Return to Video

vimeo.com/.../227500952

  • 0:03 - 0:05
    Greetings Troublemakers... welcome to Trouble.
  • 0:05 - 0:07
    My name is not important.
  • 0:07 - 0:10
    In our post-Snowden, smart gadget-laden world,
  • 0:10 - 0:12
    it’s become clear to anyone paying attention
  • 0:12 - 0:16
    that we live in an era of unprecedented mass surveillance.
  • 0:16 - 0:18
    It seems like every day a new story
  • 0:18 - 0:20
    pops up on our facebook feeds about how
  • 0:20 - 0:22
    the NSA might be spying on us
  • 0:22 - 0:24
    through our coffee makers or TV sets.
  • 0:24 - 0:26
    One... two...
  • 0:26 - 0:28
    Smith?
  • 0:28 - 0:30
    6079 Smith W?
  • 0:31 - 0:32
    Yes, you!
  • 0:32 - 0:33
    Bend Lower!
  • 0:34 - 0:38
    Or how the latest advancement in AI technology means that
  • 0:38 - 0:41
    Amazon now knows what products we're gonna buy before we do.
  • 0:41 - 0:45
    Lindor Chocolate Deluxe gift box... would you like to buy it?
  • 0:45 - 0:46
    Yes!
  • 0:46 - 0:50
    And while the mind-boggling capacity of state intelligence agencies
  • 0:50 - 0:53
    and IT corporations to monitor our behaviour,
  • 0:53 - 0:55
    habits and communications
  • 0:55 - 0:57
    is a perfectly reasonable cause for alarm,
  • 0:57 - 0:59
    the more unsettling reality is that
  • 0:59 - 1:03
    this constant flow of data collection forms only one part
  • 1:03 - 1:05
    of a much broader surveillance apparatus
  • 1:05 - 1:07
    ... one that still makes ample use of
  • 1:07 - 1:09
    the same tried and tested dirty tricks
  • 1:09 - 1:13
    that rulers have been using to keep tabs on dissent
  • 1:13 - 1:15
    since proles first started scrawling
  • 1:15 - 1:19
    Alpha Kappa Alpha Beta into the walls of the Parthenon.
  • 1:19 - 1:21
    And on that note... before we jump right into it,
  • 1:21 - 1:24
    we should point out that as we were putting this episode together
  • 1:24 - 1:26
    we ran into some legal grey areas
  • 1:26 - 1:28
    involving publication bans
  • 1:28 - 1:32
    and laws against identifying undercover agents and informants.
  • 1:32 - 1:34
    This is particularly relevant to our first segment,
  • 1:34 - 1:37
    where we cover the multi-city organizing
  • 1:37 - 1:40
    leading up to the 2010 G20 protests in Toronto,
  • 1:40 - 1:43
    and the 2013 anti-fracking protests
  • 1:43 - 1:45
    on the Mi’kmaq territory of Elsipogtog,
  • 1:45 - 1:49
    both of which were the target of large-scale intelligence operations
  • 1:49 - 1:53
    involving informants and/or undercover police.
  • 1:53 - 1:54
    After mulling it over,
  • 1:54 - 1:56
    in order to avoid putting our crew,
  • 1:56 - 1:59
    or any of the people featured in the show in a sticky situation,
  • 1:59 - 2:02
    we've made the call to only use footage and images
  • 2:02 - 2:06
    of these state assets that are already freely available on the Internet
  • 2:06 - 2:09
    ... plus a few clips from some cheesy Hollywood movies
  • 2:09 - 2:10
    to help fill in the gaps.
  • 2:10 - 2:13
    So, with that little disclaimer out of the way
  • 2:13 - 2:15
    ... over the next 30 minutes, we'll share the voices of
  • 2:15 - 2:19
    a number of individuals as they recount their first-hand experiences
  • 2:19 - 2:21
    dealing with snitches and undercover cops,
  • 2:21 - 2:24
    navigating the brave new world of digital surveillance
  • 2:24 - 2:26
    ... and making a whole lotta trouble!
  • 2:56 - 2:59
    I was involved with the Anti-Capitalist Convergence
  • 2:59 - 3:01
    in Montreal leading up to the G20.
  • 3:01 - 3:03
    So several months before even the summit
  • 3:03 - 3:06
    people had started to meet and organize.
  • 3:06 - 3:10
    And the other main element was coordinating with Toronto
  • 3:10 - 3:12
    and other cities in Southern Ontario
  • 3:12 - 3:15
    with the groups that were already organizing there.
  • 3:15 - 3:18
    I was part of the Toronto Community Mobilization Network.
  • 3:18 - 3:22
    So that was a large umbrella group that was involved
  • 3:22 - 3:25
    in doing all of the logistics and a lot of the organizing
  • 3:25 - 3:28
    around the G20 Summit in Toronto.
  • 3:28 - 3:30
    I was also involved in SOAR,
  • 3:30 - 3:32
    the Southern Ontario Anarchist Resistance.
  • 3:32 - 3:35
    We were specifically on the project Get Off the Fence,
  • 3:35 - 3:40
    which was the militant street march that happened in Toronto in 2010.
  • 3:44 - 3:45
    Brenda and Khalid,
  • 3:45 - 3:50
    their real names are Brenda Carey and Bindo Showan.
  • 3:50 - 3:51
    But we did not know that until later.
  • 3:51 - 3:55
    They're both members of the Ontario Provincial Police (the OPP)
  • 3:55 - 4:01
    and they both arrived on the scene much earlier than 2010.
  • 4:01 - 4:05
    And entered mostly through above-ground organizing,
  • 4:05 - 4:07
    but then had a much more complicated path
  • 4:07 - 4:08
    in order to stay in the movement
  • 4:08 - 4:11
    and get close to people who they wanted to target.
  • 4:11 - 4:15
    Both of those people played on sort of these political values
  • 4:15 - 4:16
    that exist within those spaces
  • 4:16 - 4:18
    in order to both get close to certain people,
  • 4:18 - 4:19
    and avoid being outed.
  • 4:19 - 4:21
    Brenda was probably the more experienced cop,
  • 4:21 - 4:25
    and she produced this kind of narrative of victimization.
  • 4:25 - 4:27
    And so she had this story of escaping an abusive relationship,
  • 4:27 - 4:30
    and this also allowed her to avoid answering questions
  • 4:30 - 4:32
    about her past, and to be very evasive.
  • 4:32 - 4:37
    And Khalid operated because anyone that questioned
  • 4:37 - 4:41
    his legitimacy would instantly be called out as being racist.
  • 4:41 - 4:44
    And because of all the internalized racism in our groups,
  • 4:44 - 4:47
    that slight-of-hand worked.
