<i>preroll music</i>

Herald: I am very happy to introduce this
year’s update on the “State of the Onion”!

This is a talk with about 5 speakers,
so let’s introduce them one by one.

First, Roger. He did it the last talk.
He is the founder of the TOR Project,

<i>applause</i>
MIT Graduate and Top 100 Global Thinkers.

Then we have Jake, a
humble PHD math student

<i>applause</i>

that is in my opinion not a
National Security threat

but a post National Security promise.

We have Mike Perry, and I think
it is enough to say about him,

that the NSA calls him a worthy adversary.

<i>applause</i>

He is also the lead dev
of the TOR Browser.

And then we have Alison Macrina,
a radical, militant librarian.

<i>applause</i>

And last but not least: Shari Steele, the
new Executive Director of the TOR Project.

<i>applause</i>

So without further ado:
This year’s State of the Onion!

<i>applause</i>

Jacob: Alright, it’s a great
honor to be back here again.

And we’re really happy to be able
to introduce so many more faces.

It’s no longer the Roger and Jake
show. That’s very important to us.

Hopefully next year, we won’t
be here, but we’ll still be alive.

So 2015, if I were to express
it in a hand gesture

or with a facial expression, it would
look something like “Ooouuw”.

It was really a year of big changes. Not
all of them were really good changes.

And there were a lot of heavy things
that happened throughout the year.

We won’t even be able to cover all of
them because we only have an hour.

So we want to focus on the
positive things. I would say that

probably the nicest thing is that we are
growing. We’re really, really growing.

Not only growing the network,
but we’re growing the community.

And in some sense we’re expanding
throughout the whole world in terms of

users who are using TOR, what TOR
users are using TOR for, which is

of course extremely important that there
is more and more people just doing

regular things with TOR, protecting
themselves. But then we have of course

lots of specialized things that happen
with the TOR network as well.

We have things like OnionBalance and
Ricochet. Really exciting developments.

And we’ll talk a bit about all of those
things. One of the most unlikely things,

at least when I imagine working
on TOR, say 10 years ago vs. now,

is that we’ve worked with some really
unlikely partners. Some of you know

that I’m not really a big fan of Silicon
Valley, even though I’m from there.

So you know, I sometimes call Facebook
not so nice names, like Stasi-Book.

And part of the reason for that is
because I think it is a little bit weird,

that you report on all your friends
in order to go to parties.

Previously it was to get into the party
and now it is to go to parties.

And yet we worked with them on something.

Because it turns out that sometimes
you have unlikely temporary alliances.

And it turns out that while I personally
may think that they are evil incarnate

in some sense, it is the case that
there is at least one good guy there.

Alec worked on this fantastic RFC7686,

that actually allowed us to help all
Facebook users mitigate some harm.

Which is that if they want to be able
to visit Facebook; and I guess

the reality is that not using Facebook
for a lot of people is sort of like

the “Kill your Television” bumper sticker
of the 90s. For those of you that ever

visited rural America. You know that that
wasn’t like a really successful campaign.

A lot of people have TVs these days
as well. So it’s a little bit like that,

only here we actually built an alternative
where we can mitigate harm.

And that’s really incredibly important
because it mitigates harm in all sorts

of different pieces of software. It
makes it possible for us to talk to

Browser vendors, to DNS resolvers.
And part of this was motivated

by some investigative journalism
that I actually did, where I revealed

XKeyscore rules, where the US
Government’s National Security Agency

was sifting through all of the internet
traffic to look for .onion addresses.

So when they saw a DNS request
for .onion they were actually

learning .onions by harvesting traffic.
And that really motivated me

to want to make it, so that the DNS
resolvers didn’t do that anymore.

It was very important, because one
of my core missions with TOR

is to make that kind of stuff a
lot harder for the spies to do.

And protecting everyday users, even
users who aren’t TOR users, yet.

And that’s very important. So working
with Alec on this has been great,

because the IETF actually
supports this. And now

ICANN will not sell
.onion to anyone.

It’s a special use reserved
name. And that’s incredible!

<i>applause</i>

Roger: OK, so. Is this
thing on? Yes it is, great!

So there are a couple of interesting
graphs, that we’re going to give you,

of usage scenarios, usage
instances over the past year.

So pretty recently we were looking at
the number of people in Russia

using TOR. Russia has been talking about
censoring, talking about all sorts of

oppression steps. And at
the beginning of November,

we moved from 180k people in
Russia each day using TOR

up to almost 400k people. And
this is probably a low estimate.

So many hundreds of thousands
of people for that two week period,

which started with a Russian bomber
getting shot down, were trying to get

news from the rest of the world, rather
than news as Russia wanted to show it

to them. So that’s
kind of a cool event.

Another interesting event: Bangladesh
ended up censoring Facebook

and some other websites and a whole
lot of people switched to using TOR.

I was actually talking to one of the
Facebook people and they have their own

internal statistics about the number of
people connecting over the TOR network

to Facebook. And it would be super
cool to super impose these two graphs.

Our data is public and open
and we like sharing it.

They don’t actually share their data.
But one day it would be really cool

to be able to see both of these
graphs at once, to see users shifting

from reaching Facebook
directly to going over TOR.

The other interesting thing from the
Bangladesh side: I was looking at the

Alexa top websites around the
world and we, torproject.org is

like 8000th in the global
rankings, but at least

for the past couple of weeks
torproject.org has been

300th in Bangladesh. So there are a
whole heck of a lot of people there,

learning about these privacy things
that can get around local censorship.

<i>applause</i>

OK, and then an exciting
other story that we’re

going to touch on briefly, but
it’s an entire talk on its own.

So let me give you a couple
of facts and we’ll go from there.

January of 2014 a hundred
relays showed up

in the TOR network and we weren’t sure
who was running them, but they weren’t

exit relays, so they didn’t seem like
they were such a threat at the time.

Fast forward a while later: The
CERT organization inside CMU

submitted a presentation to
Blackhat on how cool they were

for being able to attack TOR users. And
they talked about how they were going to

talk about individual users
that they de-anonymized

and how cool they were for that.
And I spent a while trying to extract

details from them. And eventually
I learned what their attack was.

And then Nick Mathewson, one of
the other TOR developers decided

to check the TOR network to see if
anybody was actually doing that attack.

I mean it’s CERT, they are the
folks who publicised the phrase

“responsible disclosure”. Surely,
they are not actually undermining

the TOR network and attacking TOR users.
But then it turns out that somebody was

doing the attack. And it was these
100 relays that looked kind of ordinary

and innocuous before that. Then I sent
mail to the CERT people, saying:

“Hey are those relays yours?” And they
went silent. They have never answered any

of my mails since then. So that’s
what we know. It doesn’t look good.

