  • 49:59 - 50:09
    But I was wondering myself how, um, why I
    had this rather intense things going on. I
  • 50:09 - 50:14
    mean, I was wondering, is it the time
    frame? Is it me as a person? It might have
  • 50:14 - 50:20
    to do with actually being in this funny
    scene? Of course, I've learned. I mean, I
  • 50:20 - 50:25
    know lock picking persons, I've always had
    an eye on having good locks based on their
  • 50:25 - 50:30
    advice, and understanding how easy it
    would be otherwise. And using encryption
  • 50:30 - 50:38
    was also not always about, like, hiding
    something. It was just good practice of
  • 50:38 - 50:43
    having privacy and operational security.
    So for me, that was very normal for many
  • 50:43 - 50:48
    years to do that. And maybe, you know,
    compared to other persons, that made me
  • 50:48 - 50:54
    more interesting. I don't know. I'll find
    out one day. But I think it's a good idea
  • 50:54 - 51:00
    for everybody involved to think about
    these three aspects: physical security,
  • 51:00 - 51:06
    encryption, and also what kind of ways do
    you have to realize if something is being
  • 51:06 - 51:09
    tampered with.
    Herald: Yeah -
  • 51:09 - 51:13
    Andy: And that's not necessarily
    monitoring. I mean, monitoring can help,
  • 51:13 - 51:18
    but on the other hand side, yeah, with
    monitoring systems, they can also deal
  • 51:18 - 51:22
    with.
    Herald: Like physical checksums(?), kind
  • 51:22 - 51:28
    of. Our next question: Do you ask the
    police at the border if everything is
  • 51:28 - 51:34
    prepared now?
    Andy: You know, the British border,
  • 51:34 - 51:38
    probably that's a reference to, I don't
    travel to the UK anymore. I decided, you
  • 51:38 - 51:43
    know, after they dealt with Julian there,
    I don't like that place anymore. I never
  • 51:43 - 51:50
    felt so well there. And actually, maybe I
    forgot to mention that, after this kind of
  • 51:50 - 51:56
    treatment at the border started I also
    started avoiding sleeping in the UK. So I
  • 51:56 - 52:01
    made day trips sometimes, in order to get
    the last plane out of the country. I was
  • 52:01 - 52:05
    flying to Zürich first, because it was a
    late flight to Zürich and then the next
  • 52:05 - 52:10
    morning to Berlin. I felt in Zürich better
    at the bar of a shitty hotel than in
  • 52:10 - 52:16
    London Central City with, yeah, this
    special relationship, as it's called,
  • 52:16 - 52:21
    between the intelligence of the UK and
    those of the US.
  • 52:21 - 52:29
    Herald: I see. Speaking of sleeping, or in
    this case concerning your apartment, the
  • 52:29 - 52:34
    question would be: Would some home
    surveillance system bring some relief, for
  • 52:34 - 52:37
    example?
    Andy: Well, that's like, that's like
  • 52:37 - 52:43
    exchanging the devil with the other dude,
    right? I mean, no, I'm not really a fan of
  • 52:43 - 52:47
    that. But yes, of course, I had to at the
    end of the day, at least check with my
  • 52:47 - 52:55
    door and so on, what I can do to detect
    and record things and so on. But it's not
  • 52:55 - 53:01
    a pleasure. It's not like, I don't know. I
    mean, yes, you end up doing that kind of
  • 53:01 - 53:04
    shit. But that's not how life on planet
    Earth should be.
  • 53:04 - 53:11
    Herald: Yeah, yeah. It's, it's a kind of a
    trade off, for what return. And yeah -
  • 53:11 - 53:15
    Andy: I mean, the thing is, I mean, look,
    I'm a German citizen. What I'm doing is
  • 53:15 - 53:20
    constitutionally protected. I live in the
    governmental district of Berlin. It's
  • 53:20 - 53:26
    fairly safe here. But, you know, I have
    friends in other places, other situations,
  • 53:26 - 53:34
    their life is completely different there,
    and that is more what worries me. That I'm
  • 53:34 - 53:38
    in a relatively cool position, secure
    position. That's why I can talk about
  • 53:38 - 53:43
    these things. But I have friends who have
    a more severe situation and they are not
  • 53:43 - 53:48
    sure they should talk about it, to not
    escalate things. And that's a very tricky
  • 53:48 - 53:56
    choice to make, maybe.
    Herald: Yes, indeed. Um, that brings us to
  • 53:56 - 54:02
    another question. And I think this is a
    perfect point to mention that. Can we do -
  • 54:02 - 54:07
    What can we do to support you in getting
    out of this mess? And what can we do in
  • 54:07 - 54:10
    general for this?