  • 4:48 - 4:50
    And they were both really reliable.
  • 4:50 - 4:51
    So they worked really hard,
  • 4:51 - 4:53
    they took on tasks and they always did them on time.
  • 4:53 - 4:57
    Brenda in particular, I remember always wanted to take minutes.
  • 4:57 - 5:01
    And we were like “great... take minutes! We don't want to.”
  • 5:01 - 5:03
    So that was perfect because she could take all those notes
  • 5:03 - 5:06
    and it was not drawing any attention to her.
  • 5:06 - 5:08
    Most of the evidence that was introduced
  • 5:08 - 5:13
    in the conspiracy case came from whatever they were able to collect
  • 5:13 - 5:16
    in their interactions with anarchists,
  • 5:16 - 5:19
    with activists, over this period of time.
  • 5:19 - 5:20
    These notes were then sifted through,
  • 5:20 - 5:23
    and they basically just pulled out selected elements
  • 5:23 - 5:27
    that could conceivably constitute preparation for crimes.
  • 5:27 - 5:29
    It was actually quite shocking to see
  • 5:29 - 5:31
    how much of the information that she recorded
  • 5:31 - 5:36
    was personal information about who didn't really like who,
  • 5:36 - 5:39
    and who was dating who, and who had broken up with who.
  • 5:39 - 5:42
    And who was maybe having some problems with the way
  • 5:42 - 5:45
    things were being organized, and all of that stuff.
  • 5:45 - 5:48
    And it became really obvious that that stuff
  • 5:48 - 5:51
    was very very relevant to the intelligence gathering.
  • 5:51 - 5:52
    A night drinking...
  • 5:52 - 5:54
    going out with your friends and drinking,
  • 5:54 - 5:56
    would first be presented as, y'know,
  • 5:56 - 5:58
    “we went to the club and we noted all these things
  • 5:58 - 5:59
    people talked about.”
  • 5:59 - 6:02
    But then it would end up looking like a very detailed meeting
  • 6:02 - 6:05
    that had on the agenda -- people might have made a joke
  • 6:05 - 6:06
    about fighting cops,
  • 6:06 - 6:08
    and it would just look like they planned to fight cops.
  • 6:08 - 6:13
    It's not clear that there was ever really an actual case against us.
  • 6:13 - 6:15
    But without their notes there definitely
  • 6:15 - 6:17
    would not have been a case against us.
  • 6:17 - 6:22
    The case of the Crown rested mostly with a recording
  • 6:22 - 6:24
    that was done on June 25th,
  • 6:24 - 6:28
    which was the day before the main action in Toronto.
  • 6:28 - 6:30
    And it was a large spokes-council,
  • 6:30 - 6:34
    so a lot of affinity groups were present and represented there.
  • 6:34 - 6:37
    And Brenda was there with a recording device.
  • 6:37 - 6:39
    And so on the night of the 25th they went to a judge
  • 6:39 - 6:44
    and they got warrants for the arrest of around 20 people,
  • 6:44 - 6:46
    one of which was me.
  • 6:47 - 6:49
    In the end there were 17 of us against whom
  • 6:49 - 6:51
    the charges were maintained the longest,
  • 6:51 - 6:53
    and we were charged with conspiracy to obstruct police,
  • 6:53 - 6:55
    conspiracy to assault police
  • 6:55 - 6:56
    and conspiracy to commit mischief
  • 6:56 - 6:58
    ... which just means 'fuck shit up.'
  • 6:58 - 7:01
    So I think there were at least seven police officers
  • 7:01 - 7:03
    who had kind of medium-term infiltration roles.
  • 7:03 - 7:05
    So there's people who infiltrated the medics group,
  • 7:05 - 7:07
    who infiltrated the legal observers group,
  • 7:07 - 7:09
    who were involved in different media projects.
  • 7:09 - 7:10
    And there's probably a lot of other infiltrators
  • 7:10 - 7:11
    we just never found out about.
  • 7:11 - 7:14
    Like I can imagine that probably in the context of
  • 7:14 - 7:16
    the anti-Olympics stuff happening at the same time,
  • 7:16 - 7:18
    that there were probably a lot of infiltrations
  • 7:18 - 7:19
    happening in Native communities.
  • 7:19 - 7:23
    I'm Lieutenant Suzanne Patles of the Mi'Kmaq Warrior Society,
  • 7:23 - 7:25
    and I'm from the Mi'Kmaq territory.
  • 7:25 - 7:28
    It's evident that the Canadian Security,
  • 7:28 - 7:33
    and Canada deems Indigenous people in general
  • 7:33 - 7:35
    as a threat to national security.
  • 7:35 - 7:39
    And they see development in the oil and gas industry as critical
  • 7:39 - 7:41
    – and that's what they call it, 'critical infrastructure' –
  • 7:41 - 7:44
    and they think that it's what Canada needs
  • 7:44 - 7:47
    to be able to move forward as a so-called nation.
  • 7:47 - 7:49
    So they see anybody who stands up
  • 7:49 - 7:52
    against these developments as a threat.
  • 7:52 - 7:56
    If they don't us veto over these infrastructure developments
  • 7:56 - 8:00
    and if they don't listen to the Indigenous peoples' voice,
  • 8:00 - 8:02
    the Indigenous people are going to rise up.
  • 8:02 - 8:04
    They're going to take to the streets.
  • 8:04 - 8:06
    They're going to take to the railroads.
  • 8:06 - 8:08
    They're going to take to the roads.
  • 8:08 - 8:09
    They're going to blockade.
  • 8:09 - 8:12
    They're going to set up camps.
  • 8:12 - 8:14
    It's kind of harder to infiltrate
  • 8:14 - 8:16
    within the Indigenous communities
  • 8:16 - 8:19
    because our Indigenous communities are so connected.
  • 8:19 - 8:20
    And when we talk to one another
  • 8:20 - 8:22
    we don't wanna know what you do.
  • 8:22 - 8:23
    We wanna know about your family.
  • 8:23 - 8:26
    We wanna know about where you come from... who you are.
  • 8:26 - 8:29
    It's a built-in block where we're not going to give you
  • 8:29 - 8:30
    all of our information.
  • 8:30 - 8:32
    Like, we might be nice to you and say hello,
  • 8:32 - 8:35
    and you may feel like you're a part of something,
  • 8:35 - 8:38
    but actually you're still on the outside of it.
  • 8:38 - 8:39
    We're warriors.
  • 8:39 - 8:41
    We've been doing this for hundreds and hundreds of years,
  • 8:41 - 8:43
    prior to Canada even being in existence.
  • 8:43 - 8:46
    We had this one guy come in.
  • 8:46 - 8:48
    And he came in on four different occasions.