One of the key things that we,
TOR, have done from here is

we’ve been working on strengthening
the TOR network and getting better

at recognizing these things. So
the core of the attack was that

they did what’s called a Sybil attack,
where you sign up a lot of relays

and you become too large a fraction of the
TOR network. So we’ve been working on

a lot of ways to recognize that
an attack like that is happening,

and mitigate it, and get rid of it
early. For example Philipp Winter

has a bunch of interesting research
areas on recognizing similarity

between relays. So you can
automatically start detecting:

“Wait a minute, this event
happened, where a lot of relays

are more similar than they should
be.” Another example there is:

We used to say: “Well I don’t
know who’s running them,

but they don’t seem that dangerous. So
OK, it’s good to grow the TOR network.”

Now we’re taking the other
approach of “Gosh, that’s weird,

let’s get rid of them and then
we’ll ask questions after that.”

So we’re trying to be more
aggressive, more conservative

at keeping the TOR network
safe from large adversaries.

Whether they’re government organizations
or corporations or individuals.

Whoever might be attacking it.

Jacob: We’ve had a few really big
changes in the TOR community.

One of them is that we had
an Interim Executive Director

come on in a sort of quick moment
and that’s Roger Dingledine.

Some of you probably always thought he
was the Executive Director the whole time.

That’s because for a while he was and then
he wasn’t. And then he was back again.

And that change was quite a
huge change in that instead of

working on a lot of anonymity stuff,
Roger was doing a lot of bureaucratic

paperwork which was actually quite
sad for the anonymity world, I think.

He probably reviewed fewer papers
and did fewer anonymity things

this year than ever before.
Which is really, really sad.

But that really lit a fire under us to
make sure that we would actually

change that. To make sure that it was
possible to get someone else, who is

really good at being an Executive Director
of the TOR Project, to really lead,

so that we could have Roger return to
not only being an anonymity researcher,

but also the true Spirit
Animal of the TOR Project.

He doesn’t look like
an onion, but in spirit.

Roger: Slide!
Jacob: <i>laughing</i>

Another really big thing that happened
is working with Laura Poitras

over the last many years.
She has followed the TOR Project

– lots of people like to follow the
people on the TOR Project –

but we consented to her following us.
And she made a film, “Citizenfour”,

I think some of you… have
any of you seen this film?

<i>applause</i>
Quite amazingly,

she won an Oscar. Actually, she
basically won every film prize.

<i>applause</i>

One of the key things is that people
in this room that work on Free Software

were explicitly thanked. If you work
on Tails, if you work on GnuPG,

if you work on SecureDrop,
OTR, TOR, …

She specifically said in
the credits of the film:

This film wouldn’t have been
possible without that Free Software.

Actually making her job and
the jobs of her source

and other people involved…
making that possible.

And so her winning that Oscar
in some sense feels like

closing a really big loop that had
been open for a very long time.

And it’s really great and she,
I think, would really wish that she

could be here today, again. She
sends her regards, and she is really,

really thankful for everybody here that
writes Free Software for freedom!

<i>applause</i>

Roger: So another exciting event
that happened in 2015 is that reddit

gave us 83.000$. They had some
extra profit and they decided

that they would give it to 10 non-profits
chosen from among the Redditer community.

And there were people who came to me
and said: “Hey Roger, you really have to,

you know, start advocating, start
teaching everybody, why TOR should be

one of them.” And I said: “Oh, I’m
busy. Those things never work.

You know, they’ll choose somebody
else.” And so it turns out that we were

the 10th out of 10 without doing
any advocacy work whatsoever

to the reddit community, which is super
cool that they care about us so much.

Also reddit divided the ten equally. So
even though we were the 10th out of 10,

we got 10% of the donations
that they were giving out.

<i>applause</i>

Jake: One of the really –
I would say one of the oddest things

about working at the TOR Project for me
is that TOR has supported me through

really crazy times. So when I was
being detained by the US Government

or having my property stolen by fascist
pigs in the United States Government’s

border checkpoints, TOR didn’t fire me.
TOR always backed me and always

kept me safe. And many people often look
like they wanted to kill me from stress,

but often they didn’t, which was nice.
Or they didn’t get close enough

and I could move fast enough. But
they were always very helpful. And

they’ve really helped me to
go and do things to speak for

anonymous users who can’t go
other places. And one of the places

which I was most honored to go in the
last year – I was actually scheduled

to go there with Caspar Bowden, but
unfortunately he was ill at the time.

And as you know, Caspar
has since passed away.

But we were scheduled to go together and
TOR was supporting us both, actually,

to go to this. And it resulted, I believe,

in a very amazing meeting in
Geneva at the United Nations,

where the special rapporteur actually
endorsed TOR and off-the-record messaging

and encryption programs,
and privacy, and free software.

Saying that they are absolutely essential.
And in fact their use should be encouraged

from a human rights perspective. And in
fact the really amazing part about it is

he didn’t do it only from the perspective
of free speech. And this is important,

because actually there are other rights.
And we should think about them.

So for example the right to form
and to hold an idea is a right

that cannot be abridged. The right
to free speech can be abridged

in many free societies, but what is
in your head and how you form it

is something where… that is not
a right that can be abridged.

And he wrote this in the report. And
he, when writing this report with

many other people, made it very clear that
this is something we need to keep in mind.

That when we talk about private spaces
online, where groups may collaborate

to form ideas, to be able to create
a political platform for example,

to be able to make democratic change,
they need to be able to use the internet

to freely exchange those ideas in a secure
and anonymized, encrypted fashion.

And that helps them to form and to hold
ideas. And obviously that helps them later

to express free speech ideas. And that’s
a huge thing to have the United Nations

endorse basically what many of us in this
room have been saying for, well… decades.

Roger: So the UN thing is really cool.
We’ve also been doing some other

policy angles. So Steven Murdoch, who
is a professor in England and also

part of the TOR community, has worked
really hard at teaching the British folks,

that their new backdoor laws and
their new terrible laws are actually

not what any reasonable country wants.
So he’s put a huge amount of energy into

basically advocating for freedom for
them. And similarly Paul Syverson,

part of the TOR community, basically
ended up writing a post note for the UK

about how the dark web is
misunderstood. See previous talk.

So we’ve been doing quite a bit
of education at the policy level

to try to teach the world, that encryption
is good and safe and worthwhile

and should be the default
around the world.