    Andy: While I really appreciate the
  • 54:10 - 54:16
    question, I don't have a good answer. But
    I think, yes, I would like to discuss more
  • 54:16 - 54:23
    with people about what can be done. I
    mean, for the moment, I'm dealing with
  • 54:23 - 54:30
    police, with lawyers, the Spiegel guys I'm
    working with, they also find some ways
  • 54:30 - 54:37
    maybe to address it. Um, but it seems like
    at least if it comes to Julian's
  • 54:37 - 54:42
    situation, things are, yeah, badly
    escalated and it's all a bit interrelated.
  • 54:42 - 54:49
    So I don't have a good answer at this
    moment, but I think it's a good idea to
  • 54:49 - 54:56
    discuss it more and also maybe identifying
    other people who are in some kind of a
  • 54:56 - 55:01
    risk situation because these things
    happened. And so maybe, hopefully was able
  • 55:01 - 55:06
    to show it's not that difficult to get
    into such a mess. It's - it happens.
  • 55:06 - 55:11
    Herald: Yeah, and speaking of discussing,
    you mentioned earlier, there is a Big Blue
  • 55:11 - 55:17
    Button to discuss any further. You will
    find it in the 2D area, in the 2D world in
  • 55:17 - 55:22
    the Whistleblower Wiki. Is that right?
    Andy: Yes. In the tent, actually, I was
  • 55:22 - 55:27
    told. In the tent is the URL to the Big
    Blue Button or somehow it's interlinked
  • 55:27 - 55:32
    there.
    Herald: So again, please go out, explore
  • 55:32 - 55:38
    the 2D world. And of course, the
    whistleblower tent. We still have some
  • 55:38 - 55:45
    minutes left. How do you do mentally? Did
    you use any method to keep your head clean
  • 55:45 - 55:53
    or clear and, did you freak out?
    Andy: Yeah, that's a good question. Um. I
  • 55:53 - 56:00
    drink too much vodka, but I try to keep
    it with good quality. Um, let me say it
  • 56:00 - 56:09
    like this. The real trouble is maybe that
    while in this scene here, people have a
  • 56:09 - 56:18
    rough understanding of this type of things
    already. Um, I also liked to have, to be
  • 56:18 - 56:22
    around with people who have nothing to do
    with IT, with security, with all these
  • 56:22 - 56:28
    kind of things. So-called normal people.
    Sometimes it's refreshing to be with them,
  • 56:28 - 56:38
    but their ability to understand this mess
    is a little bit limited. So it's, I think
  • 56:38 - 56:43
    others judge better how I'm doing
    mentally. I'm trying to keep my head up
  • 56:43 - 56:51
    and finding a good way out. But if anyone
    has a good idea, I am really all for
  • 56:51 - 56:57
    listening and see what's possible.
    Herald: In this case. I can can come back
  • 56:57 - 57:04
    to the vineyard and it's pretty relaxing
    to have work in the late autumn.
  • 57:04 - 57:11
    Andy: All right. Even during a pandemic.
    OK, you just find a way there. Yeah.
  • 57:11 - 57:17
    Herald: It's outside and it's a lot of
    distance between the people. I think this
  • 57:17 - 57:22
    will work. So the last question: Red or
    white wine?
  • 57:22 - 57:26
    Andy: Red, red wine.
    Herald: Red.
  • 57:26 - 57:32
    Andy: Yeah, definitely. And I mean, thanks
    for all this. Just to point out, please,
  • 57:32 - 57:36
    we also have to work on to getting Julian
    out there and others who are in this mess
  • 57:36 - 57:42
    who can't even talk about it. I really
    appreciate the opportunity to talk to you
  • 57:42 - 57:48
    guys, but it's also about the others. And
    let us get Julian out here, please. Out
  • 57:48 - 57:52
    that shit there.
    Herald: With these great words, Andy,
  • 57:52 - 58:01
    thanks for your time. Thanks for being
    here at the remote chaos. As mentioned, we
  • 58:01 - 58:07
    still have the opportunity to ask you some
    questions in the whistleblower tent. And
  • 58:07 - 58:16
    with this, have a nice evening. Try to
    relax and see you latest - next time.
  • 58:16 - 58:19
    Andy: Goodbye.
  • 58:19 - 58:39
    postroll music
  • 58:39 - 58:57
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Title:
#rC3 - CIA vs. Wikileaks
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Video Language:
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