  • 8:48 - 8:50
    He came in as a journalist.
  • 8:50 - 8:51
    He came in as militia.
  • 8:51 - 8:53
    Then he came in bringing donations.
  • 8:53 - 8:58
    And then he tried to approach us as being an international lawyer.
  • 8:58 - 9:01
    So he was just bringing things in that were not wanted,
  • 9:01 - 9:04
    and that we weren't supposed to have.
  • 9:04 - 9:05
    That we'd never even asked for.
  • 9:05 - 9:09
    He was trying to create a situation where our people
  • 9:09 - 9:12
    will be criminalized for the things that he brought in.
  • 9:12 - 9:15
    And once the men were already arrested after the raid,
  • 9:15 - 9:17
    he was approached by several members of the Warrior Society
  • 9:17 - 9:20
    and he was told: “We know you're an agent.
  • 9:20 - 9:22
    You need to get out of here.”
  • 9:24 - 9:27
    States go to incredible lengths to infiltrate resistance movements
  • 9:27 - 9:30
    and plant undercover agents in our scenes.
  • 9:30 - 9:32
    Such as the disgusting case of Mark Kennedy,
  • 9:32 - 9:34
    AKA Mark Stone,
  • 9:34 - 9:36
    who was outed in London in 2010
  • 9:36 - 9:40
    after spending 8 years as a mole in the European anarchist
  • 9:40 - 9:42
    and radical environmental movements
  • 9:42 - 9:45
    - 6 of which he spent in a long-term relationship
  • 9:45 - 9:47
    with one of the activists he was spying on.
  • 9:47 - 9:50
    But as paranoia-inducing as these cases may be,
  • 9:50 - 9:53
    they are exceptions to the rule.
  • 9:53 - 9:56
    Not only are these operations incredibly expensive,
  • 9:56 - 9:58
    but it takes a rare breed of psycho
  • 9:58 - 10:01
    to be able to effectively maintain the sort of double-life
  • 10:01 - 10:04
    required to carry out these long-term infiltrations.
  • 10:04 - 10:07
    Your average cop tends to have a much harder time blending in.
  • 10:07 - 10:09
    Black sleeves... that's gotta be hot, huh?
  • 10:11 - 10:13
    Be a little cooler if we had some drugs...
  • 10:13 - 10:15
    A much more common, and cost-effective method
  • 10:15 - 10:18
    of gathering intelligence on political dissidents
  • 10:18 - 10:22
    is through the use of informants and collaborators
  • 10:22 - 10:25
    ... or as they're more commonly known, snitches.
  • 10:26 - 10:29
    Brandon Darby was a Texas activist
  • 10:29 - 10:33
    who became an FBI informant in the mid-2000s.
  • 10:33 - 10:35
    He was somebody who had just been on the fringe
  • 10:35 - 10:36
    of the activist scene around Austin.
  • 10:36 - 10:38
    Not a major organizer or anything.
  • 10:38 - 10:40
    I was doing a lot of anti-fascist work at the time.
  • 10:40 - 10:43
    We were doing community armed defense from about 2002
  • 10:43 - 10:45
    ... so he was very enamored with that.
  • 10:45 - 10:47
    Brandon exhibited a lot of behaviours
  • 10:47 - 10:49
    that were problematic from the beginning,
  • 10:49 - 10:51
    but they're not because he was an informant.
  • 10:51 - 10:53
    They're just because he was a fucked up person,
  • 10:53 - 10:55
    just like many people.
  • 10:55 - 10:57
    And political and social movements and engagements
  • 10:57 - 10:59
    draw people who are damaged.
  • 10:59 - 11:00
    He wanted to do something.
  • 11:00 - 11:02
    He also wanted to work out his daddy issues.
  • 11:02 - 11:06
    He wanted to work out his personal stuff in a public setting.
  • 11:06 - 11:07
    My name is Brandon Darby
  • 11:07 - 11:09
    and I work with the Common Ground collective
  • 11:09 - 11:10
    in New Orleans, Louisiana.
  • 11:10 - 11:13
    He didn't come to Common Ground until about mid-October,
  • 11:13 - 11:15
    after we had done some initial rescue efforts.
  • 11:15 - 11:17
    And Common Ground was really an established organization
  • 11:17 - 11:19
    by the time he came in.
  • 11:19 - 11:22
    But due to some of the things that he and I had engaged in,
  • 11:22 - 11:24
    by taking up arms against white militias,
  • 11:24 - 11:27
    taking up arms against the police in those early days,
  • 11:27 - 11:29
    Malik Rahim, who was another co-founder
  • 11:29 - 11:31
    of the Common Ground collective in New Orleans,
  • 11:31 - 11:34
    gave him more power than he should have in the organization.
  • 11:34 - 11:37
    And the out-of-control amount of power that he was given
  • 11:37 - 11:40
    in these circumstances was just a toxic combination.
  • 11:40 - 11:42
    Just really vicious.
  • 11:42 - 11:44
    We made him leave Common Ground
  • 11:44 - 11:45
    because he was so dysfunctional.
  • 11:45 - 11:47
    And I was dysfunctional too,
  • 11:47 - 11:49
    you have to understand many of us had severe post-traumatic stress.
  • 11:49 - 11:51
    You cannot take up guns against people,
  • 11:51 - 11:53
    you cannot see dead people everywhere
  • 11:53 - 11:55
    and just, like, go “hey it's okay.”
  • 11:55 - 11:57
    We're not trained soldiers.
  • 11:57 - 11:58
    The people who lost their houses weren't trained.
  • 11:58 - 12:00
    I mean these are hard traumas.
  • 12:00 - 12:02
    We were able to take our privilege to leave,
  • 12:02 - 12:05
    but he - of course he acted fucked up afterwards.
  • 12:05 - 12:06
    But so did I
  • 12:06 - 12:08
    .... so did many people who were there for months and months.
  • 12:08 - 12:11
    A lot of people ask the million dollar question:
  • 12:11 - 12:15
    when did Brandon Darby become an FBI informant?
  • 12:15 - 12:17
    If I had to pick one particular time,
  • 12:17 - 12:20
    I think it's some time between March and May of 2006.
  • 12:20 - 12:22
    That's what it looks like in the FBI documents that I've
  • 12:22 - 12:25
    already received from the Freedom of Information Act request.
  • 12:25 - 12:27
    It looks like he starts giving information for free,
  • 12:27 - 12:30
    and then they offered to pay him at some point.
  • 12:30 - 12:32
    Recognize that he never did it for the money.
  • 12:32 - 12:33
    He's a trust fund kid.
  • 12:33 - 12:34
    Y'know, he's from a working-class background,
  • 12:34 - 12:36
    but his grandmother came into money
  • 12:36 - 12:38
    and he does have access to money through her.