Jake: And there is a kind of interesting
thing here. Maybe a little contentious

with some people in the TOR community.
But I just wanted to make it really clear.

We have the TOR Project, which is
a non-profit in the United States.

And we have a much wider TOR
community all around the world.

And in Berlin we have a really, really
like an incredible TOR community.

We have people like Donncha working
on OnionBalance. We have people like

Leif Ryge working on bananaphone. We
have all of these different people working

on all sorts of Free Software. And many
of those people don’t actually work

for the TOR Project. They’re community
members, they’re volunteers,

there is some of privacy students.
And so the Renewable Freedom Foundation

actually funded the creation
of a sort of separate space

in Berlin where people work on these
kinds of things, which is not affiliated

with US Government money. It’s
not affiliated with the TOR Project

as some sort of corporate thing.
It’s not a multinational thing.

It’s really the peer-to-peer version in
some sense of what we’ve already had

in other places. And it’s really great
and I wanted to just thank Moritz

who made that happen and to all the
people like Aaron Gibson, and Juris

who actually put that space together
and made it possible. So in Berlin,

there is a space, not just c-base,
not just CCCB, but actually

a place which is about anonymity.
It’s called Zwiebelraum.

And this is a place in which people are
working on this Free Software. And they

are doing it in an independent manner.
And we hope actually that people will

come together and support that, because
we need more spaces like that, that

are not directly affiliated with the TOR
Project, necessarily, but where we have

an aligned mission about reproduceable
builds in Free Software and also

about anonymity and actually about caring
about Free Speech. And actually making

it happen. And really building spaces
like that all around the world. So if you

have a place in your town where you want
to work on those things, we would really

hope that you will work on building that.
I called it “general cipher punkery”.

I feel like that’s a good description.
There’s lots of stuff to be done.

And now for a Marxist joke: So we
discovered the division of labor,

which was a really important discovery.
We’re about 180 years too late,

but we started to split up where it didn’t
go very well, the Marxist asked why.

Cheers, cheers!
So the Vegas Teams are really simple.

Basically we have a bunch of people
that previously they did everything.

And this really doesn’t work. It’s very
stressful and it’s very frustrating

and it leads to people doing lots and
lots of things in a very unfocused way.

And so we split it up! And it actually
happened naturally, it was emergent.

So e.g. Mike Perry, who’s gonna talk
about the Applications Team’s work

in a second here, he was
already leading this,

he was really making this happen. And
so we just made it more explicit. And,

in fact we created a way of communicating
and reporting back so that

you don’t have to, like, drink from the
fire hose about absolutely everything

that’s happening everywhere, but you can
sort of tune in to those things, which

means we get higher-level understandings
and that is a really, incredibly useful

thing that has made us much more
productive. And what was part of the

growing pains of the last year actually
was figuring out how to make that work

because we’re a pretty flat group in terms
of a community and a pretty flat group

in terms of an organization writing
Free Software and advocating.

And so that’s a really incredibly good
thing which will come up all the time.

You’ll hear people talking about the
Metrics Team or the Network Team or the

Applications Team or the Community Team.
And that’s what we’re talking about.

In that sense. So we tried to formalize it
and in some ways we may be moving in a

sort of Debian model a little bit. And
we’ll see how that actually goes. So we

have a really great person here to
explain the work of the Metrics Team.

Roger: OK, so I’m gonna tell you a little
bit about what the Metrics Team has been

working on lately to give you a
sense of some of the components

of the TOR community. So there are 5 or
10 people who work on the Metrics Team.

We actually only pay one-ish of them;
so most of them are volunteers

and that’s… on the one hand that’s great.
It’s wonderful that there are researchers

all around the world who are contributing
and helping to visualize and helping to do

analysis on the data. On the other hand
it’s sort of sad that we don’t have a full

team of full-time people who are working
on this all the time. So it’d be great

to have your assistance
working on this. So,

actually Metrics has been accumulating
all sorts of analysis tools

over the past 5 years. So there are up to
30 different little tools. There’s Atlas

and Globe and Stem and 20-something more
which is a challenge to keep coordinated,

a challenge to keep maintained. So
they’ve been working on how to integrate

these things and make them more
usable and maintainable and extensible.

So one example that they… so they wrote
some slides for me to present here.

One example that they were looking
at, to give you an example of how

this analysis works, is bad relays in the
TOR network. So maybe that’s an exit relay

that runs, but it modifies traffic, or
it watches traffic or something.

Maybe it’s a relay that signs up
as a Hidden Service directory

and then when you publish your
onion address to it, it goes to visit it

or it puts it on a big list or something
like that. Or maybe bad relays are Sybils

who – we were talking earlier about
the 2014 attack where a 100 relays

showed up at once and we, the directory
authorities have a couple of ways of

addressing that relays. One of them is
each of the directory authorities can say:

“That relay needs to get out of the
network! We just cut it out of the

network.” We can also say: “Bad exit!”
We can also say: “That relay is no longer

gonna be used as an exit!” So even though
it advertises that it can reach Blockchain

and other websites, clients choose not to
do it that way. So that’s the background.

One of the tools that Damian wrote a while
ago is called Tor-Consensus-Health and it

looks every hour at the new list of relays
in the network and it tries to figure out:

“Is there something suspicious that
just happened at this point?” And in this

case it looks for a bunch of new relays
showing up all at the same time with

similar characteristics and it sends email
to a list. So that’s useful. The second

piece of the analysis is “OK, what do you
do when that happens?” So we get an email

saying “Hey, 40 new relays showed up,
what’s up with that?” So there’s a real

challenge there to decide: do we allow
the TOR network to grow – sounds good –

or do we wonder who these people are
and try to contact them or cut them out of

the network or constrain what fraction
of the network they can become.

So Philipp Winter also has a
visualization, in this case of basically

which relays were around on a given month.
So the X axis is all of the different

relays in the month and the Y axis is each
hour during that month. And they’ve sorted

the relays here by how much they were
present in the given month. And you’ll

notice the red blocks over there are
relays that showed up at the same time

and they’d been consistently present at
the same time since then. So that’s kind

of suspicious. That’s “Hey, wait a minute,
what’s that pattern going on there?”

So this is a cool way of visualizing and
being able to drill down and say:

“Wait a minute, that pattern right there,
something weird just happened.”

