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35. Contracts: Reliance Damages

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    >> As we discussed in the module on
    expectation damages, expectation,
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    the benefit of the bargain,
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    is the preferred measure of
    damages in contract cases.
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    But there are occasions
    where it cannot be used.
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    In such cases, an alternative
    measure of damages can be used.
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    One such alternative is called
    the reliance measure of damages.
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    Whereas the goal of
    expectation damages is to put
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    the non-breaching party in
    the position she would've
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    been in if the contract
    had been performed,
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    the goal of reliance damages
    is to put her in the position
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    she occupied prior to
    entering into the contract.
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    A legal economist would describe
    the goal of reliance damages
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    as being to restore the injured
    party to the status quo ante.
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    Whereas expectation damages seek to give
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    the non-breaching party the
    benefit of her bargain,
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    reliance damages seek to ensure
    that the non-breaching party is
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    economically no worse off than she
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    would have been had she never
    entered into the contract.
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    Reliance damages do this by
    compensating the non-breaching party
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    for losses suffered because she relied
    on the breaching party's promises,
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    thereby protecting her reliance interest.
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    Basically, reliance damages
    award the non-breaching party
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    her out-of-pocket expenses that
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    resulted from the contracts
    having been breached.
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    Although this measure of damages
    is called reliance damages and
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    although it seeks to protect a
    non-breaching party's reliance interest,
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    reliance damages should not be confused
    with the cause of action based
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    on Section 90 and often called detrimental
    reliance or promissory estoppel.
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    There is no necessary connection between
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    the reliance cause of action and
    the reliance measure of damages.
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    At the time the first
    restatement was being drafted,
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    Williston was asked
    whether an action under
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    Section 90 was limited to
    recovery of reliance damages,
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    and he famously replied no.
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    He argued that reliance under
    Section 90 was a substitute
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    for consideration under
    classical contract doctrine,
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    and thus all contract remedies,
    including expectation damages,
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    should be available to a
    party who successfully
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    claim detrimental reliance
    under Section 90.
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    It's worth noting that Section
    90 is organized with a group of
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    restatement sections under the topic
    heading contracts without consideration.
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    In other words, conceptually,
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    the restatement views a
    successful Section 90 claim
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    as establishing a contract
    between the parties.
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    Following Williston's
    logic under Section 90,
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    a party can recover either
    expectation or reliance damages.
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    Furthermore, reliance damages are often
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    claimed under a traditional
    contract cause of action in
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    situations where the plaintiff
    cannot prove she had
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    lost profits and so cannot
    recover expectation damages.
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    Given that a party can recover under
    either expectation or reliance damages,
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    but not both, it is important
    that a party's attorney
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    calculate the amount recoverable
    under each measure of damages.
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    Typically, the amount of damages recoverable
    under the expectation measure is
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    greater than the amount of damages
    under reliance because typically,
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    expectation damages include
    both lost profits and
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    out-of-pocket costs while reliance
    damages don't include lost profits.
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    But again, if recovery of lost profits
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    is impossible to prove or too speculative,
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    the reliance measure of damages may be
    more favorable for the injured party.
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    Second Restatement Section 349
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    sets out the formula for
    determining reliance damages.
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    Costs made in preparation for performance
    or in performance of the contract,
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    less any loss the breaching
    party can prove with
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    reasonable certainty
    the injured party would
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    have suffered if the
    contract had been performed.
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    Because the focus is on the expenditures
    made by the non-breaching party,
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    some courts will say that
    the reliance measure of
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    damages is determined by the injured
    party's out-of-pocket costs.
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    Pop's Cones v. Resorts in the case book is
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    an example of a party
    seeking reliance damages.
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    Recall in that case,
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    Resorts kept assuring Pop's
    Cones that they would
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    sign a contract leasing Pop's
    retail space in the casino.
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    At Resorts urging,
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    Pop's did not renew his current lease,
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    but rather put all of his
    equipment into storage
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    in anticipation of
    reopening in the casino.
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    When Resorts pulled out of
    the deal at the last moment,
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    Pop's brought suit under Section 90.
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    In that suit, the court
    tells us Pop's did not
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    seek specific performance
    of the lease with Resorts.
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    Why would I want to continue
    in a relationship with
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    such a two-phase business partner?
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    Anyway, it also did not seek what the
    court called speculative lost profits.
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    If the lost profits had
    not been speculative,
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    Pop's could have sought to recover
    them under expectation damages.
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    Instead, Pop's sought to recover
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    only its reliance damages,
    including storage costs,
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    costs of retaining an attorney to
    negotiate the lease, moving expenses,
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    and the difference between
    what it was paying for
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    its original lease and
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    the higher amount that it had
    to pay under the new lease.