  • 12:38 - 12:40
    He did it for ideological reasons.
  • 12:40 - 12:42
    And so we made him take a leave of absence.
  • 12:42 - 12:46
    But then he finagled his way back in, in January of 2007.
  • 12:46 - 12:50
    That means that he was actively working for the FBI at that point.
  • 12:50 - 12:52
    But then there were some things that started to happen
  • 12:52 - 12:55
    that really gave me pause and made me very uncomfortable.
  • 12:55 - 12:57
    I was working with Anti-Racist Action
  • 12:57 - 13:00
    and we were going to do some protests against this bookstore
  • 13:00 - 13:02
    that was a libertarian or right-libertarian book store
  • 13:02 - 13:04
    that had nativist books and stuff.
  • 13:04 - 13:06
    They were big supporters of that shithead Alex Jones.
  • 13:06 - 13:08
    But during that time he wanted us to
  • 13:08 - 13:10
    burn the book store to the ground.
  • 13:10 - 13:11
    And he kept at it.
  • 13:11 - 13:12
    And I just told him I wasn't going to have anything to do with it
  • 13:12 - 13:14
    because I thought it was a stupid idea.
  • 13:14 - 13:17
    A prominent Austin-based activist named Brandon Darby
  • 13:17 - 13:19
    has revealed he worked as an FBI informant
  • 13:19 - 13:22
    in the 18 months leading up to the Republican Convention.
  • 13:22 - 13:25
    While Brandon Darby has been involved in several activist groups,
  • 13:25 - 13:27
    he's best known as a founder of
  • 13:27 - 13:29
    the New Orleans-based group Common Ground Relief,
  • 13:29 - 13:31
    which he helped start after Hurricane Katrina.
  • 13:31 - 13:34
    He's expected to testify on behalf of the government
  • 13:34 - 13:36
    later this month in the trial of two Texas activists
  • 13:36 - 13:38
    who were arrested at the RNC
  • 13:38 - 13:41
    on charges of making and possessing Molotov cocktails.
  • 13:42 - 13:45
    In the lead-up to the Republican National Convention in 2008,
  • 13:45 - 13:47
    the other thing that started to happen was he started to
  • 13:47 - 13:49
    hound me about coming up there.
  • 13:49 - 13:51
    And I was like “dude... I'm not interested.”
  • 13:51 - 13:53
    So he started working with some other people,
  • 13:53 - 13:56
    Brad Crowder and David McKay.
  • 13:56 - 13:58
    And this is one of my biggest regrets, because
  • 13:58 - 14:02
    Brad and David were very new and very enamored with Brandon.
  • 14:02 - 14:04
    And so because of those two circumstances,
  • 14:04 - 14:06
    he was able to lead them further down the road.
  • 14:06 - 14:07
    You have to understand this,
  • 14:07 - 14:09
    that he wrecked a bunch of people's lives
  • 14:09 - 14:12
    through his being an informant and a provocateur,
  • 14:12 - 14:14
    but also through just being a shitty person.
  • 14:14 - 14:16
    Brad and David did prison time for that.
  • 14:16 - 14:18
    Brandon tried to get me to commit a crime
  • 14:18 - 14:20
    that I would have done forty years for.
  • 14:20 - 14:21
    A friend of ours here in Austin,
  • 14:21 - 14:25
    a Palestinian supporter and organizer named Riad Hamad,
  • 14:25 - 14:28
    killed himself because of the FBI's harassment of him
  • 14:28 - 14:30
    due to Brandon Darby.
  • 14:30 - 14:31
    So those are the major ones,
  • 14:31 - 14:35
    but there's tons of people that he just really damaged
  • 14:35 - 14:37
    and injured those people for years afterwards.
  • 14:37 - 14:40
    You may have heard of the Earth Liberation Front.
  • 14:40 - 14:41
    The Attorney General himself says
  • 14:41 - 14:44
    it's a domestic terrorist organization.
  • 14:44 - 14:47
    The FBI says it is one of the most dangerous groups in the country.
  • 14:47 - 14:53
    The Green Scare actions really started back in 1997 through 2001.
  • 14:53 - 14:57
    They were a series of economic sabotage
  • 14:57 - 15:01
    that used arson to target kind of a mix
  • 15:01 - 15:04
    of private corporations as well as government targets.
  • 15:04 - 15:08
    All the FBI agents that had been sent out in the late 90s
  • 15:08 - 15:14
    to infiltrate and mess with Oregon, in particular,
  • 15:14 - 15:16
    were completely unsuccessful.
  • 15:16 - 15:19
    And then ten years later,
  • 15:19 - 15:24
    one of the Earth Liberation Front co-conspirators,
  • 15:24 - 15:27
    who had been a long-time heroin addict,
  • 15:27 - 15:30
    succumbed to the addiction and his own paranoia
  • 15:30 - 15:35
    by walking into the FBI office and basically saying,
  • 15:35 - 15:39
    “if you pay me $150,000 and promise that I don't go to jail,
  • 15:39 - 15:41
    I'll tell you everything I know.”
  • 15:41 - 15:44
    And he became a snitch for them.
  • 15:44 - 15:46
    He wore a wire all around the country
  • 15:46 - 15:50
    attempting to entrap his co-conspirators.
  • 15:50 - 15:54
    And it was the first crack in the case and it was a major crack.
  • 15:54 - 15:58
    All of a sudden in December of 2005,
  • 15:58 - 16:01
    the largest round-up of environmental
  • 16:01 - 16:03
    and animal rights activists occurred.
  • 16:03 - 16:05
    The government charged them with multiple counts
  • 16:05 - 16:10
    of conspiracy and arson and possession of an incendiary device.
  • 16:10 - 16:11
    And then slowly but surely,
  • 16:11 - 16:15
    one after the other became snitches for the government.
  • 16:15 - 16:19
    Joyanna Zacher, Nathan Block, Daniel McGowen,
  • 16:19 - 16:22
    Jonathan Paul and Marius Mason
  • 16:22 - 16:26
    never succumbed to the pressures put upon all of them.
  • 16:26 - 16:28
    Nathan Block was 18 years old
  • 16:28 - 16:32
    when he was involved in those acts of economic sabotage,
  • 16:32 - 16:37
    and he was facing life plus 1,115 years in prison.
  • 16:37 - 16:38
    And even though he was the youngest member
  • 16:38 - 16:40
    of all the Green Scare defendants,
  • 16:40 - 16:44
    he never even batted an eye towards the idea
  • 16:44 - 16:46
    that he would ever cooperate with the state.
  • 16:46 - 16:48
    Y'know, he served all of his prison time.
  • 16:48 - 16:50
    He's out. He's back living his life.