So part of the challenge in general for
the Metrics Team is: they have a Terabyte

of interesting data of what the network
has looked like over the years –

how do you turn that into “Wait a minute,
that right there is something mysterious

that just happened. Let’s look at it
more.” So you can look at it from

the visualization side but you can also
– there’s a tool called Onionoo where

you can basically query it, all sorts
of queries in it, it dumps the data

back on to you. So we’ve got a Terabyte
of interesting data out there, what

the relays are on the network, what
sort of statistics they been reporting,

when they’re up, when they’re down,
whether they change keys a lot,

whether they change IP addresses a lot.
So we encourage you to investigate and

look at these tools etc. So there’s
a new website we set up this year

called CollecTor, collector.torproject.org
that has all of these different data sets

and pointers to all these different
libraries and tools etc. that you too

can use to investigate, graph-visualize
etc. So here’s another example.

At this point we’re looking at the 9
directory authorities in the network.

Each of them votes its opinion about
each relay. So whether the relay’s fast,

or stable, or looks like a good exit or
maybe we should vote about “Bad Exit”

for it. So the grey lines are: all of the
directory authorities thought that

it didn’t deserve the flag and it’s very
clear. The green lines are: enough of the

directory authorities said that the relay
should get the flag, also very clear.

And all the brown and light green etc.
in the middle are contradictions.

That’s where some of the directory
authorities said “Yes it’s fast” and some

of them said “No, it’s not fast”. And this
gives us a visualization, a way to see

whether most of the directory authorities
are agreeing with each other.

We should look at this over time and if
suddenly there’s a huge brown area

then we can say “Wait a minute,
something’s going on”, where maybe

a set of relays are trying to look good to
these directory authorities and trying

not to look good to these. So basically
it helps us to recognize patterns

of weird things going on. So on CollecTor
you can find all sorts of data sets

and you can fetch them and do your
analysis of them. And Tor Metrics

– metrics.torproject.org – has a bunch of
examples of this analysis, where you can

look at graphs of the number of people
connecting from different countries, the

number of relays over time, the number
of new relays, the number of bridges,

users connecting to bridges etc. There
are 3 different libraries that help you

to parse these various data sets. So
there’s one in Python, one in Java,

one in Go; so whichever one of those
you enjoy most you can grab and start

doing analysis. They do weekly or so
IRC meetings, so the TOR Metrics Team

invites you to show up on January 7th
and they would love to have your help.

They have a bunch of really interesting
data, they have a bunch of really

interesting analysis tools and they’re
missing curious people. So show up,

start asking questions about the data, try
to learn what’s going on. And you can

learn more about them, on
the Metrics Team, there.

And then I’m gonna pass it on to Mike.

<i>applause</i>

Mike: OK, so Hello everyone! So, I’ll be
telling ’bout the Applications Team part

of the Vegas plan that
Jake introduced. Basically,

the Applications Team was created to
bring together all the aspects of TOR

and the extended community that are
working on anything that’s user facing.

So anything with a user interface that
the user will directly interact with,

that’s an application on
either Mobile or Desktop.

So to start, obviously we had the
TOR Browser, that’s sort of like

a flagship application that most people
are familiar with when they think of TOR.

Recently we’ve added OrFox which is a
project by the Guardianproject to port

the TOR Browser patches to Android
and that’s currently in Alpha Status. But

it’s available on the Guardianproject’s
F-Droid Repo. We also have 2 chat clients:

TorMessenger and Ricochet and both with
different security properties. I will be

getting to it later. So I guess, first
off let’s talk about what happened

in the TOR Browser world in 2015.
Basically most of the, or a good deal

of our work is spent keeping up
with the Firefox release treadmill.

That includes responding
to emergency releases,

auditing changes in the Firefox code
base making sure that their features

adhere to our privacy model and making
sure that our releases come out

the same day as the official
Firefox releases so that there’s

no vulnerability exposure to known
vulnerabilities after they’re disclosed.

That has been a little bit rough to over
2015. I believe there is a solid 3..4

months where it felt like we were doing
a release every 2 weeks. Due to either

log jam or random unassessed
vulnerability or any arbitrary

security issue with Firefox. But we did…
despite treading all that water we did

manage to get quite a bit of work done.
As always our work on the browser focuses

in 3 main areas: privacy, security
and usability. Our privacy work is

primarily focused around making sure that
any new browser feature doesn’t enable

new vectors for 3rd party tracking. So no
ways for a 3rd party content resource to

store state or cookies or blob URIs
or some of the newer features.

There’s a new cash API. These sorts
of things need to all be isolated

to the URL bar domain to prevent 3rd
parties from being able to track you.

From being able to recognize it’s the same
you when you log in to Facebook and

when you visit CNN, and CNN loads
the Facebook Like buttons, e.g.

Additionally we have done a lot of work on
fingerprinting defences, the Alpha Release

ships a set of fonts for the
Linux users so that the

font fingerprinting can be normalized
since a lot of Linux users tend to have

different fonts installed on their
systems. As well as tries to normalize

the font list that allowed for Windows
and Mac users where they often get

additional fonts from 3rd party
applications that install them.

On the security front the major exciting
piece is the security slider. So with iSEC

Partners’ help we did a review of all the
Firefox vulnerabilities and categorized

them based on the component that they were
in as well as their prevalence on the web.

And came up with 4 positions that allow
you to choose, basically trade off,

functionality for vulnerability surface
reduction. And this was actually quite

successful. It turned out that
all of the Pwn2own exploits

against Firefox were actually blocked
for non-https sites at medium/high.

And if you enable the high security
level they were blocked for everything.

We additionally released address
sanitizer hardened builds, these are…

basically should… especially the higher
security levels of the security slider

should protect against various memory
safety issues in the browser and also

help us diagnose issues very rapidly.

And of course we now sign our Windows
packages using a hardware security module

from DigiCert. The usability improvements
were primarily focused around this UI and

this new Onion Menus you can see if you
remember the old menu. There was quite a

lot more options there. We sort of
condensed and consolidated options and

eliminated and combined as much as we
could. An additionally displayed the

circuit for the current URL bar domain.
In 2016 we’ll be focusing mostly on again

the same 3 areas. Our main goal for
privacy is to try and convince Mozilla

that they want to adopt our idea of
isolating 3rd party identifiers at least

to the point of if the user goes into the
Preferences and tries to disable 3rd party

cookies, will let you do the same thing
for DOM storage, Cash, blob URIs,

worker threads, and all these
other sources of shared state.

We’re very excited about their work on a
multi-process sandbox, additionally even

application-level sandboxing, it should
be… without Mozilla’s sandbox,

we should still be able to prevent the
browser from bypassing TOR using SecComp

or AppArmor or SeatBelt or one of
these other sandboxing technologies.