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    It is worth noting that it's unclear why
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    Pop's Cones did not seek
    expectation damages,
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    given that the new tenant to
    which Resorts rented the space in
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    this casino was also a TCBY yogurt shop,
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    proving lost profits may have
    been relatively simple by
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    subpoenaing the new tenants
    profit and loss records.
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    Let's return to the last part of
    Section 349 under reliance damages.
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    The injured party recovers
    its expenditures minus
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    any loss the injured party would have
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    suffered if the contract
    had been performed.
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    In a sense, this clause creates
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    an affirmative defense
    for the breaching party.
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    If the breaching party can prove
    with reasonable certainty that
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    the contract was a loser for the
    non-breaching party, that is,
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    the injured party would have
    lost money on the deal,
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    the amount of that loss
    will be subtracted from
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    any damages based on the injured
    party's out-of-pocket costs.
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    Why is that? Courts hate to
    award windfalls in contract law.
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    Even under expectation damages,
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    the injured party is
    entitled only to be put in
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    as good a position as it would've been
    and if the contract had been performed.
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    The injured party is not entitled
    to be put in a better position.
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    If the contract proved to be a
    losing deal for the injured party,
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    he would not have recovered
    all of his costs.
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    That's what it means to
    have a losing contract.
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    If the injured party
    would not have recovered
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    all his costs had the
    contract been performed,
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    he should not be entitled to recover
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    those costs when the contract
    is breached by the other party.
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    To allow such a recovery would put him in
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    a better position than if the
    contract had been performed.
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    In other words, it would give them
    a windfall. Here's an example.
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    Suppose a builder enters into a contract
    to construct a road for $100,000.
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    The builder estimated that it would
    cost $90,000 to build the road,
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    so it anticipated earning
    10,000 in profit.
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    But the land where the road was to be
    built was more swampy than expected,
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    requiring more filtered than anticipated.
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    To keep things simple, let's assume
    the builder cannot invoke any of
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    the excuse doctrines such as a
    mistake to rescind the contract.
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    In fact, it cost the builder
    $105,000 to build the road.
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    Now assume the other party breaches
    the contract by refusing to pay.
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    Under the expectation measure of damages,
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    the builder would only be entitled
    to the contract price or $100,000.
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    Because that would not cover his costs,
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    the builder might try instead to
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    recover under the reliance
    measure of damages.
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    If reliance damages only took account of
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    the injured party's costs and
    awarded the builder $105,000,
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    he would be better off than if the
    breaching party had actually perform
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    the contract and the builder had
    received the contract price of $100,000.
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    This would give them a windfall,
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    which contract law abhors.
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    To avoid the windfall,
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    the breaching party is entitled to
    prove that the contract was a loser.
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    If that is proven, the court will
    subtract the builder's loss, $5,000,
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    from its costs, $105,000,
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    and awarded only $100,000.
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    Note that this amount does
    not put the builder back in
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    the position it was in before
    it entered in the contract.
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    To do that, a court would have
    had to give the builder $105,000.
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    Courts justify limiting
    reliance damages to costs
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    minus loss by saying that the $5,000
    loss was not caused by the breach.
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    Rather it was caused by the
    builder's own miscalculations.
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    In this hypothetical, the
    builder's recovery would be the
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    same under either expectation
    or reliance damages,
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    but that's not always the case.
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    Let's consider another hypo
    to show the difference.
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    Pop Kings, a band that has
    been around for five years,
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    decides it's time for
    them to go on the road.
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    They hire a manager, Slick,
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    to arrange concert dates for them.
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    Under the management contract,
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    the band advances the
    manager $10,000 to put down
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    payments on performance spaces during
    the tour and to make hotel reservations.
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    They also spend $2,000 on publicity
    materials such as posters and advertising.
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    A week before the tours to begin,
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    Slick is arrested for selling
    drugs and the band discovers that
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    he used their $10,000 to buy
    illegal drugs for resale.
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    In fact, Slick failed to arrange
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    any concert dates and it's
    too late to do so now.
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    Assume Slick has substantial assets
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    and the band sues him
    for breach of contract.
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    If the band could prove that
    they would have earned $30,000
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    in profits from the concert tour
    after all expenses were paid,
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    including the $10,000 advance
    and the $2,000 in advertising,
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    they would recover $42,000 under
    the expectation measure of damages.
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    That's what it would take to put them
    in the position they would've been in,
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    had Slick fully performed the contract.
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    Another way to say this is that
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    $42,000 represents the loss
    in value of the contract.
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    That is the amount that would have covered
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    the bands expenses plus
    pay them their profit.
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    However, if they cannot prove lost
    profits with reasonable certainty,
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    they could fall back on the
    reliance measure of damages,
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    which would allow the band to recover
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    their out-of-pocket expenses or $12,000,
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    the $10,000 advance and the
    $2,000 they paid in advertising.
Title:
35. Contracts: Reliance Damages
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
10:20

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