  • 16:50 - 16:53
    Same with Daniel McGowan, Jonathan Paul.
  • 16:53 - 16:56
    But the bottom line is that even though these people
  • 16:56 - 17:01
    were facing life plus 1,115 years in jail,
  • 17:01 - 17:05
    they ended up doing between three and eight years in prison.
  • 17:05 - 17:10
    Non-cooperating defendants basically got an additional penalty
  • 17:10 - 17:13
    of an extra 18 months in prison compared to
  • 17:13 - 17:17
    their similarly-situated snitch co-defendants.
  • 17:17 - 17:21
    So the tax for being able to morally and ethically
  • 17:21 - 17:24
    look people in the eye and say
  • 17:24 - 17:27
    “I am not a snitch. I'm not a government informant.”
  • 17:27 - 17:31
    That was a tax of 18 months of extra time in jail.
  • 17:31 - 17:34
    Which all of them were more than willing to serve
  • 17:34 - 17:37
    in order to be able to return to their communities
  • 17:37 - 17:40
    and return to the movements that they
  • 17:40 - 17:41
    literally risked their lives for.
  • 17:44 - 17:47
    Nearly 70 years after it was first published,
  • 17:47 - 17:50
    George Orwell's dystopian sci-fi novel, 1984
  • 17:50 - 17:54
    is to this day, still held up as the gold standard for what
  • 17:54 - 17:57
    an authoritarian police state underpinned by an all-pervasive
  • 17:57 - 17:59
    surveillance apparatus would look like.
  • 17:59 - 18:01
    But let's be real
  • 18:01 - 18:04
    ... who needs Big Brother when you've got Facebook and Google?
  • 18:04 - 18:08
    Contemporary techniques of mass data collection and analysis,
  • 18:08 - 18:10
    combined with a society where more and more
  • 18:10 - 18:13
    of our communications take place through heavily-controlled
  • 18:13 - 18:17
    and completely monitored corporate infrastructure,
  • 18:17 - 18:19
    has produced a framework for social control
  • 18:19 - 18:21
    that would have made Orwell throw up in his mouth.
  • 18:21 - 18:24
    The world was given a terrifying glimpse of the true potential
  • 18:24 - 18:29
    of this unholy alliance of state and corporate power in 2011,
  • 18:29 - 18:31
    as the Gulf States were putting the finishing touches
  • 18:31 - 18:33
    on the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain.
  • 18:33 - 18:37
    After a Saudi-led occupation force viciously put down
  • 18:37 - 18:39
    the revolutionary uprising,
  • 18:39 - 18:42
    the Bahraini royal family used facebook to launch a wide-ranging
  • 18:42 - 18:46
    witch hunt of activists, posting pictures of pro-democracy rallies
  • 18:46 - 18:48
    and urging pro-regime loyalists
  • 18:48 - 18:51
    to name and tag people in the pictures,
  • 18:51 - 18:54
    in a mass doxing campaign that resulted in waves
  • 18:54 - 18:56
    of targeted arrests and disappearances.
  • 18:56 - 18:59
    Yes... the future is here comrades.
  • 18:59 - 19:00
    Angry responses only.
  • 19:02 - 19:06
    The term signals intelligence seems to come out of
  • 19:06 - 19:08
    earlier histories of spying in communication
  • 19:08 - 19:11
    where it was, like, classic Cold War between the US and Russia.
  • 19:11 - 19:14
    Telecommunications, especially hard to decipher
  • 19:14 - 19:17
    or hidden telecommunications, was not used very widely.
  • 19:17 - 19:21
    And with computers becoming widespread
  • 19:21 - 19:23
    and computers being able to do the math for encryption,
  • 19:23 - 19:26
    increasingly the ways people are organizing and communicating
  • 19:26 - 19:28
    with each other is happening through these computerized means.
  • 19:28 - 19:33
    So the part of their social control apparatus that is dedicated
  • 19:33 - 19:34
    to signals intelligence,
  • 19:34 - 19:37
    this gathering of information that's happening electronically,
  • 19:37 - 19:39
    is just ballooning.
  • 19:44 - 19:46
    You can think of the types of surveillance
  • 19:46 - 19:49
    that are done by these agencies in two different forms.
  • 19:49 - 19:51
    They do mass surveillance,
  • 19:51 - 19:53
    which is gathering all of the data they can,
  • 19:53 - 19:55
    storing it, trying to analyze it and look at metadata.
  • 19:55 - 19:57
    That's for hundreds of millions or billions of people
  • 19:57 - 19:59
    all over the world, and what their communications are.
  • 19:59 - 20:01
    And then they also do targeted surveillance,
  • 20:01 - 20:02
    which is really different.
  • 20:02 - 20:03
    That's like hacking into things,
  • 20:03 - 20:06
    or trying to find a way to compromise an encryption system
  • 20:06 - 20:10
    so that they can then read what people think is being protected.
  • 20:10 - 20:14
    These sorts of attacks are way more expensive.
  • 20:14 - 20:16
    This is why mass surveillance has become really important,
  • 20:16 - 20:19
    because they can do it really really widely for relatively lower cost.
  • 20:19 - 20:23
    Facebook and social media in general
  • 20:23 - 20:28
    has been a treasure trove of information
  • 20:28 - 20:31
    for the government and for corporations.
  • 20:31 - 20:36
    These types of platforms are a way of instantly getting snapshots
  • 20:36 - 20:38
    of your network, who your friends are,
  • 20:38 - 20:41
    who've you talked to, what events you're going to.
  • 20:41 - 20:45
    And they help facilitate more targeted attacks.
  • 20:45 - 20:48
    Facebook is probably the worst out there.
  • 20:48 - 20:50
    Government and corporations can literally look
  • 20:50 - 20:54
    at all your friend groups and plot out maps
  • 20:54 - 20:57
    of how different networks are connected to each other.
  • 20:57 - 21:01
    And they use that information for conspiracy allegations,
  • 21:01 - 21:03
    for RICO allegations,
  • 21:03 - 21:08
    as well as finding weak links within those networks to target.
  • 21:08 - 21:10
    The companies are better at gathering data.
  • 21:10 - 21:14
    They have set up whole web infrastructures pretty much
  • 21:14 - 21:17
    dedicated to gathering as much information as possible about people.
  • 21:17 - 21:19
    For profit. For advertising means.
  • 21:19 - 21:21
    Google, in its terms of use,
  • 21:21 - 21:24
    says that you have no reasonable expectation of privacy
  • 21:24 - 21:28
    when you use any of their products, including gmail.
  • 21:28 - 21:30
    So basically that means nothing that you do
  • 21:30 - 21:32
    in that platform is yours,
  • 21:32 - 21:34
    and they can do whatever they want with it.