We’re looking forward to trying to
get that rolled out. And we’re doing

exploit bounties! We’ll be
partnering with HackerOne,

who’ll be announcing this shortly. The
program will start out invite-only

and then… just, so we can get
used to the flow and scale up

and then we’ll make it public later in the
year to basically provide people with

incentive to review our code to look
for vulnerabilities that might be

specific to our applications. And of
course the usual usability improving,

security, improving installation. And we’d
like to improve the censorship and bridges

ability flow as well hoping to automate
the discovery of bridges and inform you

if your bridges become unreachable.
So TOR messenger

is one of our 2 chat clients, also
part of the Applications Team.

Basically, the goal there was to minimize
the amount of configuration that

the user had to do if they wanted to
use one of their existing chat clients

with TOR and OTR. Now this is based

on another Mozilla platform – Instantbird
which is based on Thunderbird.

This allows us to share a lot of the
TOR Browser configuration codes

for managing the TOR process and
configuring bridges. So the user has a

very similar configuration
experience to the browser

when they first start it up. It also has
some additional memory safety advantages

– all the protocol parsers are written
in Javascript. This basically…

one of the major things when we
were looking at candidates for

a messaging client was we wanted to avoid
the problems of libpurple in the past

where there’s been a lot of, like, remote
code execution vulnerabilities with

protocol parsing. Now there are some
trade-offs here, obviously, when you’re

dealing with a browser product. You
still have a html window rendering

the messages. But it is XSS filtered and
even if an XSS exploit were to get through

to run Javascript in your messaging
window that Javascript would still be

unprivileged. So they need an additional
browser-style exploit. And that filter has

been reviewed by Mozilla and additionally
we’re looking into removing Javascript

from that messaging window at all.
It should be completely possible to just

display a reduced, slightly less sexy
version of the same window at perhaps

another higher security level without
Javascript involved at all in that window.

So we will hand off to Jake now to
describe some of the security properties

and differences between TOR
messenger and Ricochet.

Jacob: Just to be clear about this: We
wanted to sort of echo what Phil Rogaway

has recently said. He wrote a really
wonderful paper quite recently about the

moral character of cryptographic work and
Phil Rogaway for those of you that don’t

know is one of the sort of like amazing
cryptographers, very humble, really

wonderful man who was really a little bit
sad that cryptographers and people

working on security software don’t take
the adversaries seriously. So they use

Alice and Bob, and Mallory and they have
cutie icons and they look very happy.

We wanted to make it clear what we thought
the adversary was. Which is definitely not

a cutie adversary. When anonymity fails
for Muslims that live in Pakistan, or e.g.

the guys that are giving a talk later
today, the CAGE guys, when anonymity fails

for them they get detained or they get
murdered or they end up in Guantanamo Bay

or other things like that. So it’s a
serious thing. And we wanted to talk about

what that looks like. So e.g. a lot of you
use jabber.ccc.de, I guess. Don’t raise

your hands. You should decentralize. Stop
using jabber.ccc.de because we should

decentralize. But that said if you do,
this is sort of what it looks like, right?

There’s the possibility for targeted
attacks when you connect. There’s the

possibility that the Social Graph e.g. of
your buddy list, that that would be on the

server. It would be possible that there’s
a bug on any Jabber server anywhere.

So of course you know that if you’re using
Gmail with Jabber, you know that they are

prison providers. So if you got a pretty
big problem there and the attacker, again,

is not a cutie attacker, it’s, you know,
I like the Grim Reaper, that fit that

Mike chose, if you like that’s accurate.
And now if you see one of the protections

you’ll have for communicating with your
peers is off-the-record messaging. That’s

basically the thing. But that’s a very
slap together protocol in a sense. Because

it’s hacks on top of hacks. Where you
know you compose TOR with Jabber and TLS

and maybe you still have a certificate
authority in there somewhere. Or maybe you

have a TOR Hidden Service but then your
status updates they don’t have any

encryption at all, for example. Or, again,
your roster is an actual thing that

someone can see, including every time you
send a message to those people the server

sees that. So, that said, TOR messenger is
really great because it meets users where

they already are. Right? So e.g. actually
one other point here is if you use a piece

of software like Adium, there is actually
a bug filed against Adium where someone

said “Please disable logging-by-default
because Chelsea Manning went to prison

because of your logging policy”. And the
people working on Adium in this bug report

basically said: “Good!” That’s horrifying!
Right? So what if we made it as reasonable

as possible, as configuration-free as
possible using TOR, using OTR, trying to

remove libpurple which is a whole like…
it’s a flock of Zerodays flying in

formation. Right? So we wanted to kill the
bird in a sense but also not we want to

help provide an incentive for improving.
And so that’s where TOR messenger fits.

But we also want to experiment with next
generation stuff. And one of those things

is written by a really great guy on our
community, almost single-handedly, without

any funding at all, and his name is
“special”, that’s actually his name. He’s

also special. But it’s really nice,
because actually, if you solve the problem

of telling your friend your name, if
you’re familiar with the properties of

Hidden Services where you have a self-
authenticating name you know that you’re

talking to the person that you think you
are because you’ve already done a key

exchange. The important part of the key
exchange. And so one of the things that

you’ll see very clearly is that there is
no more server. Right? So there’s no more

jabber.ccc.de in this picture. So this is
a really good example of how we might

decentralize, actually. It’s an experiment
right now but it means no more servers. It

uses the TOR network’s TOR Hidden Service
protocol and everybody actually becomes a

TOR Hidden Service for chatting with their
buddies. And it’s end-to-end encrypted and

it’s anonymized and of course this means
that your Social Graph is a traffic

analysis problem, it’s no longer a list on
a server. And it means your metadata is

as protected as we currently know how
to do in a low-latency anonymity network.

And in the future one of the really nice
things about this is that it will be

possible – or we think it will be
possible – to even make it better in a

sense, e.g. multiple chats, sending
files, sending pictures, in other words,

everything becomes, instead of a certainty
we move it towards probability. And the

probability is in your favour.

Mike: Yes, additionally, I’ll be working
on various forms of panning for cases like

this to basically increase this high…
the probability that there will be

concurrent traffic at the same time from
multiple TOR clients, which will further

frustrate the discovery of the Social
Graph based on simple traffic analysis

especially for low-traffic cases such as
Ricochet. So just to wrap up that

TOR Applications piece: in 2016 we’re
trying to focus heavily on usability and

gin more people to be able to use TOR,
omitting the barriers to finding TOR,

downloading TOR, being able especially
for censored users, and being able to

install TOR. There’s still some snags,
various difficulties that cause people to

stop at various stages of that process and
we want to try and work for to eliminate

them. We also, of course, want to increase
coordination: share graphics, visual

aesthetics and coordinate the ability to
share the TOR process. And we also want to

create a space for more experimentation,
for more things like Ricochet. There’s

probably a lot more ideas like Ricochet
out there. There could be leverages

of TOR protocol and especially Hidden
Services in creative ways. So we’re

looking to create an official sanctioned
space as part of TOR to give them a home.

