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- [Professor Tyler Cowen] 
In the previous video,

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we introduced the ideas 
of asymmetric information,

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and adverse selection 
and we applied those ideas

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to the used car market.

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Let's take those same 
basic concepts,

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and build a basic model 
of health insurance.

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Suppose that potential 
health insurance consumers

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come in a range of states of health.

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For instance, 
the least healthy people

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might cost about $30,000 a year.

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That's these folks here.

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The most healthy might cost 
nothing in healthcare.

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That's these folks over here.

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Now consumers know this information,

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but by assumption, insurers don't.

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From the insurer point of view,

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everyone is of the same 
average health.

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Here again, we have 
asymmetric information.

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That is consumers of healthcare

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have more information about

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their health status 
than insurers do.

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In this scenario, insurers have to 
price the coverage

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based on the average cost 
among all consumers,

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namely, $15,000.

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But if the insurance costs $15,000,
then a portion of the market,

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the relatively healthy people,

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they will choose not 
to buy insurance as

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the cost of that insurance 
is greater to them

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than the expected benefit.

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So only part of this market 
will buy insurance.

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The average cost of those 
who actually will buy

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is then not $15,000 but $22,500.

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In that case, 
the insurance company,

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if it tries to price at $15,000, 
loses money.

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If the insurance company instead 
raises the price to $22,500,

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well, the same dynamic
is actually going to kick in again.

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That is relatively healthy people

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won't find it worth 
paying that price.

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The sicker people still will buy,

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and that will raise 
the expected costs

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to the insurer, 
and thus the price even further.

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This dynamic continues 
until the individual insurance firm

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finds there is no price 
at which it can attract

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a set of customers with 
healthcare costs

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lower than the price of insurance.

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This is the same death spiral 
we saw before with used cars

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and it leads to a market failure.

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As we saw in the used car market,

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there are several reasons 
why reality may differ

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from the simple model.

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First, the model we laid out would 
predict that the healthy people,

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those who exercise, 
eat their veggies,

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and buckle their seatbelts would 
not buy insurance,

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while the model is predicting that 
the smokers, the mountain climbers,

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and the motorcycle riders would
buy insurance.

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Is this true? Mostly no.

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The people who buy health insurance

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actually turn out to be 
the healthier people as well.

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Why is that?

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Well, those who try to avoid risk 
by eating well

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also try to avoid risk 
by buying health insurance.

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Our initial assumption that

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everyone calculates 
costs and benefits

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in exactly the same way 
is too simple.

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Once you account for the fact that

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people have differential 
tolerances for risk,

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you can end up having 
the healthier people be


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those who choose to buy 
the health insurance.

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This is called 
“propitious selection”


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where the people who buy 
the health insurance are healthier,

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not sicker than average.

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This can keep costs low, 
and prevent the death spiral.

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Another possible response 
to the adverse selection problem

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in health insurance 
might seem familiar.

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If you recall, 
we saw that services such as

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CARFAX and Certified Inspections

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can alleviate 
the asymmetric information problem

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when buying a used car.

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These services allow 
the buyer of the car

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to have similar information

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to that possessed
by the seller of the car.

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The result of this information 
is that better cars

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can sell for more, 
and lemons can sell for less.

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Is there an analogous approach 
for people in health insurance?

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Well, yes.

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The health of people 
can be inspected

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just as cars are inspected.

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So while consumers initially 
may have more information

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about their health than what 
the insurance companies have,

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a checkup will allow 
the insurance firms

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to get a better idea of 
the consumer's expected

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healthcare costs.

NOTE Paragraph

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And that allows 
the insurance companies

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to charge healthy consumers less 
and sicker consumers more.

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In the used car market,

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that seemed like 
a pretty good solution.

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After all, better cars 
should sell for more,

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and lemons should sell for less.

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In the health insurance market,

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that solution might work,

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but some people feel it is 
doubly unfair.

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Not only are the sick sick,

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but now they also have 
to pay more

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for their health insurance.

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Another problem 
with inspection is that

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it might reveal 
too much information,

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thereby rendering health insurance
no longer viable.

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For instance, let's say there's 
a very good diagnostic test,

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and it determines that 
a patient A has cancer

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and then B we know that cancer
will cost $1 million to treat.

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Well, to insure against that cancer,

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the price of the policy 
has to be about $1 million,

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but that's no longer insurance.

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That's just presenting the patient 
with the bill.

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Insurance is protecting against 
unexpected states of affairs,

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and it's a kind of risk pooling,

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a kind of protecting yourself
against the high bill.

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But if you're getting the high bill 
no matter what when you're sick,

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well, then we've lost 
those benefits of insurance.

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Another solution to 
the adverse selection problem

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when used extensively 
in the United States

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is group health insurance 
through employers.

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Most people in America 
don't purchase insurance directly.

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Instead, their employer 
purchases it for them

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as part of a group plan.

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The benefit of the system is that 
the insurance company

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doesn't have to worry about 
adverse selection so much

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The employer doesn't know much
more about its employees' health

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than does the insurance firm.

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Furthermore, the employer is
going to be buying

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health insurance for the employees
regardless of their health.

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So for these reasons,
the adverse selection problem is

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much weaker with 
group health insurance.

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Group health insurance, however, 
does cause other problems.

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If you lose your job, 
you can lose your health insurance.

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And what we do about retirees?

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In the United States, 
various laws have made

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health insurance more affordable,

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and furthermore retirees are insured 
by the government

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under Medicare.

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So, there are some solutions, 
albeit imperfect ones as usual.

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The most recent approach 
to the adverse selection problem

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was implemented 
in the Affordable Care Act,

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otherwise known as Obamacare.

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Under the Affordable Care Act,

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everyone is supposed to buy
health insurance.

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If you don't, 
you will be fined by law.

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The idea here is to force 
all the healthy people into the pool

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of those who buy insurance

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that will moderate the cost 
of health insurance,

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and we will avoid the death spiral.

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As you can see, although 


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the adverse selection model 
is pretty simple,

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it has lots of applications

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to some pretty complex 
real-world problems.

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Next up we'll tackle moral
hazard. See you then.

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♪ [music] ♪

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