  • 21:34 - 21:36
    They basically say “hey... know that we're
  • 21:36 - 21:38
    giving all of your shit to the government,
  • 21:38 - 21:41
    and we're going to use the shit to spy on you some more too.”
  • 21:41 - 21:45
    That's not disputed that this is the relationship.
  • 21:45 - 21:48

    Facebook also has facial recognition software
  • 21:48 - 21:51
    for all those photos and videos that you post.
  • 21:51 - 21:56
    North Dakota and DAPL used that facial recognition on facebook
  • 21:56 - 22:00
    in order to issue arrest warrants for people,
  • 22:00 - 22:04
    and literally arrested and charged people with crimes
  • 22:04 - 22:08
    based on video and photographs that activists posted.
  • 22:08 - 22:11
    Protest prediction software has been developed
  • 22:11 - 22:13
    and is currently being used
  • 22:13 - 22:15
    primarily in Latin American countries.
  • 22:15 - 22:18
    By monitoring facebook and other social media,
  • 22:18 - 22:24
    this software predicts when riots or protests,
  • 22:24 - 22:28
    or public uprisings may happen
  • 22:28 - 22:31
    ... up to three days in advance.
  • 22:31 - 22:35
    We have more direct confrontation right now with the state,
  • 22:35 - 22:37
    and so we think of things in state terms: the capacity
  • 22:37 - 22:39
    that the state has for repression,
  • 22:39 - 22:41
    and for social control broadly.
  • 22:41 - 22:43
    And that makes sense.
  • 22:43 - 22:48
    But surveillance capitalism is creating whole new forms
  • 22:48 - 22:51
    of social control that don't even depend on the state.
  • 22:51 - 22:55
    I mean, they're still built on the foundation of the prisons
  • 22:55 - 22:56
    and everything else that already exists.
  • 22:56 - 22:58
    But they're doing a whole other level of thing
  • 22:58 - 23:01
    that the state is kind of trying to use and catch up with,
  • 23:01 - 23:04
    but isn't primarily behind
  • 23:04 - 23:06
    and even isn't really necessarily that good at doing.
  • 23:06 - 23:09
    One really important aspect of it is
  • 23:09 - 23:12
    the degree to which it is marketed as voluntary.
  • 23:12 - 23:15
    That everybody chooses to get a facebook account,
  • 23:15 - 23:17
    and you have an option of not having a facebook account.
  • 23:17 - 23:19
    But the way the society is being structured,
  • 23:19 - 23:22
    there's less and less real choice involved
  • 23:22 - 23:24
    in whether we have a facebook account,
  • 23:24 - 23:25
    or whether we have a cell phone.
  • 23:25 - 23:28
    Your cell phone, and especially your smart phone,
  • 23:28 - 23:31
    is probably one of the largest vulnerabilities
  • 23:31 - 23:34
    that you have as an activist.
  • 23:34 - 23:36
    It's got your photographs, your contacts,
  • 23:36 - 23:38
    your calendar, your email.
  • 23:38 - 23:41
    Y'know, every aspect of your life
  • 23:41 - 23:43
    can often be contained on this phone.
  • 23:43 - 23:46
    Phones actually have two computers running in them.
  • 23:46 - 23:47
    There's the main computer,
  • 23:47 - 23:50
    and that can be mostly running free software.
  • 23:50 - 23:52
    Then there's a second computer called the baseband,
  • 23:52 - 23:54
    and it connects to the cell phone towers.
  • 23:54 - 23:56
    That part of the phone is running software
  • 23:56 - 23:58
    that we don't control at all.
  • 23:58 - 23:59
    It seems, at least in some cases,
  • 23:59 - 24:03
    that the tower has control of the phone via the baseband.
  • 24:03 - 24:08
    And often the baseband kind of can just override the main CPU.
  • 24:08 - 24:10
    Even if you turn off the phone,
  • 24:10 - 24:13
    your phone can be used to locate you.
  • 24:13 - 24:17
    It can be used as a microphone and/or a camera.
  • 24:17 - 24:20
    And you really have no sure way of knowing
  • 24:20 - 24:23
    whether any of those things are occurring,
  • 24:23 - 24:25
    even if you turn off the phone.
  • 24:25 - 24:27
    And then the tower is obviously controlled
  • 24:27 - 24:29
    completely by the telecom companies,
  • 24:29 - 24:31
    who are working closely with the state.
  • 24:31 - 24:34
    Or, more directly, via stingrays,
  • 24:34 - 24:36
    which are the things that police agencies are buying up
  • 24:36 - 24:40
    all over the place that create a fake cell phone tower
  • 24:40 - 24:44
    that the phones connect to, and then they get direct access.
  • 24:48 - 24:49
    Back in the 16th century,
  • 24:49 - 24:52
    when Sir Francis Bacon first coined the phrase
  • 24:52 - 24:53
    “Knowledge is Power”,
  • 24:53 - 24:54
    he was talking about how awesome
  • 24:54 - 24:57
    he thought the Scientific Method was.
  • 25:00 - 25:03
    But it wasn’t long before this homage to scientific empiricism
  • 25:03 - 25:05
    was twisted and appropriated
  • 25:05 - 25:07
    by the cheerleaders of authoritarian rule.
  • 25:07 - 25:10
    These days, the adage is more likely to be framed
  • 25:10 - 25:13
    and used as an ominous desk ornament
  • 25:13 - 25:17
    by some mid-level party member of a national intelligence agency,
  • 25:17 - 25:20
    in order to pad their ego and impress their secretary.
  • 25:20 - 25:22
    Maybe in Latin... if they’re really edgy.
  • 25:22 - 25:24
    The truth contained in these words,
  • 25:24 - 25:25
    however, goes both ways.
  • 25:25 - 25:29
    It's undoubtedly true that states and surveillance capitalist firms
  • 25:29 - 25:32
    have unprecedented levels of knowledge at their disposal,
  • 25:32 - 25:35
    which they use to increase their already considerable
  • 25:35 - 25:37
    military and policing power.
  • 25:37 - 25:39
    But it's also true that their methods
  • 25:39 - 25:40
    for gathering intelligence depend,
  • 25:40 - 25:44
    at least in part, on our ignorance of what they're up to,
  • 25:44 - 25:46
    and our willingness to fall for their traps.
  • 25:46 - 25:48
    Arming our movements with the knowledge
  • 25:48 - 25:50
    of how our enemies gather intelligence,
  • 25:50 - 25:52
    and adapting our tactics accordingly,
  • 25:52 - 25:55
    is an important component of building our own power.
  • 25:55 - 25:58
    Power that grows as we more effectively challenge
  • 25:58 - 26:00
    their systems of social control.