And to look for that in the coming
months on the TOR blog.

Jacob: Alright, I just wanted to put in a
picture of a guy wearing a Slayer T-Shirt.

So there it is. That’s Trevor Paglen. Some
of you may remember him from such things

as helping to film Citizenfour, building
Satellites that burn up in space so that

are actually currently on other
satellites. And this on the left is

Leif Ryge, he’s sort of the person that
taught me how to use computers. And he is

an incredible Free Software developer.
Trevor Paglen and myself, and this is

a cube, the Autonomy Cube which we talked
about last year. Because we think that

culture is very important and we think
that it’s important to actually get people

to understand the struggle that exists
right now. So this is installed in a

museum right now in Germany, in the city
of Oldenburg, at the Edith-Russ-Haus. And

it actually opened several months ago,
it’s filled with classified documents, it

has really interesting things to go and
read. I highly encourage you to go and

read. We built a reading room about
anonymity papers, about things that are

happening. About how corporations track
you, and then the entire museum is an

Open-WiFi network that routs you
transparently through TOR. So in Germany

a free open WiFi network that isn’t run by
Freifunk – much respect to them – we

wanted to make it possible for you to just
go and have the ability to bootstrap

yourself anonymously if you needed to. And
also these four boards are Novena boards.

And these Novena boards are Free and Open
Hardware devices made by Bunnie and Sean

in Singapore where you could, if you
wanted to, download the schematics and

fab it yourself. And it’s running the
Debian GNU Linux universal operating

system. And it’s an actual TOR exit node
with absolutely every port allowed. So the

museum’s infrastructure itself on the
city’s internet connection actually is a

TOR exit node for the whole world to be
able to use the internet anonymously.

<i>applause</i>

But the museum’s infrastructure is not
just helping people in Oldenburg, it’s

helping people all around the world to be
able to communicate anonymously and it’s

quite amazing actually because when
cultural institutions stand up for this

we recognize it’s not just a problem of
over-there stand. We have mass-surveillance

and corporate surveillance in the West
and we need to deal with that. Here, by

creating spaces like this. But that said,
we also need to make sure that we create

spaces in people’s minds all around the
world. And I want to introduce to you

someone who’s incredibly awesome, the
most bad-ass radical librarian around,

this is Alison.
Alison is going to talk about…

Alison: …Library Freedom Project! Hi!
Thank you so much! I’m so excited

to be here, it’s my first CCC and I’m on
stage, and it’s very… exciting. So I’m

going to talk to you a little bit about my
organization, Library Freedom Project.

I’m the director and what we do: we have
a partnership with TOR project to do

community outreach around TOR and other
privacy-enhancing technologies. Making

TOR network more strong and making tools
like TOR Browser more ubiquitous and

mainstream, all with the help of a
coalition of radical militant librarians.

So we introduced you to the Library
Freedom Project back in February. We told

you a little bit about the kind of work
that we do, mostly in US libraries,

increasingly internationally. Where
essentially we teach them about tools like

TOR Browser, how to install it on their
local computers, how to teach it into

computer classes that they offer for free
in the library or one-on-one technology

sessions for their community. And we’ve
had a really amazing year since then.

In addition to working with the TOR
project we’re really fortunate to work

with the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU). If you’re not familiar with them,

they’re basically… they’re the bad asses
who’ve been suing the US Intelligence

Agencies and Police for about a 100 years.
That is me with 2 people from the ACLU

Massachusetts, Jessy Rossman who is a
surveillance law expert and Kay Croqueford

who is an activist for the ACLU. And
they’re here, if you see that human buy

them a drink and ask them about the
surveillance capabilities of the US Police.

<i>applause</i>

So, it’s really cool! It’s a great
partnership with the ACLU because

basically they can teach why we need to
use tools like TOR Browser. So how to use

them is super-super important but you need
to know about the authorizations, the

programs, all the bad laws and the uses of
them against ordinary people. So, why do

we teach this stuff to librarians? It’s
basically for 2 big reasons. One of them

is that libraries and librarians have an
amazing history of activism around

privacy, fighting surveillance and
fighting censorship in the US where

I live. Librarians were some of the
staunchest opponents of the USA Patriot

Act from the beginning when it was
codified back in 2002. They made T-Shirts

that said “Another hysterical librarian
for Privacy” because of the…

The Attorney General at the time called
them “hysterical” for the fact that they

didn’t want this awful authorization to go
through. And of course then after Snowden

we learned many more things about just
how bad the Patriot Act was. So librarians

were some of the first people to oppose
that. They also have fought back against

National Security Letters which are the US
Government informational requests that

sometimes go to software providers and
other internet services. They have an

attached gag order that basically says:
“You have to give this information about

your users and you can’t tell anyone that
you got it.” Well, libraries got one of

these and fought back against that in one.
<i>applause</i>

They also, all the way back in the 1950s
even, at the height of Anti-Communist

Fervor and FUD, around the time of the
House on American Activities Committee,

librarians came out with this amazing
statement, called the “Freedom to Read”

Statement that I think really is a
beautiful text. It’s about 2 pages long

and it is their commitment to privacy and
democratic ideals made manifest.

And I have a little excerpt from it here.
I’m not gonna read the whole thing to you

’cause I understand I’m all too
pressed for time. But the last line is

my favourite. It says: “Freedom itself is
a dangerous way of life. But it is ours.”

So everybody go and get that tattooed!
You know, on your forehead or whatever.

<i>applause</i>

So, the history of activism is one of the
big things. There’s a second part that

is more practical. Libraries have an
amazing relationship to the local

communities. That doesn’t really exist
anywhere else especially in this era of

privatization and the destruction of
public commons. Libraries have already

free computer classes in many places,
sometimes the only free computer help that

you can get anywhere. They offer free
computer terminals to many people who

don’t have any other computer access.
They’re trusted community spaces, they

already teach about a whole number of
things. So we think they’re really the

ideal location for people to learn about
things like TOR Browser. So it’s been

going really well. This year we have
visited hundreds of different locations.

