9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:01.729,0:00:06.069[br]elena rostrum was a political scientist[br]but she won the two thousand nine nobel 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:06.069,0:00:08.040[br]prize in economics 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:08.040,0:00:12.199[br]we were very sorry to hear for passing[br]in the summer of two thousand twelve 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:12.199,0:00:16.439[br]she had visited george mason university[br]numerous times and she was an extremely 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:16.439,0:00:18.090[br]gracious person 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:18.090,0:00:23.400[br]but if her career she spent that indiana[br]university 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:23.400,0:00:27.079[br]her work starts by addressing a[br]well-known economic problem called 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:27.079,0:00:28.910[br]tragedy of the commons 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:28.910,0:00:33.190[br]when a common pool resources generally[br]owned or available for use to an entire 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:33.190,0:00:34.310[br]community 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:34.310,0:00:37.870[br]it's a problem that individuals overuse[br]that resource 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:37.870,0:00:42.050[br]they may pull out too many fish from[br]lake they may come too many dear they 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:42.050,0:00:45.940[br]may pump to much wider head of the[br]ground and in all these cases there is a 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:45.940,0:00:48.820[br]potential institutional failure 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:48.820,0:00:51.650[br]the general problem is a lack of[br]property rights 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:51.650,0:00:55.270[br]so if there's some water under the[br]ground in the form of an ac refer and no 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:55.270,0:00:59.270[br]one knows that water you as a user know[br]that if you pull that water out of the 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:00:59.270,0:01:03.280[br]gramm dwell you're not taking it away[br]from your own property at all so you 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:03.280,0:01:08.560[br]might as well use as much as you can as[br]quickly as possible 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:08.560,0:01:12.640[br]on stansky insight as to point out that[br]very often these tragedy of the commons 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:12.640,0:01:14.580[br]problems can be solved 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:14.580,0:01:18.340[br]and especially they can be solved by[br]small groups and they can be solved by 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:18.340,0:01:22.510[br]informal norms even one formal property[br]rights are absent 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:22.510,0:01:25.960[br]hoster has laid out some of the[br]techniques used solve these common pool 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:25.960,0:01:30.050[br]problems and three of these are as[br]follows 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:30.050,0:01:34.690[br]small groups can use clearly defined[br]boundaries and exclude external parties 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:34.690,0:01:37.800[br]from drawing upon the resource 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:37.800,0:01:42.080[br]small groups can have rules regarding[br]how to appropriate the resource and how 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:42.080,0:01:45.500[br]to adopt that appropriation to local[br]conditions 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:45.500,0:01:49.630[br]third there can be within the small[br]groups collective choice arrangements 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:49.630,0:01:53.850[br]that allow most resource appropriators[br]to participate in the decision making 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:53.850,0:01:55.380[br]process 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:55.380,0:01:59.070[br]another words they're kind of informal[br]governance can arise and you can think 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:01:59.070,0:02:05.330[br]of austen's work as really being about[br]the power of the local 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:05.330,0:02:09.329[br]some further principles for governing[br]common pool resources are 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:09.329,0:02:12.769[br]effective monitoring by monitors who are[br]accountable to the resource 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:12.769,0:02:14.649[br]appropriators 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:14.649,0:02:18.889[br]the scale of graduated sanctions for[br]resource appropriators who violate 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:18.889,0:02:22.680[br]community rules and mechanisms of[br]conflict resolution 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:22.680,0:02:25.239[br]that are cheap and easy to access 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:25.239,0:02:30.319[br]all of these institutions can help[br]prevent overuse apartment for resource 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:30.319,0:02:32.820[br]an ostrich has shown this both[br]theoretically 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:32.820,0:02:37.290[br]and with a lot of empirical case studies 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:37.290,0:02:41.120[br]posthumous studied a great number of[br]common resource pool problems 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:41.120,0:02:44.870[br]but some of her most important work[br]often with carter and his comment made 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:44.870,0:02:45.759[br]by our 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:45.759,0:02:49.019[br]in particular there she studied former[br]your addition 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:49.019,0:02:53.260[br]hinder cooper's gather data on a large[br]number of local former irrigation 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:53.260,0:02:54.569[br]project 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:54.569,0:02:58.359[br]they found that overall the local[br]project for a better able to build 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:02:58.359,0:03:01.649[br]maintain and use the irrigation system 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:01.649,0:03:04.829[br]the times when a distant or large[br]bureaucracy would come in 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:04.829,0:03:09.299[br]and impose some kind of external rule on[br]the irrigation in those cases then the 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:09.299,0:03:14.309[br]local norms would weaken and generally[br]agricultural productivity would fall 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:14.309,0:03:18.299[br]after mentor co-workers showed that in[br]the cases where the former irrigation 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:18.299,0:03:19.389[br]systems 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:19.389,0:03:21.369[br]were successful at the local level 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:21.369,0:03:25.399[br]they were based on exactly the kinds of[br]informal norms which your theory had 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:25.399,0:03:28.939[br]helped us analyze 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:28.939,0:03:32.339[br]for people who work on local[br]environmental economics in particular 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:32.339,0:03:36.879[br]local public goods such a fisheries are[br]mountain commons are raising our water 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:36.879,0:03:38.109[br]aquifers 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:38.109,0:03:42.499[br]the work of illinois off term is a[br]fundamental starting point for analysis 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:42.499,0:03:46.559[br]if you'd like to follow up on our work[br]you can just google her name or enter 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 0:03:46.559,0:03:48.849[br]into scholar dot google dot com 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000