  • 26:00 - 26:04
    Don't overestimate the state's capacity, or the cops' capacity.
  • 26:04 - 26:08
    Don't underestimate it, but don't overestimate it.
  • 26:08 - 26:11
    They know some things, but they don't know shit.
  • 26:11 - 26:14
    Their intelligence gathering, unless you are absolutely the target,
  • 26:14 - 26:15
    is not very good.
  • 26:15 - 26:18
    Each bureaucracy is doing its own intelligence gathering,
  • 26:18 - 26:20
    has its own chain of command, and then intelligence tends to stay
  • 26:20 - 26:23
    in each of those bureaucracies and become trapped in like a silo.
  • 26:23 - 26:27
    As much as states and empires try to be, like,
  • 26:27 - 26:30
    “we're all powerful.... we can stop whatever we want”,
  • 26:30 - 26:32
    they very obviously cannot stop encryption.
  • 26:32 - 26:34
    And that's something to build on.
  • 26:34 - 26:38
    Digital encryption is basically a way of using computers
  • 26:38 - 26:39
    to hide information.
  • 26:39 - 26:42
    One of the most basic kinds of encryption is
  • 26:42 - 26:45
    you have data stored somewhere... you encrypt it in that place.
  • 26:45 - 26:47
    Local disk encryption can be done
  • 26:47 - 26:50
    using a program called Veracrypt.
  • 26:50 - 26:51
    It gets more complicated obviously,
  • 26:51 - 26:53
    when there's multiple people involved,
  • 26:53 - 26:55
    like when you're doing encrypted communication.
  • 26:55 - 26:58
    For email the best way that I've found
  • 26:58 - 27:03
    is using Thunderbird and an add-on called Enigmail.
  • 27:03 - 27:06
    If you have a smart phone you can do everything
  • 27:06 - 27:08
    in a program called Signal.
  • 27:08 - 27:14
    You need to use tools that you understand, based on the risk threat.
  • 27:14 - 27:16
    So I can drive around a car
  • 27:16 - 27:19
    and I don't understand exactly how that car works,
  • 27:19 - 27:22
    but I need a basic understanding of that tool set.
  • 27:22 - 27:24
    However if I'm using that car in such a way
  • 27:24 - 27:26
    where if the car breaks down,
  • 27:26 - 27:30
    me and the people I love get thrown in jail for a decade or more,
  • 27:30 - 27:33
    then I better have a really good fucking understanding
  • 27:33 - 27:35
    of exactly how that car works.
  • 27:35 - 27:37
    We have to support infrastructures that are based more
  • 27:37 - 27:41
    in the social relations that we want to be reflected in our world.
  • 27:41 - 27:42
    It's not just about surveillance.
  • 27:42 - 27:44
    It's ultimately about social control,
  • 27:44 - 27:46
    which is a more active process
  • 27:46 - 27:48
    than just knowing what people are saying.
  • 27:48 - 27:50
    Facebook is controlling people.
  • 27:50 - 27:54
    When we say their business model is based on advertising,
  • 27:54 - 27:57
    really what that's saying is get enough information about people
  • 27:57 - 27:59
    to be able to control their behaviour.
  • 27:59 - 28:01
    And it can be like a literally person-by-person
  • 28:01 - 28:03
    individualized version of the world,
  • 28:03 - 28:04
    to try to influence how they're going to act
  • 28:04 - 28:05
    and what they're going to say.
  • 28:05 - 28:07
    We decided that these would be the social norms now,
  • 28:07 - 28:09
    and we just went for it.
  • 28:09 - 28:12
    Security culture, at its core,
  • 28:12 - 28:15
    involves knowledge and understanding.
  • 28:15 - 28:21
    Developing personal relationships, face-to-face relationships,
  • 28:21 - 28:25
    affinity groups, trusting friendships and comradery
  • 28:25 - 28:30
    is probably the most effective form of security culture that we have.
  • 28:30 - 28:34
    Things like Brandon Darby create media sensation for us
  • 28:34 - 28:35
    because they are so rare.
  • 28:35 - 28:38
    Because it costs so much in resources for them
  • 28:38 - 28:40
    to actually do infiltration,
  • 28:40 - 28:43
    for them to actually do the heavy surveillance.
  • 28:43 - 28:45
    Whenever Brenda and Khalid were “on a play”,
  • 28:45 - 28:48
    and that's what they call when they're at work,
  • 28:48 - 28:49
    it's not just them that's being paid,
  • 28:49 - 28:52
    but it's also their two handlers who are sitting in a car.
  • 28:52 - 28:57
    It's also all of the people who are, y'know, typing out their notes,
  • 28:57 - 28:58
    and who are holding the debriefs,
  • 28:58 - 29:01
    and who are doing all of the bureaucratic work.
  • 29:01 - 29:03
    So it's a really expensive operation.
  • 29:03 - 29:06
    So there's absolutely no way that they could afford
  • 29:06 - 29:09
    to do that unless they had a big event to use as an excuse.
  • 29:09 - 29:11
    What we didn't factor in was that
  • 29:11 - 29:16
    there was a billion dollar security budget for the G20.
  • 29:16 - 29:17
    I mean there's a lot of explanations we could give
  • 29:17 - 29:20
    for our kind of unpreparedness towards that,
  • 29:20 - 29:21
    and one is that we don't necessarily take ourselves
  • 29:21 - 29:24
    super seriously as threats.
  • 29:24 - 29:26
    And that we might have this rhetoric of wanting to
  • 29:26 - 29:27
    produce radical transformation
  • 29:27 - 29:28
    and destroy all forms of authority.
  • 29:28 - 29:30
    But that we don't necessarily take ourselves
  • 29:30 - 29:33
    as seriously as that intention merits.
  • 29:33 - 29:36
    One of the main goals of surveillance and infiltration
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    is to disrupt the organizing that we're doing.
  • 29:39 - 29:41

    The police are always going to be kind of testing you
  • 29:41 - 29:43
    and sending in informants and seeing if they can get
  • 29:43 - 29:44
    different kinds of information,
  • 29:44 - 29:46
    because of what of your ideas are and because of your decision
  • 29:46 - 29:48
    to situate yourself as an enemy of this society.
  • 29:48 - 29:51
    It is the modus operandi of the state
  • 29:51 - 29:54
    to use informants, infiltrators, and forms of disruption
  • 29:54 - 29:57
    to keep political and social engagements
  • 29:57 - 29:58
    and movements from happening.
  • 29:58 - 29:59
    Sometimes folks will try to say that
  • 29:59 - 30:00
    when you have a cop in your group
  • 30:00 - 30:02
    it doesn't matter if you're not doing anything illegal.
  • 30:02 - 30:04
    And in this situation, we totally were doing illegal things.