We’ve trained about 2300 librarians in the
US, in Canada and a few other countries,

Australia, UK and Ireland. We held an
amazing conference, you might recognize

this as Noisebridge. Any Noisebridge fans
here? I hope so. Come on, there’s got to

be more Noisebridge fans than that!
Christ! We had an amazing conference in

Noisebridge and actually my co-organizer
is also here, April Glaser, so you can buy

her a drink, she’s right over there. There
has been a huge response from the library

community. They wanna learn about TOR
Browser, they’re so excited that finally

there’s a practical way for them to help
protect their patrons’ privacy. They’ve

cared about this stuff from an ideological
and ethical standpoint for a really long

time, and now they know that there are
tools that they can actually use and

implement in their libraries and teach to
their community to help them take back

their privacy. We’re really lucky that not
only do we get to teach librarians but

occasionally we get invited to visit
the local communities themselves.

So, here we teach how to teach privacy
classes with TOR as a big focus.

But sometimes we get to meet the local
community members themselves. So I want to

show you this picture of a recent visit
that I made to Yonkers, New York. It was

a class just for teens. They’re all
holding TOR stickers if you can see that

and Library Freedom Project stickers.
This is a great picture that sort of is

emblematic of the kind of communities
that we get to visit. Yonkers is one of

the poorest cities in the US. These kids
are… many of them are immigrants, their

parents are immigrants, they face
surveillance and state violence as a

matter of their regular everyday lives.
For them privacy is not just a human

right but it’s sometimes a matter of life
and death. And these kids are just some

of the amazing people that we get to see.
Also, just to give you an idea of how the

public perception around privacy is
shifting in my anecdotal experience:

we had 65 teenagers come to this class!
If you have a teenager or if you’ve been

a teenager you know teenagers don’t show
up for stuff, they don’t do that. 65 kids

came to this! And they were so excited!
This was just the group that was left over

at the end that had so many questions and
wanted more stickers to bring back to

their friends. So it’s pretty cool stuff.
Recently we embarked on a new project

bringing TOR relays into libraries. This
is Nima Fatemi with me, when we set up

our pilot at a library in New Hampshire
which is the state just above where I live

in the United States. And we basically
decided to do this project because we

thought it was a really great continuation
of the work that we were already doing,

teaching and training librarians around
using TOR. We wanted to take a step

further and take the infrastructure that
libraries already have; many of them are

moving to really fast internet, they can
donate an IP address and some bandwidth.

And they… many of them want to do kind
of the next thing to help protect privacy

and not just in their local communities,
as well. They want to help protect

internet freedom everywhere. So we thought
it was a really great sort of next step to

go. So we set up our pilot project in New
Hampshire. It went pretty well, we got a

lot of great press attention, a lot of
really great local and global community

support. We also got the attention of
the Department of Homeland Security.

<i>applause</i>

Basically they contacted the local Police
in this town in New Hampshire and they

said: “You know, this is stupid, and bad,
and criminal and you should shut this

down!” And the library was understandably
shaken by this and temporarily suspended

the operation of the relay. So we
responded by writing a letter, an open

letter from Library Freedom Project, from
TOR project, from ACLU and a broad

coalition of public interest groups and
luminary individuals including the

Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), the
Freedom of the Press Foundation, the Free

Software Foundation and all of our other
friends many of whom are in this audience

today. We wrote this letter to the library
basically affirming our commitment to

them, how much we are proud of them for
participating in this project and how much

we wanted them to continue. We put a lot
of nice, you know, ideological, why this

is important, warm fuzzy stuff. We also
got EFF to start a petition for us and

over a weekend we got about 4500
signatures from all over the world, the

library was flooded with emails, calls.
Only one negative one. Just one out of

hundreds. And that person was a little
confused, so I’m not even counting that

necessarily. It was like a conspiracy type thing.
So we got this amazing support and this

was all in anticipation of their board
meeting that was gonna happen a few days

later where the board was gonna decide
what to do about the relay. So Nima and I

show up to New Hampshire on a Tuesday
Night and you might imagine what a library

board meeting in rural New Hampshire is
typically like. It was nothing like that.

So we get outside and there’s a protest
happening already. Many people holding

Pro-TOR signs. This was just a glimpse of
it. And the look on my face is because

someone pointed to a very small child and
said: “Alison, look at that child over

there”. This tiny little girl was holding
a sign that said “Dammit Big Brother” and

I was like “I’m done, that’s it, I got to
go home!” So we went into the board

meeting and we were met with about 4 dozen
people and media and a huge amount of

support. Many of the community members
expressed how much they loved TOR, that

this whole incident made them download TOR
and check it out for themselves. Basically

it galvanized this community into a
greater level of support than we even had

when we initially set it up about a month
earlier. People who had no idea that the

library was doing this heard about it
because it got a huge amount of media

attention thanks to a story by Julia
Angwin in ProPublica that broke the news

to everybody and then it just went like
wildfire. So as you might imagine the

relay went back online that night. We were
super-successful. Everybody in the

community was incredibly excited about it
and supportive. And what has happened now

is that this community has sort of… like
I said they’ve been galvanized to support

TOR even more. The library has now allowed
at some of their staff time and travel

budget to help other libraries in the area
set up TOR relays. They’re speaking about

TOR…
<i>applause</i>

Thank you!
They’re speaking about TOR at conferences.

And this has really caught on in the
greater library community as well. So I

mentioned already the kind of success that
we’ve had at Library Freedom Project in

teaching tools like TOR Browser and
getting folks to bring us in for trainings.

This is even bigger than that! Libraries
are now organizing their, you know, staff

training days around, you know, “Should we
participate in the TOR relay project?” or

“How can we do this best?”, “What’s the
best angle for us?” So we’re really

excited to do announce that we’re gonna
be continuing the relay project at scale.

Nima Fatemi, who is now also in this
picture again, I’m really sad that he

can’t be here, he is wonderful and
essential to this project. But he will now

be able to travel across the US and we
hope to go a little further opening up

more relays in libraries. We’re gonna
continue teaching, of course, about TOR

Browser and other privacy-enhancing Free
Software. We’re now gonna incorporate some

other TOR services, so we’re really
excited to bring “Let’s Encrypt” into

libraries. And while we’re there, why not
run a Hidden Service on the library’s web

server. Among many other things. The other
goals for Library Freedom Project: to take

this to a much more international level.
So if you want to do this in your country,

you know your librarian, put them in touch
with us. You can follow our progress on

LibraryFreedomProject.org or
@libraryfreedom on Twidder. And we’re

always sort of posting on Tor Blog about
stuff that’s going on with us, so…

Thank you so much for letting me tell you
about it. It’s really a pleasure to be

here!
<i>applause</i>

Jacob: So, that’s a really tough act to
follow! But we’re very pressed for time

now. And we want to make sure that we can
tell you two big things. And one of them

is that, as you know, we were looking for
an Executive Director because our Spirit

Animal, Roger,…
Roger: Slide…

Jacob: Right… He couldn’t do it all. And
in fact we needed someone to help us. And

we needed someone to help us who has the
respect not only of the community here but

the community, basically, all around the
world. And we couldn’t think of a better

person, in fact, when we came up with a
list of people. The person that we ended

up with was the Dream Candidate for a
number of the people in the TOR Project

and around the world. And so, I mean, I
have to say that I’m so excited, I’m so

excited that we have her as our Executive
Director. I used to think that our ship

was going to sink, that we would all go to
prison, and that may still happen, the

second part. But the first part, for sure,
is not going to happen. We found someone

who I believe will keep the TOR Project
going long after all of us are dead and

buried. Hopefully, not in shallow graves.
So, this is Shari Steele!

<i>applause</i>

Shari: Hi!
<i>applause</i>

Thanks! Thanks, it’s actually so fun to be
back in this community. And I wasn’t gone

for very long. I had so much for
retirement. It didn’t work out for me.

But, that’s OK, I’m really excited. I have
had – we’re so tight on time – so I want

to just tell you there are 2 big mandates
that I was given when I first was hired.

And one is: Help build a great
infrastructure so that TOR Project is

sustainable. Working on that! The other
thing is: Money! We need to diversify our

funding sources, as everybody knows here.
The Government funding has been really

difficult for us specifically because it’s
all restricted. And so it limits the kinds

of things we want to do. When you get the
developers in a room blue-skying about the

things that they want to do, it’s
incredible! Really, really brilliant

people who want to do great things but
they’re really limited when the funding

says they have to do particular things. So
we happen to be doing our very first ever

crowd funding campaign right now. I want
to give a shout out to Katina Bishop who

is here somewhere and who is running
the campaign for us and is just doing an

amazing job. As of last count which is a
couple of days ago, we had over 3000

individual donors and over 120.000 Dollars
which is incredible for our very first

time when we didn’t even really have a
mechanism in place to be collecting this

money, even. So, it’s really great! And I
wanna also say we have a limited number

of these T-Shirts that I brought in a
suitcase from Seattle. So, and they’re

gonna be available, if you come down to
the Wau Holland booth at the Noisy Square.

Come talk with us! Give a donation!
We’re doing a special: it’s normally a

100 Dollar donation to get a shirt, but
for the conference we’ll do, for 60 Euro

you can get a shirt and it would be great
you’d be able to show your support. And

you can also donate online if you don’t
wanna do that here. That’s the URL. And

to end, we’d like to have a
word from Down Under!

<i>Video starts</i>

<i>Video Intro Violin Music</i>

Good Day to you! Fellow Members of the
Intergalactic Resistance against Dystopian

bastardry! It is I, George Orwell, with an
urgent message from Planet Earth, as it

embarks on a new orbit. Transmitting via
the Juice Channeling Portal. Our time is

short. So let’s get straight to the point.
Shall we? This transmission goes out to

all you internet citizens. Denizens of
the one remaining free frequency. In whose

hands rests the fate of humanity.
Lord… f_ckin’ help us!

<i>typewriter typing sounds</i>

When I last appeared to you, I warned you
noobs: You must not lose the Internet! Now

before I proceed, let us clarify one
crucial thing. The Internet is not Virtual

Reality, it is actual Reality.
<i>typewriter typing sounds</i>

Are you still with me? Good. Now ask
yourselves: Would you let some fascist

dictate with whom you can and cannot
communicate? Because that’s what happens

every time a government blacklists a
website domain. Would you let anyone force

you to get all your information from cable
TV? That’s effectively the case if you

allow corporations to kill Net Neutrality.
<i>typewriter typing sounds</i>

Would you let the Thought Police install
telescreens in your house, monitor and

record everything you do, every time you
move, every word you’ve read, to peer into

the most private nook of all, your head?
BECAUSE THAT’S WHAT HAPPENS when

you let your governments monitor the net
and enact mandatory data-retention laws!

<i>smashing sounds</i>

If you answered “No” to all those
questions, then we can safely deduce

that terms like “Online”, “IRL” and “in
Cyberspace” are Newspeak. They confuse the

truth: There is no “Cybersphere”. There
is only life. Here. It follows that if you

have an oppressive Internet, you have
an oppressive society, too. Remember:

online is real life…
<i>typewriter typing sounds</i>

Your Digital Rights are no different from
everyday human rights! And don’t give me

that BS that you don’t care about
Privacy because you have nothing to hide.

That’s pure Doublethink. As comrade
Snowden clearly explained, that’s like

saying you don’t care about Free Speech
because you have nothing to say!

Stick that up your memory
holes and smoke it, noobs!

Pigs Arse, the portal is closing, I’m
losing you! I’ll leave you with a new tool

to use. I assume you’ve all been fitted
with one of these spying devices. Well,

here’s an app you can use in spite of
this. It’s called Signal, and, yes, it’s

free and simple. Install it and tell all
your contacts to mingle then all your

calls and texts will be encrypted. So even
if Big Brother sees them the c_nt won’t be

able to read them. Hahaa! Now that’s
a smartphone! Our time is up!

<i>typewriter typing sounds</i>
Until the next transmission. Heed the

words of George Orwell. Or
should I say: George TORwell?

<i>typewriter typing sounds</i>

Remember, just as I went to Spain to fight
the dirty fascists you can come to Onion

land and fight Big Brother’s filthy
tactics. If you’re a Pro run a node and

strengthen the code. Or if you’re in the
Outer Party and can afford it, send TOR

some of your dough. Special Salute to
all my comrades, the “State of the Onion”.

Happy Hacking! Now go forth and
f_ck up Big Brother. That mendacious

motherf_cking, c_ck-sucking bastard
son of a corporatist b_tch…

<i>Video Outro Music</i>

<i>applause</i>

Jacob: So, I think that’s all the time
that we have. Thank you very much for

coming. And thank you all
for your material support.

<i>applause</i>

Herald: Unfortunately we won’t have time
for a Q&A. But I heard that some of the

crew will now go to the Wau Holland booth
at Noisy Square down in the Foyer and

might be ready to answer
questions there. If you have any.

<i>postroll music</i>

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