  • 30:04 - 30:07
    Like, I was doing exactly what they accused me of doing.
  • 30:07 - 30:09
    But even if the police aren't trying to build up charges,
  • 30:09 - 30:12
    their goal is to maintain this sort of permanent level of disruption.
  • 30:12 - 30:14
    There's only one golden rule when it comes to talking to cops,
  • 30:14 - 30:16
    is “don't fucking talk to cops.”
  • 30:16 - 30:19
    If you suspect someone of being a snitch or a cop,
  • 30:19 - 30:21
    don't come out to your movement
  • 30:21 - 30:24
    or to the public before you are absolutely sure.
  • 30:24 - 30:26
    You don't have to snitch-jacket someone
  • 30:26 - 30:31
    in order to protect yourself and to further your strategic,
  • 30:31 - 30:34
    effective organizing efforts.
  • 30:34 - 30:37
    I think if we had a way to talk to each other
  • 30:37 - 30:40
    about these things in a way that wasn't gossipy
  • 30:40 - 30:42
    and didn't start rumours,
  • 30:42 - 30:44
    we would have caught on a lot earlier
  • 30:44 - 30:47
    that a lot of people had concerns about Khalid.
  • 30:47 - 30:49
    Having some level of practice in which you get to know each other
  • 30:49 - 30:51
    and kind of check each others' back stories a little bit
  • 30:51 - 30:53
    can be a way of just building trust
  • 30:53 - 30:55
    and of demonstrating a kind of seriousness and commitment.
  • 30:55 - 31:00
    We need to build explicit parameters for what we're vouching.
  • 31:00 - 31:01
    So we could be vouching
  • 31:01 - 31:04
    “is this person who they say that they are?”
  • 31:04 - 31:08
    And then we need to set a criteria for how we know.
  • 31:08 - 31:11
    And you need to make all these uncomfortable conversations
  • 31:11 - 31:13
    about vouching explicit.
  • 31:13 - 31:15
    Being intentional about checking each others' stories,
  • 31:15 - 31:17
    so that it's not just something you do to people you don't trust,
  • 31:17 - 31:19
    but something you do to people you want to trust more.
  • 31:19 - 31:22
    If we don't build trust with each other,
  • 31:22 - 31:23
    fear becomes the winner.
  • 31:23 - 31:25
    And you cannot make revolution,
  • 31:25 - 31:27
    you cannot create liberatory spaces,
  • 31:27 - 31:31
    you cannot create liberatory openings based solely on fear.
  • 31:31 - 31:33
    We must stand on the edge of our potential
  • 31:33 - 31:35
    and see what's on the other side.
  • 31:35 - 31:37
    And be willing to take those risks.
  • 31:37 - 31:39
    But we must do that pragmatically.
  • 31:39 - 31:42
    If we understand the role that intelligence plays,
  • 31:42 - 31:45
    it can maybe allow us to try to be a little more opaque ourselves,
  • 31:45 - 31:47
    to be a little bit less easily surveilled.
  • 31:47 - 31:50
    But also to be a bit more resistant to the inevitable repression,
  • 31:50 - 31:52
    and be a little bit less scared of it when it does fall.
  • 31:52 - 31:54
    Because ultimately we can't prevent repression
  • 31:54 - 31:55
    ... I don't think it's useful to try to.
  • 31:55 - 31:59
    I think it's useful to ask ourselves how can we achieve our goals,
  • 31:59 - 32:01
    and how can we be prepared for the consequences.
  • 32:04 - 32:06
    As states and corporations scramble to develop
  • 32:06 - 32:09
    increasingly sophisticated ways to monitor and control dissent,
  • 32:09 - 32:11
    in a desperate attempt to predict threats
  • 32:11 - 32:14
    that might challenge their continued dominance,
  • 32:14 - 32:16
    it is critical that our resistance movements develop
  • 32:16 - 32:19
    strategies and effective techniques that allow for
  • 32:19 - 32:22
    the decentralized spread of self-organization,
  • 32:22 - 32:25
    and methods of communication that thwart their attempts
  • 32:25 - 32:27
    to stay one step ahead of us.
  • 32:27 - 32:29
    So at this point, we’d like to remind you
  • 32:29 - 32:31
    that Trouble is intended to be watched in groups,
  • 32:31 - 32:34
    and to be used as a resource to promote discussion
  • 32:34 - 32:36
    and collective organizing.
  • 32:36 - 32:38
    Feel like anarchists and other activists in your town
  • 32:38 - 32:40
    could use a primer on security culture?
  • 32:40 - 32:43
    Please consider getting together with some comrades,
  • 32:43 - 32:45
    screening this film and discussing what steps people can take
  • 32:45 - 32:49
    to help protect your communities from infiltration and surveillance.
  • 32:49 - 32:51
    Interested in running regular screenings of Trouble
  • 32:51 - 32:54
    at your campus, infoshop, community center,
  • 32:54 - 32:55
    or even just at your home with friends?
  • 32:55 - 32:57
    Become a Trouble-Maker!
  • 32:57 - 32:59
    For 10 bucks a month, we’ll hook you up
  • 32:59 - 33:00
    with an advanced copy of the show,
  • 33:00 - 33:03
    and a screening kit featuring additional resources
  • 33:03 - 33:06
    and some questions you can use to get a discussion going.
  • 33:06 - 33:09
    If you can’t afford to support us financially, no worries!
  • 33:09 - 33:12
    You can stream and/or download all our content for free
  • 33:12 - 33:15
    off our website: sub.media/trouble.
  • 33:15 - 33:18
    If you’ve got any suggestions for show topics,
  • 33:18 - 33:20
    or just wanna get in touch,
  • 33:20 - 33:24
    drop us a line at trouble@sub.media

  • 33:24 - 33:25
    We’re excited to see that people have been
  • 33:25 - 33:28
    supporting our work by becoming troublemakers,
  • 33:28 - 33:31
    and wanna send a shout-out to Justin, Ram Philly,
  • 33:31 - 33:36
    Alex, SIU, Douglas, Jay, Adam, Joe, Scott, Michael,
  • 33:36 - 33:39
    Matt, Filip, Stephen, Zach and David.
  • 33:39 - 33:41
    We also wanna send a big shout out
  • 33:41 - 33:45
    to new Troublemaker chapters in Toronto & Washington DC.
  • 33:45 - 33:47
    This episode would not have been possible
  • 33:47 - 33:51
    without the generous support of Ryan, Matthew, Rodrigue and Amelie.
  • 33:51 - 33:54
    Now get out there, and make some trouble!
Title:
vimeo.com/.../227500952
Video Language:
English
Duration:
34:17

English subtitles

Revisions